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The real bottom line, after you get through
assembling all these different financial
services and instruments, is still people's
lives-- how all of this is affecting them,
whether it just means providing those who
have been forgotten or cast aside by society
with a decent, affordable well-managed place
they call home, or whether it even goes
further than that in terms of the kind of
empowerment that you're creating.
Daniel Leibsohn, Urban Land
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PREFACE
My four-year long interest in Zimbabwe started on an
innocuous afternoon in 1983 at the Harvard Law School where a
speech was being delivered by the Prime Minister of a recently
independent Southern African state. He spoke candidly of the
difficulties in making the political transition from an apartheid
state to a socialist but reconciliatory style of state rule.
While optimistic, his tone betrayed an apprehension, knowing that
the path between socialism and economic pragmatism is often
wrought with contradiction and conflict.
I visited Zimbabwe a year later in response to an invitation
from a colleague at the Ministry of Public Construction and
National Housing. As such, my first view of the housing issue
was through the eyes of the government. The ministry officials
were refreshingly candid about what they hoped to achieve through
their housing program and the implementation problems they have
encountered so far. They had been struggling for the past three
years to define a housing policy which had not hitherto existed.
It was a formidable task for the new government who felt the need
to provide a basic need to the majority of its population who
have been deprived of the right to live in urban areas prior to
independence.
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In the design of low-income housing projects, the government
did not perceive either standards or land as an issue. The
problem was how to mobilize the resources necessary to finance
its ambitious housing program, given competing development
objectives. At the other end of the housing market, the building
societies were suffering from a decline in their traditional
upper-income clientele as well as from regulatory reforms which
reduced their deposit base. These two factors, backdropped
against a fluid housing program, set the stage for the initial
phase of the inquiry. There was a third factor, operating in the
broader realm of development thinking, that affected the train of
events in Zimbabwe. This was the trend towards private-public
partnerships in housing, in general, and in housing finance, in
particular.
At the time of my visit, the building societies-- taking
advantage of the shortfall in public resources for housing --were
in the process of negotiating for a more favorable tax rate as a
guid pro quo for direct participation in the funding of low-
income housing projects. It was a desperate move on the part of
the societies, and a controversial one for the government. It
reflected the fundamental conflict ingrained in pragmatic strains
of socialism found in many developing countries. Newspapers
headlined alleged histories of racial discrimination by the
building societies while ministers debated the possibility of
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creating a National Housing Corporation to administer all aspects
of the housing program, including finance.
One factor, however, supported the building society
movement. Their proposal to participate in the financing of
housing occurred at a time of growing international interest in
public-private partnerships in housing. The fluid state of
housing policy in Zimbabwe was conducive to experimental housing
projects which sought to bring standards within affordable reach
of low-income families through variations in the long-term
mortgage. Through a series of independent events, a building
society became engaged to provide a graduate payment mortgage to
low-income participants of two pilot schemes even prior to the
conclusion of an agreement between the government and building
societies on financial reform.
My first visit to Zimbabwe left me with several impressions
on the housing issue. First, in spite of its acceptance of the
"aided self-help" method, the government retained control of the
housing delivery process through the project vehicle. Secondly,
the housing problem was defined in terms of the need for finance
by both the government, the building societies, and international
lending agencies. Finance became a multi-faceted problem. For the
government, it was a problem of financing competing development
objectives; for the lending agencies, it was a problem of
ensuring that projects reached lower-income households; for
building societies, it was an issue of maintaining financial
viability; and for low-income household, it was a question of
affordability. As I visited several projects, each was explained
to me in terms of how its financial mechanism and institutional
arrangement rectified the shortcomings of other projects
preceding or following it. The focus was undoubtedly on finance.
Back at MIT, the issue of finance was turned around when my
Ph.D. Committee posed the question of whether there was, in fact,
a need for mortgage finance. Although implementing and financing
agencies had assumed finance to be the critical bottleneck to
construction, it was never really proven that this was the case.
If it could be shown that finance was a major constraint, then
technical innovations to improve the current performance of the
projects are warranted. However, if this did not prove to be the
case, what other types of interventions should project designers
be looking at?
I could not answer this pivotal question based solely on
project documents and interviews with ministry and lending agency
officials. There was a need for a second and longer visit to
Zimbabwe to understand the housing process from the perspective
of the project participants themselves. To answer the question
posed by the committee of whether a real need for finance
existed, it was necessary to study how poor families constructed
their homes in the absence of formal finance. In other countries,
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this issue is best explored within the context of informal
settlements. However, with its highly regulated land market,
Zimbabwe did not have a quasi-legal land market or popular
subdivisions. The government's vigorous anti-squatter policy, a
continuation of colonial practice, has so far been able to
successfully contain the mushrooming of squatter settlements.
Fortunately, the family I lived with was able to assist me
in "discovering" an alternative but similar socio-economic
system. My friend introduced me to her aunt who lived in St.
Mary's Township, originally a relocation area for squatters
displaced from the adjacent banks of the Hunyani River. Her aunt,
a well-known community figure, traditional healer and
entrepreneur, narrated to me how she and her son
themselves to save on construction costs;how she
and earnings from hawking to finance the initial
designed and erected twelve lodging rooms on her
serviced stand; and how these earnings were used
the house and capitalize the tuckshop she opened
stand. She also buys vegetables wholesale to sell
gate of her property. Part of her income goes to
savings group whose members I was introduced to.
gradually became acquainted with various aspects
built their home
used her savings
unit; how she
300 sq.m.
to consolidate
on the same
retail at the
her informal
In this way I
of life in St.
Mary's, and comfortable enough to interview families on socio-
economic situation and housing history.
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When not interviewing, I did a literature search of existing
studies on informal housing and finance in Zimbabwe. There is
very little written. This was not altogether surprising given the
country's recent colonial history. While the university setting
was very useful for guidance and feedback, I found the local
consulting firm associated with one of the projects highly
defensive when questioned about their original data in spite of
official clearance from the agencies concerned.
The impressions I had formed from my first visit were
enriched by in-depth interviews with families living within the
projects. Employing the case study approach, I learned about the
housing process and the socio-economic background of each family,
its history of accommodation, and housing preferences.
In the course of analyzing the data, however, there appeared
to be several analytical gaps which could not be explained using
solely the financing construct. For instance, the question of
costs, i.e. the tangible and intangible price of building a 4-
room core within 18-months, was never addressed. The focus was on
how to pay for housing, and not whether the cost of housing was
within the means of households, or even whether the housing
solution offered was responsive to the needs of families. Would
families apply for a loan in the absence of these program
constraints, or are they being forced to take out the mortgage
because of the need to comply with the 4-room within 18-months
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requirement? The case studies indicated that families were
generally reluctant to take out the loans, but in the absence of
an alternative source of financing, such as a well developed
informal finance market, they had little choice but to do so.
In contrast, families residing in St. Mary's Township were able
to consolidate their homes in the absence of mortgage finance as
well as programmatic constraints, casting doubt on the necessity
of long-term credit.
Meanwhile, in spite of the variety in financial innovations
and increasing sophistication of institutional arrangements, the
same implementation problems repeated themselves from one project
to the next. Moreover, while local authorities as well as a
couple of building societies had little choice but to participate
in the projects, the interviews suggested that they assumed their
new roles reluctantly, unsure of what to expect from each other.
Although the pieces to the puzzle fell into place during the
writing period at Cambridge, the process really started in a
bumpy bus ride back to Harare when my astute research assistant,
raising his hands in frustration after having interviewed several
families disgruntled with the mortgage program, asked point
blank, "Should government be at all in the business of delivering
houses?". In the context of aided self-help projects, the
question really meant, should the government restrict the housing
process to the project context? My Ph.D. Committee carried this
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inquiry a step further by asking, if finance is not the critical
constraint to housing, what is the appropriate form of housing
intervention in Zimbabwe? To answer these questions, I had to
ask, in what way did the government restrict the housing process
to the project context? The answer became evident for the first
time -- by controlling access to land.
Using this newly formulated theoretical framework, I re-
examined the data and was struck at how strategic land was to the
issues raised above. However, having seen the problem framed in
terms of finance by both the government and the lending agencies,
the initial focus of my inquiry had been on "how much financing"
and "how to make it work", rather than asking, "why financing and
not any other form of intervention"? Fortunately, by using the
case study approach I was able to obtain in-depth information on
a broad range of socio-economic issues, in addition to finance,
which enabled me to re-examine the housing question in this new
light and to arrive at conclusive evidence within the context of
the projects examined. Nevertheless, the study would have been
enriched by the inclusion of specific questions on land. For
instance, such a modification would have yielded more precise
recommendations on land intervention. This serendipitous process
of field research demonstrates the difficulty of defining the
research problem and categories of data to be collected before
the actual field work. The truth is that it is far more realistic
to simply identify a broad category of social, economic or
political issues prior to the investigation, and to let the field
data speak for themselves.
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ABSTRACT
The study posits that the need for mortgage finance is
artificially created by the enforcement of program constraints
regulating building standards and rate of construction. The
study presents two sets of evidence to support this hypothesis.
First, evidence from studies of unregulated settlements in the
Third World demonstrates that low-income families are able to
build and consolidate their houses in the absence of formal
finance. The case studies from the St. Mary Township-- a
squatter relocation settlement established during the pre-
independence period in Zimbabwe --indicate that Zimbabwe is no
exception. Second, an analysis of the land tenure policy
currently in place in Zimbabwe indicates that the sole mechanism
for access to land for low-income housing is through
participation in highly regulated government-sponsored housing
schemes. This is evidenced by the absence of squatter
settlements and other low-income private housing developments.
Given that access to land is the critical constraint to the
housing process, focusing on financing strategies to increase
affordability detracts from the real issue of who controls land
and how that resource is allocated. The government's
misconception that finance, not land, is the critical bottleneck
to construction has led to institutional and implementation
problems, and a general reluctance by households to avail
themselves of the mortgage program.
The government's monopolistic control of land-- the result of a
colonial tradition characterized by the government's dominant
role as supplier of low-income housing --is an integral component
of the country's socialist strategy to rectify inequalities of
the past. However, due to increasing population trends and
rising expectations, the thesis hypothesizes that it is unlikely
that the government would be able to continue regulating the
housing delivery process as rigidly as it has done in the past.
Population growth is leading to the doubling up of families as
the tightening rental market absorbs the brunt of unsatisfied
housing need. As post-independence expectations for better
living standards accelerate, the demand for housing opportunities
is likely to become transformed into political agitation which
may force the government to eventually confront the issue of land
allocation.
For the reasons mentioned above, the study argues that the
government's dominant control of land access for low-income
housing may be a short-lived solution to its housing need. In
this regard, the study provides a cursory review of the types of
interventions that the government can undertake with regards to
the allocation of land for low-income housing. One distinct form
of intervention is a socialistic approach to landownership
whereby land is owned and controlled by the public sector. This
implies a continuation of the status quo which would be
financially and politically costly for both the population and
the government. In contrast, under a capitalist system,
landownership is entirely private with land being allocated
through market forces. Between these approaches lies a range of
interventions with varying degrees of public-private control,
supported by different forms of technical assistance and credit
programs. Each intervention should be weighed in terms of its
cost and political acceptability in the short- and long-term.
Thesis Supervisor: Dr. Lisa Redfield Peattie
Title: Senior Lecturer and Professor Emeritus
CHAPTER I
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND STRUCTURE
In the last decade, mortgage finance has played a major role
in strategies to ameliorate the housing condition of the urban
poor in developing countries. In this regard, Zimbabwe is no
exception. The study hypothesizes that the government's strong
project emphasis on mortgage finance is artificially created by
the enforcement of building standards and the pace of
construction. The government's misconception that finance, not
land, is the critical constraint to the housing process may lead
to implementation problems and a general reluctance by low-income
households to apply for mortgage loans. Nevertheless, the latter
may feel compelled to participate in government-sponsored schemes
when such projects are the exclusive vehicle for access to land.
In this way, the Government of Zimbabwe's focus on finance
is an example of what has come to be known in social theory as
"problems with problem definition". In this instance, framing the
housing problem as lack of finance may not only create
institutional and affordability problems for project
participants, it may also detract policymakers from addressing
the need to facilitate access to land, and to increase the choice
of affordable housing solutions for low-income families. This
situation may not be unique to Zimbabwe. As other developing
countries re-examine their limited success in ameliorating the
housing condition of the urban poor through projects that call
for unaffordable standards, they may be convinced to explore
other areas of policy reform. The thesis suggests that land
presents the most strategic area for intervention given its
fundamental importance to housing.
The Problem of Standards
At the heart of Zimbabwe's housing problem is the issue of
standards. The government's insistence on high standards is a
striking example of a misplaced but well-meaning attempt at
social and economic reform inspired in part by the early social
movements described in such works by Dickens, Hugo, Zola, and
Engels. These works spearheaded proposals for minimum housing
standards to ameliorate the deplorable condition of the urban
poor.
In many developing countries, including Zimbabwe, the focus
on standards has led to housing solutions which are beyond what
low-income families are able and willing to pay. This does not
only price new units out of the reach of poor families, it also
endangers the existing housing stock by legitimizing the
destruction of popular solutions that do not meet government
specified standards. The latter has been demonstrated by
widespread slum and squatter settlement eradication in both
industrialized and developing countries. For instance, Peattie
(1987:75) describes the increasing number of homeless people on
the city streets of the United States as the "unintended result"
of the reform of housing by slum clearance as well as by the
action of private developers. She adds, "Like the Bengalis who
starved to death in 1943 because the price of rice had s oared
beyond what they could pay, people are in our streets because
there is no longer a stock of housing they can afford." In
developing countries the phenomenon of squatter and slum razing
has been equally rampant. Given the magnitude of housing need and
limited financial resources, these countries can ill afford the
depletion of their housing stock through the unnecessary
destruction of informal housing which account for the bulk of
shelter in the Third World. In Bangkok, Angel (1977) observed
that the shortage of housing is the result of the government's
myopic view of housing which excluded structures that failed to
conform to existing standards, and which, in turn, legitimized
the destruction of popular solutions to the housing problem.
Unfortunately, governments are typically unable to provide
alternative standard dwelling units that are affordable to low-
income families, much less deliver them at a pace commensurate to
the burgeoning housing need.
The recognition of popular solutions as an alternative to
conventional housing programs was first brought to the forefront
of development thinking by seminal works by Abrams, Mangin and
Turner. In Man's Struggle for Shelter in an Urbanizing World,
Abrams (1964) discusses the viability of progressive housing
developments as an alternative to conventional housing programs.
Rather than social blights, popular settlements were seen as a
solution to the housing shortage. This progressive view of
housing advocated for the acceptance and support of informal
housing through such programs as roof loan schemes. Perlman
(1976) similarly disperses the myth of marginality associated
with low-income settlements in her work on the favelas in Brazil.
Arguing for progressive development and against "instant"
development based on modern minimum standards, Turner (1967)
states that "the imposition of standards on popular housing is an
assault on the traditional function of housing as a source of
social and economic security and stability... the average lower
income family.. .wants secure land tenure, community facilities,
an adequate dwelling, and utilities in that order. The state
offers the exact opposite: a modern (but minimum) house in the
first place, some community facilities (generally at later
stages) and eventually, title to the property after the mortgage
has been paid off (pp. 168-179)." In contrast to the standards-
focused project approach, both Turner and Abrams, urge government
to recognize popular housing and to support the struggles of
families to house themselves by making the necessary resources
available to them. Of these, land is the most fundamental.
The Project Approach to the Housing Problem:
Standards and the Need for Finance
Given the project focus on standards, and the inability of
low-income families to pay for them, governments in developing
countries have in recent times introduced mortgage finance
programs to enable households to buy an acceptable housing on
credit. This section will not only review the rationale for long-
term credit, it will also examine the relevance of this finance
instrument to the socio-economic conditions of the poor, and the
role of mortgage finance vis-a-vis other programmatic
interventions in housing, such as land management.
As a background, a brief review will be made of the role of
mortgage finance in the United States during the first half of
the century -- a system that has served as a model for mortgage
finance programs in developing countries. This approach will be
contrasted with the variety of financing mechanisms at work in
informal settlements of developing countries. Within this
context, the question will be asked why, although it appears at
first glance that families stand to gain from a mortgage finance
program, are they in fact reluctant to borrow? It is hypothesized
that the problem of housing finance in Zimbabwe is an artificial
need created by the government's insistence on high standards and
a rapid rate of construction.
Mortgage Finance System: A Model from the United States
Advocates of mortgage finance programs in developing
countries argue that long-term credit makes owning a home
affordable to a larger number of low-income families who would
otherwise rent by enabling them to spread the bulk of their
investment over time, thereby allowing them to match their income
stream with housing consumption flow, even before income has
reached its peak. This position draws its merits largely from the
experience of the United States where the development of the
conventional long-term mortgage instrument increased the rate of
homeownership from 49% to 63% of all households between 1930 and
1970 (U.S. Congressional Budget Office, 1983). Prior to the
introduction of the long-term fixed mortgage, loans were not
amortized, with balloon payments made at the end of the term.
This schedule of payments, with its limited 5-year maturity and
high interest rate, made it extremely difficult for families to
fulfill their mortgage obligation. The problem was aggravated by
the refusal of mortgage lenders to re-finance the mortgages
coming due, thereby leaving the home mortgage industry in a state
of virtual collapse.
In response to this crisis, the federal government
intervened in the housing market in order to (a) mobilize long-
term savings in housing financial institutions by providing the
saver with reasonable security and rate of return; (b) reduce the
risk faced by lenders through a system of mortgage insurance;
and, (c) make mortgage repayments more affordable to borrowers by
spreading them over a 30-year maturity period.1 The documented
success of these interventions laid the foundation for the long-
term amortized mortgage and demonstrated the potential of lending
to households with moderate incomes, provided mortgage payments
were equal to affordable rent. In turn, this accounted for the
dramatic increase in the country's homeownership rate.
The success of the American housing finance system in
increasing the rate of homeownership has inspired international
lending agencies and policymakers to introduce long-term credit
in low-income housing projects. It is, however, not clear that
housing finance is the critical bottleneck to housing in
developing countries where a dynamic building process is taking
place in the absence of formal finance.
Housing Construction and Finance in the Informal Sector
Homeownership rates in developing countries do not only
exceed those in the United States and other industrialized
countries, but a substantial portion of this housing is being
1 For a brief review of the history of the U.S. housing
finance system see Melton Semer, et. al., "Evolution of Federal
Legislative Policy in Housing: Housing Credits," Housing in the
Seventies, U.S. H.U.D. Working Papers, Vol. 1, National Housing
Policy Review (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office,
1976).
built without the benefit of formal mortgage finance on land
under illegal or quasi-legal tenure. 2 The fact that a dynamic
building process takes place in the absence of mortgage finance
raises the issue of how construction by poor families is
financed, and what the proper role of mortgage
finance should be vis-a-vis other programmatic interventions in
the housing process.
Research of housing construction among low-income families
in Third World cities reveals that housing construction is
undertaken in stages, a process which has been referred to as
"brick-by-brick capitalization" (Doebele, 1985:2). This process
is financed through a multitude of informal financing sources of
which savings, loans and borrowing from relatives and friends,
trade credit, and rental income are the most common methods of
financing used (Christian, 1980; United Nations, 1978 and 1976;
USAID, 1981, 1982, and 1986; Jorgenson, 1975 and 1976; Keyes and
2 While Kuznets (1961, 1976) and others have found through
time series and cross sectional analysis that housing investment
in a country is positively correlated to income per capita,
others like Strassman (1970) and Burns and Grebler (1977) note
that the level of housing investment in developing countries is
only low because most housing is produced outside the monetized
sector of the economy. Moreover, Annez (1981) states that the
under measurement of housing production by census data in
developing countries is a widely acknowledged problem. This
conclusion is supported by authors such Peattie (1969), Stokes
(1962) and Ray (unpublished manuscript) whose studies of low-
income housing in developing countries indicate that substantial
amounts of housing are being created outside the public domain by
individuals and groups in violation of building codes and
frequently illegal or quasi-legal tenure.
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Burcroff, 1075; Hoek-Smit, 1977; Brossard, 1975; Mazingira
Institute, 1983; Naksook, 1987; Ishmael, 1988). Secondary sources
include sale of assets, job compensation, lottery and gambling.3
The optimum combination of various sources differ in accordance
with the particular socio-economic circumstances of each
household.
Of the commonly held assumptions about informal savings and
credit mechanisms, i.e. that loans are largely unsecured, costly
and short-term, only the last applies to informal finance
(Hamman, 1984; United Nations, 1976 and 1978). Credit available
through informal channels is indeed short-term money with the
maximum term rarely exceeding one year. More often than not,
these loans are rarely available for more than one month. This
was found to be preferable by both money-lenders and borrowers.
Borrowers favored short-term loans because they can assume a
known level of debt for a definite period of time, while lenders
preferred such loans because they can be rolled over quickly,
thereby increasing the volume of borrowers over a short period of
time. Moreover, earnings can be compounded and the risk
minimized.
In contrast, while it is widely believed that security for
informal loans stems from mutual confidence and social pressures
3 Appendix A complements the literature review on informal
financial mechanisms discussed in chapter 3.
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to repay, in reality many informal lenders require some form of
risk-reducing guarantees such as co-signers, guarantors, and when
possible, titles to property. Thus, although personal knowledge
may be the ultimate guarantee, loans were often backed up by some
form of security, such as a savings account with the lender
(Hamman, 1984).
In regard to risk, the relationship between the money-lender
and borrower often involves a personal knowledge and continuous
contact. Unlike banks, informal lenders may not always have any
interest in knowing the specific use for the loan, but they do
have a knowledge of, and a keen interest in the overall financial
position of the borrower's family and friends as well. In the
absence of such information, guarantees based on "personal
knowledge" of third parties have become the more accepted forms
of collateral. As a result, repayment of loans becomes both an
economic and a social necessity (Hamman,1984).
Although substantial amounts of housing are being created
outside the public domain without the benefit of formal finance,
the informal finance sector is still commonly typified as being
highly inefficient. The informal market is widely characterized
by the presence of usurious money-lenders and/or friends and
relatives who are too poor to offer significant financial
assistance.
Housing finance obtained from organized
informal sources (as contrasted with other
informal sources such as family or friends)
may not serve as an acceptable substitute for
expanded formal financing. The informal
system may be much less efficient, thereby
imposing a higher price for borrowed funds.
A key feature of informal borrowing is the
uncertainty of obtaining an initial loan,
typically of short duration, and of being
able to roll it over if necessary. Access to
such financing may be uneven and the
underwriting criteria employed may not
correspond to reasonable ability-to-pay
standards, in part because of the often
limited collateral provided by the borrower
(Struyk and Turner, 1986:3).
The above characterization results in part from
institutional inertia and the lack of understanding regarding the
nature of the informal finance market. While field research in
the recent past have accumulated knowledge contradicting some of
these negative characterization, this information and its policy
repercussions are still in the process of being slowly integrated
into mainstream theories of housing finance.
Supporters of formal finance argue that access to long-term
mortgage finance would enable a family to shift from renting to
homeownership faster than typically possible using informal
finance. In turn, this would enable households to accelerate the
rate of return on the economic use of space through the
letting out of rooms or initiation of home-based economic
enterprises. 4
Given these advantages, the demand for mortgage finance
should be overwhelming. However, there is anecdotal evidence to
suggest the contrary. The thesis hypothesizes that families would
be reluctant to commit to a long-term mortgage. This reluctance
may stem from two sets of factors. The first set relates to the
structure of the mortgage instrument and its incompatibility with
the erratic nature of the cash flow stream of low-income
families. The second set of factors relates to the hierarchy of
household priorities in which housing need is ranked differently
at various stages of a family's life cycle.
Housing investments by families residing in squatter
settlements, in private land subdivisions, and more recently, in
sites-and-service projects, do not even superficially resemble
affordable rent. Conventional mortgage theory is predicated on
the assumption that families are able to allocate what is
normally spent on rent to mortgage payments, thereby converting
4 For a discussion of home-based enterprises, see Paul
Strassman, "Types of Neighborhoods and Home-Based Enterprises
from Lima, Peru, " (East Lansing Michigan: Michigan State
University), undated draft. For rental income, see N.O.
Jorgenson, et.al., "Informal Sector Housing Finance: A Survey of
Two Informal Settlements Combined with A Review of Recent
Literature," draft report prepared for the U.S. Agency for
International Development, Regional Housing and Urban Development
Office, Kenya, 1986.
rent into investment or savings for housing. However, most low-
income families either live rent-free in squatter accommodation.
Depending on the demand for rental accommodation, lodgers can pay
very little, or exorbitantly high rents.
1 Moreover, relative to the period of time, the bulk of the
family's spending is concentrated in a series of short phases,
and is more often than not erratic, not only in the sense that
month-to-month and year-to-year spending fluctuates compared to
regular downpayments and credit installments, but also in the
sense that the length of the spending period itself is not pre-
fixed by contractual obligation and probably differs markedly
among families at the same income level (Rodell, 1987). Together
these factors make compliance with the amortization schedule
difficult.
The problem is exacerbated within a project context where
the pace and standards of construction are highly regulated, and
households are expected to mobilize a substantial portion of
resources on their own. Given their income levels, poor families
typically qualify for low loan-to-value mortgage values, and are
forced to raise the bulk of the construction finance informally
over a relatively short period of time compared to the
incremental building process practiced in informal settlements.
In this sense, low-income families are worse off than middle-
income households whose housing costs are largely met by the
mortgage loan, and informal settlers who, while not having access
to formal finance, are able to build incrementally according to
their ability to pay. While advocates of mortgage finance
programs posit the existence of substantial "hidden" savings that
can be mobilized to complement the initial loan, relatively
little research has been done to determine the potential of low-
income households to accumulate savings.
Given these constraints, households are likely to be
reluctant to apply for long-term mortgage financing. However, the
degree of long-term risk aversion is often contingent on the
family's hierarchy of needs at different phases of its life
cycle, and the importance of housing relative to those needs.
The degree of aversion to long-term financial risk is related to
the reasons for investing in a house, or more precisely, on
whether families are building themselves just a place to live and
accumulate wealth for old age security and an inheritance for
their children, or whether they are also building additional
rooms to rent or use for some other business purpose on a
permanent and long-term basis. In the context of this life cycle
analysis, the distinction between the owner-investor and the
owner-occupant may not be entirely relevant. Given the variety of
motives for housing investment, it would be unrealistic to
attribute a single motive for ownership to families whose socio-
economic situation can change from one day to the next, from one
season to the other.
Given the fact that a dynamic construction sector thrives in
the absence of formal credit in the low-income settlements of the
developing world, and the inapplicability of the conventional
fixed term mortgage to poor families, there is a need to re-think
the role of finance vis-a-vis other programmatic interventions in
the housing process. Subsequent chapters will demonstrate that
the real constraint to housing in Zimbabwe is access to land, and
that there is a need for the government to encourage a variety of
affordable housing solutions.
The Structure of the Thesis
The thesis argues that the need for mortgage finance is
artificially created by the government's strong project emphasis
on standards and rate of construction. It will trace this
argument through, and present evidence for it in the following
way:
Chapter 2 describes the context of the housing issue in
Zimbabwe. It argues that the government is not conscious that its
housing problem is attributable to the way in which land is being
presently controlled. The government's monopolistic control of
land-- the result of a colonial tradition characterized by the
government's dominant role as supplier of low-income housing --is
an integral component of the country's socialist strategy to
rectify inequalities of the past. However, due to increasing
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population trends and rising expectations, the thesis
hypothesizes that it is unlikely for the government to continue
regulating the housing delivery process as rigidly as it had done
in the past. Population growth is leading to families doubling up
with the rental market absorbing the brunt of unsatisfied housing
need. As post-independence expectations for better living
standards accelerate, the demand for housing opportunities is
likely to become transformed into political agitation which may
force the government to eventually re-examine its approach to
housing.
Chapter 3 reviews the literature on informal housing finance
in developing countries, and provides evidence from case
histories collected at St. Mary's Township in Zimbabwe,
indicating that low-income households are able to construct and
consolidate their dwellings in the absence of formal finance.
These support the hypothesis that lack of financing is not the
critical constraint to the construction process.
Chapter 4 demonstrates that access to land in Zimbabwe is
only possible through participation in government-sponsored
projects. Squatters dwellings are regularly demolished, and the
only existing low-income settlements are those executed under
government sponsorship. Since Chapter 3 has demonstrated that
households are able to build in the absence of formal finance, it
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becomes clear in the discussion that the critical constraint to
construction is access to land.
Chapter 5 argues that, by emphasizing standards and rate of
construction, the government makes it more difficult for families
to participate in housing programs. This chapter examines the
rationale for standards and its impact on project participants
and implementing agencies. In particular, it will argue that
rather than being a management problem, difficulties in project
implementation are rooted in the nature of the intervention
itself.
Chapter 6 argues that the need for mortgage finance is
artificially created by the government as a result of its project
orientation. The government's misconception that finance, not
land, is the critical bottleneck to construction has led to a
general reluctance by households to avail of the mortgage loan.
Chapter 7 examines the strategies used by households,
borrowers and non-borrowers, to reduce construction costs as well
as mobilize supplementary resources to finance housing
construction. It highlights the sacrifices undertaken by families
struggling to comply with existing standards.
Chapter 8 argues that the government's project emphasis on
finance has led to institutional and coordination problems which
exacerbate the difficulties faced by project participants.
Drawing heavily on interviews with officials of implementing and
lending institutions, this chapter will demonstrate that local
authorities and building societies are equally reluctant to
participate in long-term credit program for the urban poor.
However, like the latter, they have little choice but to
participate.
The last Chapter states that since it is unlikely for the
government to continue regulating the housing delivery process as
rigidly as it had done in the past. Due to population trends and
rising expectations, it may have to eventually confront the issue
of land allocation. This chapter very briefly touches on a range
of interventions that the government can take with regards to the
allocation of land for low-income families.
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CHAPTER II
HOUSING POLICY IN ZIMBABWE: AN OVERVIEW
Housing policy in Zimbabwe is characterized by the dominant
role of the government as supplier of low-income housing. Even
with the acceptance of the site-and-service approach to housing,
the government continues to exercise control over the housing
delivery process. The thesis argues that by situating the
government's land tenure policy in the context of its socialist
ideology, the public sector's monopolistic control of the land
allocation process should not be seen as a conscious and
deliberate attempt by the government to restrict housing
opportunities for the urban poor. on the contrary, the
government perceives its dominant rule in the housing delivery
process as an intrinsic and necessary part of its strategy to
rectify past socio-economic inequalities. Ironically, however,
by insisting on unrealistic standards and pace of construction,
it is making homeownership increasingly more difficult for the
neediest members of its population who are forced, in the absence
of alternative housing solutions, into the rental market.
Within this context, the inability of households to afford a
standard dwelling unit is perceived as a financing problem.
Since the government is unable to bear the investment costs of
providing each individual family with the standard house, it has
chosen to shift part of the burden of financing to the building
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societies, and ultimately to low-income households through its
implicit acceptance of the rental practice. In this way, The
fundamental issue of access to land is over shadowed by the
importance given to finance by the government.
Housing Policy in Zimbabwe: A Brief Overview
The tenure status of blacks in urban areas has always been
the most controversial aspect of colonial housing policy. The
migrant labor system, which envisaged the black worker as a
temporary dweller in urban commercial areas, and the land tenure
policy, which severely restricted the areas in which blacks could
own property, led to the shortage of low-income housing at the
time of independence.
The blueprint of land development in Zimbabwe was laid out
during the colonial settlement period which started in 1890,
following the granting of a royal charter to the British South
African Company by the British government in 1889. Soon after
their arrival in 'Rhodesia', the colonialists adopted a policy of
land apportionment on the basis of race as embodied in the Land
Apportionment Act (No.30 of 1930). This Act was subsequently
amended to permit blacks to acquire freehold tenure in designated
townships outside the municipal boundaries. In 1969 it was
replaced by the Land Tenure Act which created African townships
within the European Area. Even with the advent of independence
the imprint of this spatial pattern of urban development has
remained largely intact.
Although tenure policy has limited the stabilization of the
black population in the urban areas, it was the provision of
accommodation or rather the lack thereof, that has been
instrumental in curbing rural-urban migration. As background, the
following section presents a brief historical overview of housing
policy during the pre-independence period.
Historical Overview
In 1984, the government imposed a hut tax on the inhabitants
of rural reserves to force the indigenous population to enter the
cash economy. In order to obtain a salary which would allow them
to pay the tax, males were forced to hire themselves out as farm
labor, urban workers, or domestic servants. Later it would be
pressure on land and higher wages, as well as job opportunities
that would draw the population into the urban areas.
Initially black workers were accommodated on their
employers' premises in the European preserves. As the flood of
job seekers from the rural areas grew, the government established
black worker townships or locations separate from the European
residential areas. The settlement of blacks in the urban areas
was first brought under control by the Native Locations Ordinance
(1906) which tied urban residence to gainful employment. By the
1930s the size of the population in the locations, as well as the
number of new job seekers, outgrew the amount of accommodation
provided by the government, forcing it to initiate the
development of black townships on farms at the periphery of urban
areas to absorb and regulate the growth of squatters.
While the administration of worker housing schemes rested on
the Central Government, this situation changed in 1946 with the
enactment of the Native (Urban Areas) Accommodation and
Registration Act (No.8 of 1951) which required local authorities
to finance and administer urban black townships. It also made
local authorities responsible for the operation of pass laws
which restricted black residence in towns to land set aside for
the purpose and duration of employment. The 1960 Vagrancy Act
likewise empowered local authorities to repatriate back to the
rural areas blacks who could not prove that they were gainfully
employed or formally registered as urban residents. Legal
occupiers of accommodation in the townships were required to
register their visitors whose period of stay was limited to two
weeks. This requirement was enforced by authorities through
surveillance, usually in the form of periodic night raids.
The Land Apportionment Act of 1941, which stated "that no
native shall acquire, lease or occupy land in the European area",
was amended in 1960 to enable blacks to own or lease land on
terms decided by the Governor in areas described as African
Townships. This was done to stabilize the work force and thwart
the political activism that was becoming increasingly violent at
that time. With the intensification of the war of liberation,
the implementation of influx control measures broke down.5 As the
number of migrants surged, the government created "transitional"
settlements--temporary transit camps located near bus terminals
and markets at the periphery of the city where residents rented
plastic tents for a minimum amount. The government intended to
phase out these transitional squatter settlements as soon as the
inhabitants could be relocated to municipal rental housing
consisting of low-cost, 2-room rental married and single
accommodations. Allocation was done from the municipal housing
waiting list.6 Many squatters were unemployed, or if employed,
did not earn sufficient wages to afford the housing solutions
provided by the government. Faced with a tremendous housing
backlog and increasing demand, the government considered the
5 Those working in Salisbury brought their families to live
with them in the city. The war further disrupted the rural
economy in part because of the movement of people into protected
villages. An estimated 600,000 people migrated to the urban areas
in search of a means of subsistence during a period of increasing
unemployment brought about by the state of economic recession.
6 In a typical transitional settlement at Zengeza, 28 km
from the center of Salisbury, the government provided 2,637
stands of 9.5m x 10m on to which the people, with the assistance
of municipal transport, moved their belongings and building
materials and constructed their own dwellings. Communal taps,
community pit latrines and a refuse collection service were
provided. There was a charge for the rent of the plot to cover
services and wages for extra staff employed by the Zengeza
Township.
acceptance of the site-and-service approach in the late 1970s as
an alternative to conventional subsidized rental housing.
The government introduced the first major site-and-service
scheme in 1979 at Glenview in Harare. The Glenview project,
implemented during a period of uncertainty and political
upheaval, offered 7,347 serviced plots with a toilet/shower and
standpipe on-site. These were sold at a cost of Z$582. The
project offered a maximum loan of Z$200 repayable over a period
of one, two or three years. Once the loan, either in the form of
cash or materials, was repaid, the borrower could renew the loan.
The City of Harare also offered owners small home improvement
loans.
The Glenview scheme represented a radical departure from
prior housing projects in Zimbabwe. To avoid paying double rent,
beneficiaries were permitted for the first time to move on-site
and live in temporary shelter while building their permanent
homes. The first permanent room had to be completed during the
first three years. Critics of the project feared that the area
would develop into a slum that would eventually have to be
upgraded. In reality, most of the Glenview participants had
never been squatters. Most were employed and had been lodgers
with a long experience in urban life. Moreover, unlike the St.
Mary relocation site Chitungwiza, Glenview was located within
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the city boundaries, thereby enabling low-income households to
have easy access to places of employment.
Anti-Squatter Policy
Throughout the evolution of housing policy in Zimbabwe, the
government consistently opposed the development of squatter
settlements. The term of Housing Minister Zvogo in the early
1980s is best remembered by Zimbabweans for its aggressive anti-
squatter campaigns. Immediately after the new government took
office, Zvogo eradicated the squatter camp in Mbare Musika in
Harare. The government exhorted squatters to return to the rural
areas. However, although a few went, most considered they had
nothing to return to that was economically viable. Some families
were accommodated in over crowded condition in former 'single'
men's hostels, while other families were moved further away from
the road, out of sight of the main public highway in the area.
Another large squatter settlement Chirambuyo in Chitungwiza,
housing some 30,000 people was also demolished . The self-built
houses were razed down without any compensation paid to the
occupants. The new squatter settlements that sprang from the
demolition of Chirambuyo were bulldozed to the ground. Under
"Operation Clean-Up" initiated by the Zimbabwe African National
Union Central Committee, the police and army arrested squatters
throughout the cities in late-night and dawn raids, bulldozing or
burning down houses. The government insisted that squatters
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return to the rural areas through rural-resettlement schemes,
including those squatters who were long-term urban dwellers
unable to afford the government-sponsored housing solutions.
The above discussion demonstrate that prior to independence
tenure and housing restrictions were used by the colonial regime
as a tool for regulating rural-urban migration into designated
white areas. It is striking to note that the post-independence
government has turned this approach around by utilizing housing
and land as a mechanism for rectifying past socio-economic and
geographical inequalities. In both instances, government has
remained in control of the housing delivery process, and has used
housing to effect specific policy objectives. For the colonial
government, the goals were founded on racial segregation; for the
current regime, on socio-economic equality. The ideological
climate of the post-independence period is particularly conducive
to government control of the housing process, as will be
explained in the following section.
The Role of Housing in Zimbabwe's
Socialist Transformation
Zimbabwe inherited from its colonial past a highly dualistic
economy characterized by a small modern sector and an
impoverished rural peasant sector. Highly inequitable patterns
of land distribution, and past neglect of the urban sector lie at
the root of the country's development problem. Partly as a
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result of these factors, there has been a large disparity in
labor productivity between these two sectors, giving rise, in
turn, to gross inequalities in living standards and income-
generating opportunities.
Development Objectives and Strategy:
Growth with Equity
The development goals of the new government are outlined in
its Transitional National Development Plan (1982/83-1984/85)
hereafter referred to as the Plan. On the one hand, the
government is concerned with improving the existing productive
base to sustain self-sufficiency in food, a rapid rate of growth
in gross domestic product, and significant increases in
employment. On the other hand, it is also anxious to ensure a
more equitable distribution of growth. The Plan states that the
primary objective of the government is to remove historical
distortions, and to,
advance the interests of the broad masses of
the people and of the nation as a whole, and
to lay down the foundation for the creation
of a free, democratic and independent
socialist nation... the underlying philosophy
of the Transitional National Development Plan
is that the structure of property
relationship has to be transformed in
Zimbabwe in order to create the basis for a
socialist order... (with) ... the Plan (as) the
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first step in the direction of this socialist
transformation.7
The provision of adequate housing is an essential element of
Zimbabwe's social development program. The country's
urbanization rate is expected to increase rapidly due to the
repeal of migration controls, rural-urban income disparities, and
impoverished living conditions in the communal lands. The demand
for low-income housing is expected to increase as a result of
continuing migration and high population growth rates. Within
this context, the housing "problem" manifested in severe
overcrowding is perceived by the government not only as a
shortage in the supply of affordable housing, but more
fundamentally, as a manifestation of the inequitable allocation
of resources that has historically divided socio-economic and
racial groups, and promoted rural-urban dichotomies. In
particular, the migrant labor system, which envisaged the black
worker as a temporary dweller in urban commercial areas, and the
Land Apportionment Act which severely restricted the areas in
which blacks could own property, contributed to the shortage of
low-income housing at the time of independence. In this context,
the government perceives housing as both a goal of, and vehicle
for, development. This is reflected in its Plan which stresses
the role of housing as a tool for the redistribution of wealth,
7 The Transitional National Development 1982/83-1984/85,
Republic of Zimbabwe, May 1983.
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and for the creation of a more balanced human settlements system.
Accordingly, the government has shifted away from the colonial
policy of constructing rental housing for migrant labor towards
more widespread homeownership schemes for a growing class of
urban migrants.
Volume 2 of the Transitional National Development Plan
outlines the main components of the new government's housing
strategy, stating explicitly its commitment to the delivery of
serviced sites, hand in hand with the strict enforcement of
housing standards in both urban and rural areas. This imposition
of rigid program standards distinguishes post-independence
projects from the Glenview Model. Moreover, in contrast to the
small construction and home improvement loans offered at
Glenview, these latter schemes offered larger, long-term mortgage
finance. This departure from the Glenview model can be explained
by the government's view of housing as a visible sign of its
efforts to provide the population with a standard of living
comparable to that enjoyed by the privileged colonial class.
To increase the affordability of this housing solution, the
government adopted a two-pronged approach. The first component
consists of strategies to reduce housing costs, notably through
direct government involvement in the production of building
materials and construction of houses using building brigades--a
concept borrowed from Cuba. The organization of housing brigades
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is an integral component of the government's strategy to overcome
housing shortage. These brigades are under the jurisdiction of
local authorities or district councils. The government has
launched a vigorous campaign to register anyone with building
skills, whether they are qualified or not, for possible inclusion
in the brigades. In this way, the government hopes to reduce
building costs, and thereby make the house more affordable.
Ironically, in practice brigades are the most expensive mode of
construction compared to both the aided self-help and cooperative
methods.
The second approach focuses on the development of a
financing strategy which would enable low-income households to
have greater access to mortgage financing from building
societies. This latter approach has been at the core of the
multitude of donor-sponsored housing projects in Zimbabwe,
implemented through various sophisticated institutional
arrangements and marked by greater private sector participation.
Of these projects, three have been selected for in-depth analysis
in the thesis: the Kuwadzana site-and-service scheme sponsored by
the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), Nketa low-
income pilot project in Kwekwe sponsored by USAID and the U.N.
Centre for Human Settlements (UNCHS), and the Sunningdale housing
scheme in Harare, one of four projects sponsored by the World
Bank.8
In looking back at its performance vis-a-vis the housing
goals contained in its Transitional National Development Plan
(1982/83-1984/85), the government acknowledges that it had fallen
short of its quota (Five Year National Development Plan 1986-
1990).9 Rather than re-examining the focus of its housing
delivery approach, the government attributes this shortfall to
escalating material and labor costs. It maintains a dominant
control of the process by restricting access to land, in spite of
its acceptance of the aided self-help approach. Given this
perspective, its failure to meet its housing goals is attributed
to rising costs of production, rather than from the nature of the
intervention itself. Thus, it explicitly states in the 1986/90
Plan that it intends to reduce labor and material costs through
increased government involvement in these activities through the
creation of the National Housing Corporation. Moreover, the Plan
indicates that in spite of the shortage of resources, the
8 Details of the projects are provided in Appendix B. The
basis for the selection of the projects, as well as the
methodology for the case study approach are presented in Appendix
C.
9 The Transitional Development Plan had set a target of
115,000 housing units to be constructed over the three-year
period, but only 13,500 were completed at the end of the third
year.
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government intends to further raise the standards of urban and
rural housing.
Thus, the transition from a colonial to a socialist regime
has left essentially unchanged the public sector's role as
supplier of housing 10 and regulator of the housing delivery
process. Private and individual initiatives in housing remains
subject to the larger political process regulating the housing
delivery process. The following statement made by the Permanent
Secretary in the Ministry of Housing indicates, in broad terms,
the government's housing policy objectives--a policy basically
concerned with the transition from capitalism to socialism:
Ours being a people-oriented Government bent
on achieving socialist goals, our housing
policy is a redistributive mechanism for
redressing colonial income and wealth
inequalities. The geographic polarization of
the nation according to race and income,
reminiscent of the colonial days is being
dismantled (Sunday Mail, February 6, 1983)."
A critical condition for the dismantling of the colonial
segregationist policy is the government's control of the housing
delivery process. However, the achievement of the national
housing goals, as stated in the development plans, calls for a
larger government involvement, particularly in the financing of
new housing construction. Given the shortfall in available
10 Used in the broad sense to include control of access to
land for low-income housing development.
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resources for housing investment, the Government of Zimbabwe,
upon the urging of international donor agencies, has entered into
a reluctant partnership with building societies in the
expectation that the latter would assume part of the burden for
low-income housing finance. The following section discusses the
uneasy alliance between the government, the building societies,
and ultimately, the participants in the financing of housing--
bearing in mind that the need for finance is more artificial than
real, and is the result of standards and other housing
programmatic constraints.
Housing Finance System: A Case of
Uneasy Alliances
The present housing finance system in Zimbabwe is predicated
on the tenuous alliance between a government committed to a
socialist ideology and control of the housing delivery process,
and private financial institutions with no prior involvement in
direct mortgage lending to low-income families. These unlikely
partners are drawn together by social and economic exigencies
which consist, on one hand, of the government's commitment to
deliver an ambitious housing program it cannot afford, and on the
other hand, of the building societies' precarious financial state
brought about by a highly regulated financial environment.
An important goal of the government is to raise living
standards through greater participation by the public sector in
the economy as a whole, and in the housing delivery system, in
particular. To finance the revenue shortfall arising from its
large scale social and infrastructure programs as well as the
growth of state-owned enterprises, the government has drawn upon
the resources of the financial sector using a myriad of
operational controls. Drawing on domestic savings, this financial
intervention has significantly constrained the ability of
building societies to mobilize resources for housing finance
(Coleman and Lintz,1985).
The greatest challenge to the building societies comes from
the government-operated Post Office Savings Bank. Regulated
ceilings on taxable interest rates paid on deposits is the major
bottleneck in attracting deposits especially in the light of tax-
free competition from the Post Office Savings Bank. Without a
high level of deposits, the amount of mortgage that can be
provided through the use of recycled capital is extremely
limited.
The prospect for the building societies to survive
financially is contingent on the government. If the government
allows them to compete fairly with other financial institutions
and earn a fair return on investments, the societies will be able
to resume their active role in the housing market. Recently, the
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societies have expressed a willingness to serve lower-income
families as quid pro guo for concessions from the government on
matters of fair competition and improved earnings. For instance,
as a show of good faith or perhaps desperation, one of the three
building societies participated in the pilot housing scheme in
Kwekwe even before the government had ruled on their request for
concessions. For its part, the government has reluctantly agreed
to relax restrictions provided that twenty-five percent of
earnings generated from the introduction of more favorable tax
rates would be earmarked for low-income mortgage finance.
However, this uneasy alliance does not resolve the
fundamental issue of affordability of government-sponsored
housing solutions by low-income families, which, in turn, brings
to question the long-term financial viability of building society
involvement in the low-income housing market. The problems that
have resulted from the Kwekwe experimental project can be
attributed not only to the premature participation by the
building society concerned but, more fundamentally, to excessive
standards which price the housing solutions beyond what
households are able to pay, even with mortgage financing due to
low loan-to-value ratios dictated by the participants' income
profile. The problems of institutional coordination lie only
second to this affordability issue in importance. Similarly,
government will not have to divert funds away from the building
society to finance its housing program if access to land was
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opened up to other more flexible and affordable forms of public-
private arrangements. Instead, the societies could concentrate
in building houses for the growing class of middle-income black
families, thereby easing the competition for low-income housing
solutions.
CHAPTER III
INFORMAL CONSTRUCTION AND FINANCE
The fact that a dynamic building process takes place in the
absence of formal finance raises the issue of how construction by
low-income households is financed, and questions the belief held
by international experts and donors that lack of finance is a
major constraint to the building process. The reality is that
substantial amounts of housing are being created in developing
countries outside the public domain. Most housing is built by
individuals and groups without the benefit of public housing
finance, frequently in violation of building codes, on land whose
tenure arrangements are haphazard and frequently illegal."
Given the government of Zimbabwe's effective policy of
squatter eradication, there are currently no squatter settlements
in Zimbabwe.12 To investigate how families finance construction
1 United Nations, Non-Conventional Financing of Housing for
Low-Income Households, (New York,1978), 37-41.
12 This situation is not entirely unique. For example, in
Kenya, there is very little squatting in the sense of families
building on public or private land for owner occupation without
any form of title. The common practice is for either a landlord,
a land-buying company, a cooperative, or the owner-occupier to
have some form of legal claim to the land. In Zimbabwe, the only
known settlement that is generally labelled as a squatter
settlement is Epworth. However, legally speaking it is not.
Epworth was the property of a Methodist mission which was founded
in the last part of the 19th century by Cecil Rhodes. The
Methodist Mission followers settled and farmed the land, and over
the years, bought two more farms, bringing the area to 3,817
hectares. The area is presently populated by over 5,800 families
who were tenants of the mission until the late 1982 when the
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in the absence of formal credit and program restrictions, the
thesis selected a squatter relocation area for families evicted
from the banks of the Hunyani River. Since the relocation was
executed prior to independence, families were neither subject to
program requirements regarding the structure and pace of
construction, nor were they eligible for construction loans.
Interviews of the relocated families are a testimony to the
ability of low-income households to build and consolidate their
homes given access to land.
Characterization of Informal Financial Systems
Informal financial circuits exist primarily because of the
large body of households with no access to either formal credit
or to subsidized housing. Lack of access results from the
incompatibility of finance institutional requirements and the
ability of low-income groups to meet them. Most government
programs are intended to serve the needs of this group but fall
short of expectation because of ineffective targeting or lack of
public funds. This gap is filled in by the informal sector.
The strength of the informal system lies in its ability to
conform to standards which are appropriate to those of the
market. It is based on the family or group which people feel some
government took over the majority of the land (USAID, 1984).
identity, rather than a somewhat anonymous financial institution.
It does not require formality in the application of the loan, and
considerable flexibility is exercised in the choice of
collateral. As they are community-based, informal financial
circuits are able to recover loans through personal pressure.
In her study of West African countries, Hamman (1985) describes
informal financing mechanisms as being highly localized and able
to respond to a diversity of needs within a social context.
Although transactions may be formalized, personal knowledge of
the borrower is important to the lender. Applying for credit and
repaying loans then becomes a social obligation as well as an
economic necessity. Informal finance systems also link voluntary
savings with access to credit. Many poor families in developing
countries are distrustful of formal institutions and prefer to
put their savings into jewelry. Access to credit has been found
to be a strong motivator for savings in the informal sector of
West Africa (Hamman, 1984). While informal savings and credit
groups are known to exist worldwide, their potential as finance
institutions capable of serving a broader range of financial
services has often been overlooked.
Indigenous informal financial circuits supply most of the
credit needed for the operation of the informal sector of the
economy in developing countries. These informal mechanisms
operate outside regulatory controls on lending and borrowing
rates. While they depend largely on local resources for credit
funds, some maintain links to formal sector institutions.
Although some are simple, mutual assistance groups, other are
quite complex organizations, such as the tontines of Cameroon and
the susu clubs of Liberia, which are capable of mobilizing fairly
large amounts of cash and providing specialized financial
services. However, a study of informal financial circuits in five
West African countries reveal that although a very large
percentage of credit and savings activity operate outside the
framework of financial institutions, findings from the Ivory
Coast, Liberia, Senegal, Niger and Togo revealed that only a
relatively small proportion of this credit is channeled towards
housing (Hamman, 1985). Housing is frequently self-financed. For
instance, it is rare for Thai families to buy a plot and finance
a house at the same time, but quite common for families to move
their houses from other locations and reconstruct them or simply
build a temporary house at minimal cost. Thus very little of
commercial credit is utilized for housing construction.
In recent years, a growing interest on the informal sector
has led to a number of field research whose findings have
contributed to a better understanding of the dynamics of informal
land and housing markets.13 Unfortunately, recent findings on
13 So far unpublished field studies include such works as
"Towards Responsive Projects and Programs: Lessons from a Site and
Services Project" by Solomon Benjamin which examines informal
construction and financing processes at work in the Navagamgoda
project in Colombo; "Housing Finance of the Reconstruction
Projects' Dwellers" by Charin Naksook which describes informal
financing mechanisms used by households in several squatter
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informal housing finance are still to be incorporated into
mainstream financial theory, and more so into housing policy
interventions. Due in part to institutional inertia, programs
have focused largely on the introduction of mortgage finance to
low-income housing projects. These interventions are based on the
misconception that lack of finance discourages investment in
housing and that informal finance mechanisms are generally
inefficient and costly. This has, in turn, resulted in the
perpetuation of myths about the informal financial market which,
among other things, argue for the substitution of informal
mechanisms by formal institutions. Boleat (1987:163) suggests
that governments should not aim to prevent the informal system
from working, but to provide it with competition to make it more
effective. This would, in turn, require a better understanding of
how families finance housing and their preferred financial terms.
There exist a wide variety of informal and quasi-formal
financing mechanisms in the developing world. A literature
review is provided in Appendix A. Of these, savings, loans and
borrowings are the most common methods of financing used. For
instance, Christian (1972) observed the universal existence of
informal savings and credit groups in developing countries.
These groups are known under a variety of names: tontine in West
relocation sites; and "Dynamics of Informal Sector Factor
Mobilization: The Process by which Poor People Shelter Themselves
with a Focus on the Caribbean - St. Vincent and Dominica " by Len
Ishmael.
Africa, esusu in Nigeria, harambee or obilima in Kenya, ekub in
Ethiopia, sanduk in the Sudan, gamiya in Egypt, char in Thailand,
kye in Korea, ooi in Hongkong and sociedad mutuales in Latin
America. Another common form of financing in some parts of the
Third World is the extension of credit by small contractors and
suppliers of building materials who are usually financed by
formal sector financial institutions. In addition, quasi-legal
sources of finance are also tapped for housing construction.14
Secondary sources include the sale of land and other assets,
compensation for being dismissed from jobs, lottery and gambling
(Nansook, 1987). The optimum combination of various sources
differs in accordance with the particular socio-economic
circumstances of each household. The letting out of rooms
likewise plays a decisive role in enabling a household to convert
surplus earnings into housing as dramatically demonstrated by
cases from St. Mary's Township.15
There is no one-to-one relationship between the type of
housing finance intermediary or system, and the type of land
14 An informal finance study of Kenya (USAID, 1986)
describes how one credit union successfully administered a small
loan program to low-income families, lending monies for such
items as the roof and the downpayment for the land.
15 This is also evident in the World Bank-sponsored site and
service project in Dandora, Kenya, where rental income
constituted a significant portion of household income. This
process is described in a report entitled "Formal and Informal
Financing in a Sites and Service Project in Kenya (Dandora)"
prepared by the Mazingira Institute in Kenya for the United
Nations Centre for Human Settlements (Habitat) on August 1983.
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tenure and quality of housing built. Thus, an individual
obtaining a plot of land in Kenya's 'Thika corridor" may finance
a part of the house using building society loans with a short-
term savings and credit society loan to cover the downpayment,
and inter-family transfers to cover the extensions. Again, an
individual wishing to build rental housing in an informal
settlement may use income from other business, such as a matatu
(small bus) business, a savings and credit loan, and income from
the rent of a partially constructed structure to finish the
construction.16 These examples illustrate the complex nature of
these financial mechanisms.
Of the commonly held assumptions about savings and credit
mechanisms, i.e. that loans are largely unsecured, risky, costly,
and short-term, only the last applied to informal mechanisms
(Hamman, 1985). Credit available through informal channels,
particularly to low-income groups, is indeed very short-term
money with the maximum term rarely exceeding one year. More
often than not, these loans are rarely available for more than
one month. This was preferable to both lenders and borrowers.
The latter preferred short terms because they can assume a known
level of debt for a definite short period of time while lenders
16 Taken from preliminary communications between RHUDO/USAID
Kenya and consulting associates Mbugua, Jorgenson and Mwaniki
regarding an informal sector finance study to be done on Kenya,
1985.
likewise favored such loans because they can be rolled-over
quickly, permitting lending to a larger number of borrowers over
a short period of time. Moreover, earnings can be compounded and
the risk minimized.
In contrast, while it is widely believed that security for
informal loans stems from mutual confidence and social pressures
to repay, in reality, many informal lenders require some form of
risk-reducing guarantees such as co-signers, guarantors, and when
possible, titles to property. Thus, although personal knowledge
may be the ultimate guarantee, loans were often backed up by some
form of security such as a savings account with the lender. In
Lome, moneylenders called gadiga require conventional guarantees,
such as land titles, personal property or a co-signer. Liberian
mutual assistance groups require that loans to outsiders be
guaranteed by a member of the group.
In regard to risk, the relationship between the money-lender
and borrower often involves personal knowledge and continuous
contact. Unlike bankers, informal lenders may not always have
any interest in knowing the specific use for the loan but they do
have a knowledge of, and a keen interest in the overall financial
position of the borrower's family and friends as well. In the
absence of such information, guarantees based on "personal
knowledge" of third parties have become more accepted forms of
collateral. As a result, repayment of loans becomes both an
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economic and social necessity. Informal lenders are also known
to be very persistent about collecting debts.
Moreover, Christian (1972) notes that the commonly perceived
dichotomy between the formal and informal financial systems is
not entirely true since certain processes within the informal
financial market are known to have a direct link to the formal
system. Moreover, the distinction between self-finance versus
other forms of finance is often unclear. In theory, there is a
very clear distinction between what is paid from savings and that
which is paid from borrowings. However, in reality, as
demonstrated by the study on the Thai household economy by
Nansook (1986), households are able to survive even though
expenditures are higher than income by using a cycle of debt
accumulation which is paid off through various informal financing
methods.
The preceding discussion demonstrates the variety and
complexity of informal finance mechanisms used by households in
housing construction. The following stories by the residents of
St. Mary's Township will reinforce the evidence collected from
other countries, testifying to the ability of families to
consolidate their homes without formal finance.
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Informal Housing Finance in Zimbabwe: Case Studies
from St. Mary's Township
Studies of unregulated settlements in the Third World
demonstrate that low-income families are able to build and
consolidate their houses in the absence of formal finance. The
case studies from St. Mary's Township-- a squatter relocation
settlement established during the pre-independence period in
Zimbabwe --indicate that Zimbabwe is no exception. Located
outside the Harare boundary and some 20km from the city center,
St. Mary's was originally founded by the Rhodesian government in
1956 to house black employees of the former Salisbury airport.
In 1962, some 2,000 people formed a squatter settlement on the
banks of the Hunyani River near St. Mary's. The government
feared pollution of the river and Salisbury's water supply. Over
a period of two years, it moved the blacks from this area to
stands which were individually serviced with running water and
latrines.
Twelve in-depth interviews of St. Mary residents were
carried out as part of this study to understand how they built
their homes in the absence of formal finance, and to ascertain
their attitude regarding credit programs. Since the project
started before independence, construction took place in the
absence of both program requirements and housing finance.
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Analysis of the case studies is divided into two sections.
The first section on construction demonstrates that unlike
project participants who are required to complete a standard unit
within a shorter period of time, residents of St. Mary's built
their houses incrementally over a longer period of time --
consolidating and extending the unit to meet their changing needs
and changing cash flow situation. The second section on finance
indicates that unlike mortgage holders in the United States, St.
Mary residents did not purchase or build a complete unit upfront,
nor were they bound to the rigidity of the mortgage instrument.
Thus families were able to housing consumption with their
unpredictable economic situation.
Construction Process
The most common mode of construction used was auto-
construction. Many female household heads, mostly war widows from
the liberation struggle, constructed the basic core themselves
over a long period of time with little assistance from builders.
Grown-up children were expected to extend the house -- a process
which can take place from two to ten years. Of those who hired
informal builders, at least a fourth complained of unreliable
builders. In one case, at least five builders were involved in
one stage or another in the construction of his 4-room house.
All interviewees stated that their first priority in
construction was to complete a minimum habitable unit to avoid
having to pay rent elsewhere during construction. The initial
number of rooms varied according to family need and size, ranging
from one to seven rooms. In one case, the owner started with a
temporary 3-room shack which he tore down after the completion of
the permanent 4-room house. Table 1 summarizes the major features
of the construction activity as revealed through the in-depth
interviews.
With the completion of the initial core, the next priority
is to extend the core for rental purposes. New rooms are either
added incrementally to the existing unit or a separate rental
"block" is constructed behind or alongside the house. Most plots
had several structures. Besides the main house there is often
another unit for use by another family or families, either as
lodgers or relatives.The latter is rectangular in shape and is
divided into rows of room. The construction of a separate lodging
unit is intended to preserve the family's privacy, despite the
presence of lodgers. Even when the rental section is attached to
the main house, it usually has a separate entry way for privacy.
The occupants share a common kitchen, toilet and shower. In
general, the quality of the rental units depended on how much the
owner is able to invest, or is willing to invest based on
anticipated rental income. In one instance, the owner resided in
a 1-room shack behind a 4-room rental unit.
Most houses are in relatively good condition. Most are built
of sun dried brick, which is often plastered and painted. Some
are built of concrete block or burnt brick made on the site.
Roofs are either corrugated iron or asbestos cement, and are in
good condition. Most residents used a combination of old and new
materials in the construction of their houses. More durable
materials, such as window and door frames, were frequently
salvaged from former houses along the Hunyani River while new
materials are bought from local suppliers within the site. The
most popular local materials were bricks which are manufactured
using sand and clay from the banks of the nearby river. In one
case, the household manufactured the bricks themselves due to
lack of funds to purchase new materials. This is described in
the excerpt below:
The Tailor's Story
A migrant from Malawi, Said was allocated his
300 sq.m. stand in 1969. He has completed
four rooms and is in the process of adding
three more rooms to his house. He has no
intention of taking in lodgers. His house is
built of sun-dried bricks with the roof
consisting of gumpoles as rafters and
zinc/metal sheets. The windows and door
frames are wooden and the floor has a smooth
cement finish. Said's family uses two rooms
for sleeping, one as a living/dining room and
the other as a kitchen. The house has a small
veranda which Said uses for his "after hours"
tailoring activities.
Because of lack of finance to buy
conventional building materials, viz. bricks,
Said and his family molded the bricks, sun-
dried them, and used them for house
construction. He bought cement, zinc/metal
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sheets for the roof, gum poles, and stone for
the foundation. He had to dig up the sand
along the river and carried it himself to the
construction site.
While the use of sun-dried bricks has not met opposition
from the Municipality in the above example, the municipality may,
on occasion, insists on the use of more durable materials. In
the following case, the household was forced to destroy and
rebuild the original 6-room house after municipal inspectors
disproved of the quality of the materials used. This somewhat
arbitrary decision caused the family a great loss in time and
money.
The Second Tailor's Story
The household head is a migrant from Malawi.
He lives with his family in his present 7-
room house which has a separate 3-room lodger
unit behind it. Six rooms in the main unit
are used as bedrooms, while the seventh room
is used as a combined living and dining room.
One of the bedrooms doubles up as a tailoring
area where the owner receives orders from the
local clientele. The kitchen is built
separately since it is communally shared. The
veranda, originally open, has since been
incorporated with the living room to increase
floor space. The roof is built with asbestos
and timber salvaged from his previous house.
The walls are built of burnt bricks; the
floor cemented with a red-oxide polish. The
house is fenced in with wire mesh and has a
gate for entry. There is an elaborate finish
on the main entrance of the house with steps
leading into an elevated sitting room. In
addition to a small lawn, the house is
surrounded by a variety of flowers and fruit
trees such as guavas, lemons, mangoes and
avocados. On an empty lot across the road,
the owner operates a tuckshop and cultivates
a vegetable garden alongside it.
He was allocated his 300 sq.m. stand in 1967
after being evicted from the swampy area of
St. Mary's. Two months later he started to
develop his stand and incrementally built his
first 6-room house and rental unit over a
period of four years. The first house, built
by local builders, was made of asbestos under
sun-dried bricks. Unfortunately, he was
forced to tear it down after the municipality
indicated that the materials were below
standard, and the house, unsafe. He had paid
the builder Z$400 in cash into payments, and
bought the materials from local suppliers.
With much effort, he started building his
second house a few months later, salvaging as
much of the roofing materials as he could.
He would like to rebuild the roof with new
materials when resources become available.
With the exception of the roof, he used all
new materials. He put up the roof himself and
did the plumbing to reduce costs. He paid the
builder in stages, totalling to Z$1,336 for
seven rooms, over a period of five years. He
never took out any loan to build his house.
In spite of the difficulties of rebuilding his old house,
the tailor succeeded in constructing a house that is structurally
comparable to that found in the newer government-sponsored
projects. This shows that given time, households are able to
construct housing using their own resources, bringing to question
that finance is a critical constraint to construction and the
fear held by policymakers that without strict programmatic
constraints, such projects turn into slums. The following section
examines the informal financing strategies used by households to
build their houses.
Table 1. -- Summary of Construction Characteristics:
St. Mary's Township
Characteristics Respondents (N=12)
-------------------------------------------
Construction Mode
Self-help
Cooperative
Builder
Self-help & builder
Building Materials
Old
New
Old & New
Home-Made & New/Old
Initial Unit
1 room
2 rooms
3 rooms
4 rooms
5 rooms
Present Number
in Main House
1-3 rooms
4-5 rooms
6-8 rooms
of Rooms
Number of Rooms Rented
in Main House
1-2 rooms
3-4 rooms
4 rooms
Number of Rooms in
Separate Rental Unit
1-2 rooms -
3-4 rooms 8
4 + rooms 1
--------------------------------------------
Alternative Financing Mechanisms
Since the respondents were not eligible for financial
assistance from the municipality, they were asked how they
financed the construction of their houses. The response revealed
a variety of financing sources, including savings, employer loan,
rental income, material credit, and assistance from religious
groups. In addition, families reported having to adjust their
consumption patterns to meet building costs as well as having
lived on-site to avoid paying double rents.
Income and Savings
Since the St. Mary allottees were not eligible for loans,
they relied on monthly income and savings, if any, to finance a
major portion of their housing construction. Vegetable gardens,
no matter how small, served the important economic function of
reducing family food expenditures during this critical start-up
period. Rural assets did not play a major role in this
settlement primarily because of the nature of the population.
Many are migrants from the neighboring countries who had severed
ties with their families. Those who were from Zimbabwe were
either too poor to own rural assets, or were entrenched urbanites
who had severed their rural ties. There is also a large
religious sect which relied on their community's resources rather
than on rural kinship ties.
Savings with Material Suppliers
This mechanism functions as a savings account families
opened an account with a private supplier towards the future
purchase of building materials. In this way, respondents
disciplined themselves from spending the money on other expense
items. This is a variation on the practice of buying materials
incrementally, storing them on-site, until a sufficient quantity
is accumulated to construct the new portion of the house.
Rental Income
Of the financing strategies adopted by residents to cope
with inadequate capital, renting was the most important. The
widespread presence of separate rental blocks within the stand
indicates the importance of rent as an income source. Rental
income was used primarily to construct additional rooms, and
later, to pay for plot and service charges, as well as food. Many
owners claim that most of their renters had been with them for
several years, which reflect the continuing shortage of housing
in Harare. The following excerpt illustrates the importance of
rental income to housing construction.
The Tailor/Landlord's Story
The owner is seventy-two years old. He runs
his small tailoring business from the veranda
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of his 4-room house. The house is rented out
to four sets of lodgers, while the owner
resides in a separate 1-room shack behind the
main unit. There is a very small vegetable
garden on the stand which is cultivated by
the lodgers for their and the old man's
consumption.
The owner built the initial room from his
earnings as a tailor for an Indian shop in
the City. The materials were the cheapest he
could find. After the completion of the
second room, he took in his first set of
lodgers. Using this rental income, he
expanded the house to the third room. He took
in a second set of lodgers and used the
income to complete the fourth room. To
maximize rental income, he rented out the
fourth room, living in a small shack behind
the house. With rental income from four
rooms, he resigned from his job, and started
sewing from his stand.
The walls of the main house are made of
unburnt bricks with paint falling off the
plaster. The floors have been cemented; the
roof is built of galvanized iron roof sheets;
and the window frames are wooden. There is no
fence around the property; a huge rock
separates the house from the adjacent
property. It took him almost ten years to
complete the four rooms. He has no plans to
extend the main house.
The owner earns very little from sewing and
does not keep a running account of his
earning. Income derived from sewing is used
on daily expenses. His steady income comes
from his lodgers who each pay Z$10 per room.
His only expenditure is plot rent which is
Z$13 monthly. His food is provided by his
children, and the renters pay for water
charges as well. He has no savings.
In the above excerpt, the tailor used the rental income to
expand the house one room at a time. When rent was approximately
equal to what he earned from his employment, he resigned from his
job and become partially self-employed. Thus, rental income
substituted for his salary as a steady source of funds. The
following interview excerpt reinforces the importance of rental
income, particularly for the unemployed and those with irregular
and limited income.
The Second Landlord's Story
The owner is a migrant from Mozambique who
supports himself from the renting of rooms.
His house has eight rooms with a separate
lodging unit alongside it. At present he is
renting out six rooms at Z$15.
He was allocated his present 300 sq.m. stand
in 1969. He first built two rooms with the
help of a small builder, and gradually
extended it to the present eight rooms as
resources became available. At present his
family occupies four rooms while the
remaining six rooms are rented out. Rental
income is used to meet living expenses and
plot charges. Occasionally, his renters fail
to pay their rent on time. With his current
unemployment and dependence on rental income,
any delay in payments causes him cash flow
problems.
Employer Loan
For those employed in the formal sector, interest-free loans
from one's employer is another important source of financing.
Although the sums borrowed and the proportion of the loan to the
total cost of the dwelling were small, the importance of this
type of financing cannot be underestimated. In the case below,
the employer not only assumed all the initial cost of
constructing the initial 3-room core, but also undertook the
"contractual work" of buying the materials and hiring the
builder.
The Domestics' Story
Both the owner and his wife worked as
domestic help. Prior to moving to their 3-
room house, they lived on their employer's
premises rent-free. Their employer worked for
a construction company which, at that time,
was hired by the municipality to construct
the drainage system at St. Mary's. In this
way, he came to know of the relocation
project and asked the couple if they would be
interested in owning a house at St. Mary's.
The couple stated their interest but
expressed the problem of finance. Their
employer assured them that he would "arrange
everything". The latter acquired the 200
sq.m. stand on their behalf, and arranged for
the construction of the house over a 2-month
period. He only required them to repay him
for costs of the materials through monthly
salary deductions at no interest.
The couple themselves were not involved in
the construction of the house. The employer
acquired the stand for them, bought the
building materials, and hired the builder.
The couple moved in when the 3-room house was
ready. The walls, built of burnt bricks, are
plastered and painted; the cement floor has a
red polish; the roof consist of galvanized
iron and painted black; and the windows are
made of steel frames with glass panes. The
stand has a wire mesh fence. The couple have
added three rooms from their joint savings
using building materials they had
incrementally collected over the years. With
the materials ready, the builder completed
the 3-room rental unit within two weeks.
Rotating Saving and Credit Societies
At least two respondents indicated that they participated in
some form of savings and credit group. Group meetings were held
regularly each month during which members contributed a fixed
amount. At the inception of the group in the 1960s, the
contribution was $25 but this has since risen to $200 per month.
Credit, equivalent to the month's total collection, was allocated
by lottery, with the group ensuring that the money was used for
the purpose stated by the borrower. One member stated that she
used the loan to purchase building materials. The group, which
retains much of its original members, has since expanded its
activities to include other socio-political functions in the
community. She claims that this type of informal group is common
in the township, especially among women. This is not surprising
due to the large number of female-headed households, mostly
widows, at St.Mary's.
Religious Organizations
Another important source of financing at St. Mary's is a
religious sect, the Apostolic Sabbath Church of God (Masowe
Church), one of the growing independent religious sects in
Zimbabwe. The story is told of how Masowe and his followers
17 The members of this Church are referred to as the
'maPostoris' (Apostles) of Johane Masowe or simply the Korsten
basket-weavers. The Church emphasizes the influence and power of
58
sold all their property in Rhodesia and settled in Korsten, a
slum in Port Elizabeth on the South African coast where they
became noted for their industry in producing for sale goods
manufactured both by hand and by machine. Masowe believed that
the only way to protect the group from the corroding influence of
the outside world was to become self-reliant and self-sufficient
with regards to the fulfillment of one's material needs. The
maPostoris thus developed a variety of manual skills which they
brought with them from Southern Rhodesia. By 1955, they operated
a small furniture factory of their own in Korsten, and they were
transporting furniture for sale to districts far away from Port
Elizabeth as well as in the city itself. They were also very
enterprising in the production of tinware and baskets, hence the
famous name Korsten basket-weavers.18 In 1962 the implementation
of the South African Group Areas Act forced those who were not
native to South Africa to return home. Johane travelled to
Zambia and Kenya where he made further converts, but many of his
followers returned to Rhodesia where a large group settled in the
Seki Tribal Trust Land near present-day Harare and St. Mary's
the Holy Spirit in such practices as faith-healing, prophecy and
speaking in tongues.
18 Although basket-making was by no means their most
important or profitable form of industry,it was the one which
drew the most public attention as women and children, as well as
men, wove baskets around the Korsten village and hawked them on
the streets of Port Elizabeth at very reasonable prices.
Township.
This sect has a substantial membership, accounting for as
much as one-fourth of the total number of residents. While the
residents take in lodgers from outside the religious community,
it is very much a closed social group based on mutual help.
Members assist each other in building each other's houses, not
unlike a cooperative.19
The Story of a Former MaPostori
The standowner was a former member of the
MaPastori sect. Prior to building his own
house, he rented a room with a sect member in
St. Mary's. As a lodger, he found the
community very cohesive; this negated the
need for "too many house rules".
He financed the construction of his house
from a combination of savings and income from
secondary activities, notably, those
associated with the sect. As a lodger, he
learned how to weld tin into various
household items which he then sold around the
community. Sect members also assisted him in
constructing his initial 3-room house.
The owner initially built three rooms of
mediocre quality to give his family a place
to live rent-free. Around the same time, he
decided to leave the sect. A few months after
they moved on-site, he started building
another four rooms using a registered builder
and new materials. When the four rooms were
completed, he moved in and destroyed the
initial three rooms. Shortly thereafter, he
19 The community is a very close organization not easily
accessible to outside interviewers. The only case study of
financing from this source was an interview with a former member
of the Church who continued to reside in St. Mary's.
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started construction on another four rooms
which he rented out.
Self-Help Methods: Labor & Material Savings
Another strategy used by households to reduce the cost of
construction is to build the houses themselves and/or to
manufacture their own building materials. The use of both
methods is illustrated in the excerpt below:
The Widow's Story
The owner of the stand is a widow who relies
on rental income from one room for her
family's subsistence. The eldest daughter,
deserted by her husband, and her five
children reside with her mother. The widow
sells clothes occasionally to augment the
family income. She says that the only
expenditure that needs to met on a regular
basis every month is the plot rent of
Z$13.06. For food, the family cultivates a
small vegetable garden and the grandchildren
gather firewood. They also fish in the
river.
The 4-room house and the separate 3-room
rental unit are poorly finished. The
material used to build the house were home
made and second hand. The bricks were made by
the family, and the door and window frames
were salvaged from the various farms she used
to worked in. The roofing sheets and timber
were also second hand. Cement was purchased
from local suppliers. The glass for the
windows were new.
She started with three rooms with the help of
her son-in-law and grandchildren. During
construction the family lived on-site in
temporary shack. After the three rooms were
completed, the family moved into the house
but continued building the fourth room. She
later built the separate 3-room rental unit.
However, the quality of the construction was
so poor that she was only able to rent out
one room.
She spent only Z$160 for the purchase of
cement and glass. These were paid for in
cash. Labor and the rest of the materials
were free. As her economic situation
improves, she would like to replace the
wooden window and door frames with steel
ones, and replaster and refinish the house.
She would also like to demolish the existing
lodger unit, and rebuild it to a higher
standard so that she may charge a higher rent
for it. This would, in turn, constitute her
source of steady income.
Lengthening the Construction Period
Due to the lack of resources, most households built their
houses incrementally over an extended period of time. In the case
below, the standowner resided in a shack on-site while gathering
enough materials to initiate construction. She built her house
room by room over ten years until her eldest son started working
and could take over the expenses associated with the
consolidation of the house.
The Divorcee's Story
Mrs. F first lived on a farm in Ruwa where
her husband worked as a laborer. Later the
family moved to another farm before finally
settling in St. Mary's in 1962. Her husband
abandoned the family and she had to raise the
family on her own. She heard of the St. Mary
housing scheme at St. Mary's which was open
to widows and divorcees as well. She applied
for a stand and was first allocated a site
close to the Hunyani River Bank. Fearing
pollution of the river, the government
relocated her and other residents to the
present site of the township.
She built an 8-room house on her 300
sq.m.stand. This unit is used exclusively by
the family. Alongside the house is an 8-room
rental structure. All the occupants of the
main house and the rental unit share one
kitchen, toilet and bathroom. Both units are
built of burnt bricks and roofed with
asbestos sheets. The stand is fenced in with
a gate entry way.
Mrs. F considers herself lucky that at the
time of construction there was no time limit
within which to complete any size dwelling.
This provided her with enough time to gather
materials while she lived in a shack on-site.
She complained of shortage of funds during
construction. She never had enough money to
complete at least one room at once. It has
taken her more than ten years to complete the
house to its present level. Only when her
eldest son started working, has her financial
burden been relieved.
The Widow's Story
Mrs. R arrived in Harare in 1978 during the
liberation struggle. She first resided as a
lodger in Highfield but was eventually able
to buy a stand from an allottee who had to
return to the rural area. She paid for the
municipality Z$40 to obtain title to the
land.
Together with her children, Mrs. R lived on-
site for two years before starting
construction on her initial 3-room core unit.
During construction, the family suffered from
lack of food because most of their resources
were used for the construction of the house
and education of the children. She feels
fortunate not to be bound by a time
constraint given her erratic income sources.
It took her an additional four years to
complete the three rooms on her income from
informal activities. She is presently
unemployed and relies on her two sons to
support the family and extend the house to
seven room. So far six of the seven rooms are
roofed, but the plastering and flooring on
the last two rooms are not yet finished, and
the doors and window frames have not yet been
installed. When completed she plans to rent
out three rooms. She does not feel the ned
for a loan if given the freedom to build
without a time constraint. If offered a loan,
she would have turned it down because she
does not want to burden her children with a
long-term debt.
A trend that is evident from these cases is a reluctance by
households to borrow for either new construction or renovation.
Instead families prefer to spread out the construction activity
over several years to enable them to pay for the expenditures in
cash.
Attitudes About Credit Programs
In addition to financing sources, households also indicated
their attitudes about current standards and project requirements
as well as their opinion on mortgage terms. They were also asked
if they would have applied for a loan, if offered one. Since they
themselves were never eligible for such loans, it is interesting
to learn how these families felt programs should be designed to
best assist those in the informal sector.
The Printer's Story
Mr. N works at a printing shop in Harare. He
resides with his family of seven children in
his 7-room house in St. Mary's. There is a
separate 3-room rental unit alongside his
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house. Unlike most of the respondents, N was
born in Highfield in Salisbury where his
parents used to own a 4-room house. With the
death of his father, the expenditures in
maintaining the house became too burdensome
for him, and he sold the house. He squatted
on the banks of the Hunyani River while his
mother returned to their rural homestead
where she supervises the cultivation of his
six acre land. During 1985/86 she earned
Z$1000 worth of maize. All the money was used
for subsistence and purchase of farm inputs.
N earns Z$500 monthly from his job, while his
wife averages Z$100 from her knitting
activities. She owns a knitting machine and
runs her business from their house. Her
earnings are used to meet daily household
expenses. They also maintain a small
vegetable garden for family consumption.
He first built a 2-room house along the
river, using corrugated iron sheets as
roofing. He obtained most of his materials
from a businessman friend in exchange for
looking after the latter's accounts. He
complained that sanitation was a big problem
in the settlement. Four years later, he was
allocated his present 300 sq.m. stand in St.
Mary's. He started building his first 5-room
house two months later. He bought the bricks
from the local brick makers, and salvaged the
roofing material from his old house. For the
windows and doors, he got a loan of Z$300
from his employer. He repaid this loan
through a Z$4 monthly salary deduction. It
was interest-free. The builder charged him
Z$150 for constructing five rooms. He paid
the builder cash upon completion. He brought
in two lodgers whose rental payments were
used to pay for plot charges and food.
Six years later, he started the final
extension of his house. The builder charged
him Z$750 for the extension and renovation.
N and his wife painted the house themselves.
The materials for the 3-room extension were
Z$486, and were paid in cash from his wage
earnings. He spent another Z$260 for the
fence, and Z$45 for the title deed. Two
months later, he hired another builder to
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construct the 3-room rental unit on the same
stand. The builder charged Z$300 and the
materials cost him Z$320. All were paid for
in cash from his earnings. Each of his five
sets of lodgers pay Z$16 per month for rent.
This money is used for food and plot rent.
He feels that the government should provide
interest-free loans since the public already
pay sales tax on building materials. If he
were eligible for loans, he would prefer
materials rather than cash. If cash loans are
to be made available, they should be paid
directly by the municipality to the builder.
He commented that personally, he is against
long repayment periods because he realizes
that the longer the amortization period, the
more one would have to pay in interest
payments.
He wishes that employers assist their
employers in the construction of their houses
so that loans administered by the
municipality could be targeted to those in
the informal sector. He disagrees with
projects that provide low-income households
with only a serviced site and particularly
the restriction against on-site residence
during construction because these exacerbates
their financial burden by requiring them to
pay rent elsewhere while saving for
construction.
The interviewee felt the need to divide housing finance
programs between wage-earners and the self-employed, with
employers catering to the needs of the former, and the municipal
responding to the needs of the latter. In this way, he felt the
loan program can cater to the specific economic situation of each
category of borrowers, and invariably save the self-employed from
being penalized by affordability criteria that apply only to the
salaried participants. Table 2 presents a cross-sectional view
of the opinions expressed by respondents when asked how they
would respond if offered a mortgage loan within the context of
the government's current housing projects.
Table 2.--Cross-Sectional View of Respondent Attitudes
Regarding the Long-Term Mortgage Instrument and Construction
Requirements under the Present Housing Program
-------------------------------------------------------
1. "If offered a mortgage loan, I would never accept it. As a
free lance builder, I never know when I'll have the money to pay
it back."
2. "If I were ever offered a loan, it should be interest-free
since I am already paying sales tax on building materials."
3. "Since very few of us have had several years of schooling, I
strongly feel that any loan program should be well explained to
potential borrowers so we can understand what our future
financial obligations will be."
4. "I prefer the loan to be in the form of materials; cash credit
should be paid directly by the municipality to the builder to
avoid abuse of funds."
5. "I would never take out a long-term loan. I prefer a shorter
maturity period. A 25-year maturity period is too long and would
accrue too much interest payments relative to the principal."
6. "Instead of a mortgage loan, I would find a home improvement
or extension loan more useful, especially since I have plans to
extend my lodging unit."
7. "I would not be able to comply with the government's present
requirement of four rooms in 18 months. There is too much housing
to be built within such a short period of time. Since I am self-
employed, I am never sure how much I will earn in a month."
8. "I believe that the standowner should be permitted to live on-
site during construction to avoid the penalty of paying rent
elsewhere. In this way, he could also guard his building
materials."
Summary
This chapter has shown that low-income households living in
the St. Mary's Township are able to build and consolidate their
houses in the absence of formal finance. The literature review
indicated that this phenomenon is not unique to Zimbabwe but is a
commonly found in cities of the developing world. Moreover, the
case studies have demonstrated that not only are families able to
construct in the absence of formal credit, they are also not
interested in participating in mortgage finance programs, much
less under the conditions regulating the government's current
low-income housing projects.
CHAPTER IV
INSTITUTIONAL CONSTRAINTS TO ACCESS TO LAND
Access to land in Zimbabwe is only possible through
participation in government-sponsored housing projects. Squatter
settlements are regularly demolished, and the only existing low-
income settlements are those executed under government
sponsorship. By restricting access to land, the government will
only make it increasingly difficult for families to achieve
homeownership within the context of highly regulated government
housing schemes.
Constraints to Land Supply
The constraints to access to land for low-income housing in
Zimbabwe are institutional rather than physical in nature.
Unlike many other Sub-Saharan African countries, Zimbabwe does
not generally suffer from a shortage of land suitable for
residential development within existing urban areas. It is
estimated that in Harare, the most land-short of the larger urban
centers, enough publicly-owned land exists to accommodate over
30,000 additional units, sufficient to satisfy estimated
requirements for the next four years. In Bulawayo, the 1981
Master Plan states that available residential land can
accommodate an additional 1.2 million people or 200,000 more than
the projected population of twenty years hence (World Bank,
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1981). Over 11,500 hectares of land are owned by the
municipality which could be made available for residential use.
The situation is similar in other major urban centers such as
Mutare, Masvingo, etc. where sufficient public land is available
to accommodate urban growth for at least the next decade. only in
Harare will the availability of land become a constraint in the
next few years.
Although, in general, land supply is not a constraint in the
foreseeable future, donor agencies (World Bank, 1985:47) have
expressed a fear that the profligate use of urban land could lead
to shortage in the largest cities in a short time. Their concern
pertains particularly to Harare where large reservations for
schools, other community facilities and roads would seriously
deplete the supply of vacant municipally-land in a little over
two years. Thus, they have urged the government to offer a wider
range of plot options by trading plot sizes against service
standards. This issue is demonstrated by the growing concern
expressed by middle-income households over the high development
costs of big plots. Echoing this demand for smaller lots, a
leading estate agent has suggested that the Harare Municipal
Council divide the plots into smaller parcels for those who wish
to build their own homes. "At the moment, we have large plots
which people cannot afford, like an acre plot in Borrowdale. Who
wants all that land for a small house? People need 1000 sq.m.
plots they can manage." 20 In this regard, Zimbabwe is not
unique. Newly independent countries typically strive to parallel
standards, traditionally reserved for the privileged colonial
class, for the bulk of its population, not only in housing but in
land and infrastructure as well. This is particularly true when,
as in Zimbabwe's case, there is ample supply of land for
potential residential development, or when foreign exchange does
not pose a major constraint. However, history has shown that the
state of post-independence euphoria is quite brief as demographic
and urbanization factors catch up with finite resources.
The current land surplus situation in Zimbabwe can be
attributed to the rigid land use controls imposed by the colonial
government to segregate the black population from the whites.
These early segregationist policies resulted in a relatively
lower level of urbanization compared with other countries on the
basis of per capita Gross National Product (Mutizwa-Mangiza,
1985:7).
20 Due to the shortage of middle-income housing, and the
consequent rise in housing prices, developers, real estate agents
and families have been looking for more affordable ways of
building and financing housing. For instance, a recently launched
housing scheme in Harare enables households to construct a house
at a cost of about Z$30,000, just above the minimum cost of
putting up a home in the low density suburbs. It does not have
built-in cupboards, fireplace, curtain tracks and other finishing
which would have otherwise raised the price to Z$40,000.
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The situation of surplus land supply has not, however, been
translated into available land since access has been restricted
to participation in highly regulated government-sponsored housing
projects. This has given rise to an ironical situation wherein a
surplus land supply suitable for residential development exists
alongside a situation of housing shortfall. The shortage in land
available for housing is clearly due to institutional rather than
physical constraints.
The study argues the institutional constraint to land is not
a conscious decision on the part of the government to exclude the
lowest-income groups from obtaining land. On the contrary, as
discussed in chapter II, the government views its monopolistic
control of land-- the result of a colonial tradition
characterized by the government's dominant role as supplier of
low-income housing --as an integral component of its socialist
strategy to rectify inequalities of the past. The provision of
adequate housing is an essential element of Zimbabwe's social
development program. The housing "problem", manifested in severe
overcrowding, is perceived by the government not only as a
shortage in the supply of affordable housing, but more
fundamentally, as a manifestation of the inequitable allocation
of resources that has historically divided socio-economic and
racial groups, and promoted rural-urban dichotomies. In
particular, the migrant labor system, which envisaged the black
worker as a temporary dweller in urban commercial areas, and the
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Land Apportionment Act which severely restricted the areas in
which blacks could own property, contributed to the shortage of
low-income housing at the time of independence. In this context,
the government perceives housing as both a goal of, and vehicle
for, development. This is reflected in its Plan which stresses
the role of housing as an effective tool for the redistribution
of wealth, and for the creation of a more balanced human
settlements system. Volume 2 of the Transitional National
Development Plan 1982/83-1984/85 (Republic of Zimbabwe, 1982 and
1983) outlines the main components of the new government's
housing strategy, stating explicitly its commitment to the
delivery of serviced sites, hand in hand with the strict
enforcement of housing standards in both urban and rural areas.
In this context, control of land is assumed to be a necessary
component of the government's housing delivery system. It is
never considered as an issue due to its abundant supply unlike
finance which, in the government's eyes, is critical in order to
make current housing solutions affordable to low-income
households.
Nevertheless, an implicit policy of restricted land access
can lead to a paradoxical situation whereby a government, in its
desire to elevate the living standards of its historically
deprived population, effectively hinders the neediest from
acquiring land by restricting access to government schemes. Since
constraint to land is institutional, i.e. a product of policy, it
implies a need for an institutional and political, rather than
financial intervention in the current housing process. Only by
eliminating the current constraints to land access can the
government truly offer poor families affordable housing
solutions. Evidence from other countries have shown that land is
an essential resource for the creation of housing. Similarly, it
has been affirmed that the issue of land is not a technical, or
in the case of Zimbabwe, a physical issue, but rather a political
and institutional one. The resolution of the housing shortage
lies in finding and putting into action effective arrangements
for helping the poor gain access to land (Angel, et.al., 1983;
Doebele, 1985). The next section will discuss these institutional
barriers to access to land.
Institutional Barriers to Access to Land
Institutional barriers to land access are primarily
articulated in two ways. The first and most obvious expression
of regulation is the government's strong stance against squatter
formation. The government's present policy calls for the removal
of squatters and the bulldozing of illegal settlements. 21 The
second barrier to land access comes in the form of programmatic
constraints which, by elevating the cost of housing beyond what
families are able to afford, effectively excludes them from
21 USAID, Zimbabwe: Urban Upgrading and Community
Facilities, Project Paper (Unclassified), 1984.
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access to land. The impact of standards and other program
constraints on poor families are discussed in greater depth in
the chapter on standards. For the present, only an abbreviated
discussion will be presented here.
The Government of Zimbabwe's present housing policy calls
for the removal of squatters and the bulldozing of illegal
settlements. So far, the government has been successful in
eradicating transient settlements, in part because of the low
level of urbanization present at the time of independence.
Zimbabwe is in a unique position in that the government does not
yet have to deal with an uncontrollable surge of squatter
settlements. This is primarily the result of legislation which
enabled authorities to control the flood of rural migrants
seeking jobs in urban areas. The African (Urban Areas)
Accommodation and Registration Act of 1951 required that all
residents of African townships and domestic servants resident on
employers' premises be registered with township authorities. The
Vagrancy Act empowered civil authorities to send back to the
tribal area those who cannot prove they are gainfully employed or
formally registered urban residents. The Land Tenure Act
specified those areas in which persons of each race may reside,
and also enabled authorities to sweep aside any embryonic
squatter settlements. In this way, the colonial government
regulated the flow of male migrants to urban areas by tying
residence to the availability of employment.
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The government's active campaign against squatter
settlements was spearheaded in the post-independence period by
the then Minister of Housing Zvogo. Immediately after he took
office, Zvogo launched a campaign to eradicate squatter
settlements starting with the squatter camp in Mbare Musika in
Harare in which squatter were exhorted to return to the rural
areas. Although a few went, most considered they had nothing to
return to that was economically viable. Some families were
accommodated in very over crowded condition in former 'single'
men's hostels, while other families were moved further away from
the road, out of sight of the main public highway in the area.
Another large squatter settlement Chirambuyo in Chitungwiza,
housing some 30,000 people, also fell victim to the demolition
squad. The self-built houses were razed without any compensation
paid to the occupants. The new squatter settlements that sprang
from the demolition of Chirambuyo were bulldozed to the ground.
Under "Operation Clean-Up" initiated by the Zimbabwe African
National Union Central Committee, the police and army arrested
squatters throughout the cities in late-night and dawn raids,
bulldozing or burning down houses. The government insisted that
squatters return to the rural areas through rural-resettlement
schemes, including those squatters who were long-term urban
dwellers forced to squat due to the lack of affordable housing
alternatives. This has left low-income households with little
choice but to apply for municipal housing schemes or to rent, at
times paying exorbitant rents. Others have attempted to
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construct temporary shelters using whatever materials they can
collect, such as plastic sheeting, metal sheets, poles and grass.
Most squatter settlements have, however, been merely flushed out
by the municipal authorities with no alternative arrangements
provided for the people. Other households reside with family
members through the extended family system which often
incorporates groups of houses; some hot-bed by shift of workers
while others reside in employer- and domestic-accommodation.
There is also a growing number of 'settlement extensions' to farm
compounds which vary in size and are kept in check through
municipal 'surveillance' (Horrell, 1981). 22
Partly because of the absorptive capacity of the lodger
market and the government's anti-squatter policy, the growth of
squatter settlements in Zimbabwe has not yet reached alarming
proportions found in other East African countries (Hywel,
1981:75). The government's alternative to squatter settlements is
an ambitious housing program intended to house all urban
households within 15 years and all rural households within 30
years. However, given current standards, government solutions
As a result of the Municipality's close watch, there is
no security of tenure to speak of, and there appears to be little
prospect of such being established in the immediate future.
23 Donald Manson and Harold Katsura, Meeting the Housing
Needs of Zimbabwe: An Assessment of the Alternatives, Urban
Institute, prepared for the Office of Housing and Urban Programs,
U.S. Agency for International Development, Washington, D.C.,
February, 1985 (field draft).
are unaffordable to a large segment of the urban poor, and will
require enormous subsidies which the government is unable to
afford. 24
Summary
The issue of land presents the greatest paradox in
Zimbabwe's housing policy. While in the colonial regime, the poor
were deprived access to urban land through segregationist land
policies, under the current regime, the government in its desire
to rectify pass inequalities, has raised the standards of housing
within projects such that the very poor are once again excluded
from access to land. This is exacerbated by the government's
adverse attitude towards squatters and squatter upgrading (USAID,
1987). If access to land is restricted to projects, low-income
households will have little choice but to either rent, and
thereby lose their ability to convert surplus labor into
increased dwellings, or to participate in the projects at
considerably higher costs than they are willing, or are capable
of paying.
Improving the supply of land for housing the poor in
Zimbabwe will require, among other things, opening up the land
market to formal and informal private sectors for housing
24 For a fuller discussion of this issue, refer to the
chapter on standards.
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development and the adoption of appropriate building standards
and infrastructure levels. Similarly, the government could
introduce infrastructure standards that lend themselves to
gradual improvements over time. Above all, the government needs
to change its role from supplier to facilitator of the housing
process, increasing access by low-income families to various
factors of production of which land has proven to be the most
critical.
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CHAPTER V
STANDARDS AS A NON-ISSUE IN THE
HOUSING PROCESS
This chapter posits that by emphasizing standards and the
rate of construction, the government makes it more difficult for
families to participate in housing programs. It is argued that
the government's focus on standards detracts from the real issue
of access to land, and results in a dilemma for households who,
because of small loan-to-value mortgages, are unable to pay for
the standard dwelling unit even with mortgage finance.
This chapter will identify existing building standards and
other housing programmatic constraints in Zimbabwe. Likewise, it
will analyze the government's rationale for instituting these
program requirements, and the position of building societies vis-
a-vis standards and pace of construction. Finally, it will
examine the problems which these requirements present to low-
income households, arguing that the current level of standards
are unaffordable to lower-income households, and thereby, create
the artificial need for mortgage finance.
Standards and Other Programmatic Constraints
Shortly after independence, the Government of Zimbabwe
formulated building standards and program requirements regulating
the mode and pace of construction. These requirements were
introduced in the context of its implicit land allocation policy
which restricted land ownership to participation in government-
sponsored housing projects.
By definition, only those with incomes at, or below the
median are eligible to participate in the government's low-income
housing projects. Participants are required to complete four
rooms including ablution facilities within eighteen months of
stand allocation. The complete 7-room, 70 sq.m. structure has to
be erected within five years of stand allocation. They could
select among three modes of construction. Under the aided self-
help concept, participants may perform all of the construction
work themselves or, alternatively, hire out some or all of the
work to contractors. Another method available is the hiring of
local building brigades.25 Finally, participants could opt to
construct their homes using mutual self-help cooperatives through
which beneficiaries would assist one another in homebuilding.26
25 In reality this method is seldom used. Brigade labor is
estimated to be about 50% more expensive than labor hired
directly by a beneficiary, largely because of higher
administrative and overhead costs. Source derived from Ministry
of Public Construction and National Housing, "Low-Income Shelter
Project: Parkridge/Fountainbleu Phase I: Project Delivery Plan".
Prepared for submission to the U.S. Agency for International
Development, 1984.
26 In practice, a large portion of the construction in urban
areas is performed by small contractor/builders. This is
consistent with findings in other countries where self-help
methods are encouraged (World Bank, 1980). In rural areas, where
the experience of the Ministry of Public Construction and
National Housing is more limited, there are also indications that
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During the construction period, families are not permitted to
reside on-site prior to the completion of one rooms and ablution
facility.
The amount of money that households spend on housing depends
not only on their income, but also on the share of income that
they devote to housing expenditures. This share varies across
different income groups, ranging from as high as 23.1% for lower
income households to 13.1% for the highest income groups.
Moreover, lower-income households are willing to allocate even a
higher percentage of their income for better housing. Based on
these findings27, the government stated that no more than 27.5%
of household income should be devoted for housing expenditures.
The government adopted two standards for urban and
metropolitan area, and rural areas housing. Appendix D describes
the design criteria established by the Ministry of Public
Construction and National Housing for both areas. In rural
areas, the government views virtually all housing as
unacceptable. Even in instances where housing is of high quality
households have hired contractors to build their homes.
27 Marja C. Hoek-Smit, Housing Preferences and Potential
Housing Demand of Low-Income Urban Households in Zimbabwe: Vol I:
Harare and Vol. II. Kadoma, Marondera and Chinhoyi, prepared for
the U.S. Agency for International Development, Washington, D.C.
1983.
and sound construction, it is considered inadequate if not
located in planned rural villages.
Literature Review: A Critique of Housing Standards
The literature on housing standards is vast and disparate.
Annez (1981: 49-50) has grouped them into three types. The first
is descriptive literature, drawing on the works of Dickens, Hugo
and Zola, which chronicles the nature of housing conditions among
the very poor. The second school of thought decried these
deplorable conditions in such classic works as The Bitter Cry of
Outcast London published by Reverend Mearns in 1883 and Engel's
The Conditions of the Working Class (1884). Finally, Annez notes
a third type of normative literature on housing which was
responsible for the first proposals for minimum standards. These
later became the foundation for court decisions defining minimum
specifications.
It is unfortunate that in recent times, a substantial supply
of popular housing solutions are being destroyed in the name of
social reform. Turner (1967:167) states that planning and
building codes designed to improve and maintain modern housing
standards have the opposite effect in many countries. Commenting
on standards, he states:
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The argument, briefly, is that the principle
of "minimum modern standards" is based on
three assumptions: that high structural and
equipment standards take precedence over high
space standards; that households can and
should move when their socio-economic status
has changed so that they can afford to have a
larger (above minimum) standard dwelling; and
that the function of the house is, above all,
to provide a hygienic and comfortable
shelter. While these assumptions are valid in
the United States, Europe and the USSR, they
do not hold true for such countries as Peru,
Turkey, and the Philippines.
He adds the observation that families in developing
countries typically prefer to live in large unfinished houses or
even large shacks rather than small finished ones. "The typical
family, earning an uncertain wage in an unstable economy which
provides little or no social security, depends heavily on
property for security... for such families, the vast majority in
the cities of urbanizing countries, housing is a 'vehicle for
social change'."
Even in the United States, the enforcement of standards has
led to the eradication of slums and the growing number of
homeless people on the streets. Peattie (1987:69) emphasizes the
importance given by policymakers to the social presentation of
housing. "A 'slum' may be operationally defined as housing which
is thought to disgrace society. Part of urban policy is
identifying housing which is a social disgrace and getting rid of
it." In the course of eradicating 'sub-standard' housing, and the
imposition of higher standard, more expensive alternatives,
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valuable housing stock is lost, and more people are deprived of
shelter, access to employment, source of income and capital
investment.
The government's rationale for the current level of housing
standards in Zimbabwe is a combination of normative, technical,
and institutional motivations. In particular, there is a need to
analyze the institutional interests that are mutually served by
the maintenance of such standards. These interests are summarily
examined below.
The Government's Perspective
Housing is an important element in the government's strategy
to rectify past socio-economic inequalities. To this end, the
government has insisted on high standards, similar to those
reserved for white Rhodesians, to compensate for the deplorable
pre-independence low-income accommodations for blacks. Zimbabwe
is not unique in this regard.28
The first elements of a housing policy in Zimbabwe were set
forth in Volumes 1 and 2 of the Transitional National Development
28 Rodwin and Sanyal (1985) suggest that, for many
developing countries, standards are a reflection of inherited
colonial standards, while often times serving as an indicator of
modernization and economic progress, particularly when the
shortage of foreign exchange is not a problem.
Plan 1982/83 - 1984/85 (Republic of Zimbabwe, 1982 and 1983).
These early documents established the principles that are
reflected in the present housing policies of the Ministry of
Public Construction and National Housing. These policies
emphasize the need to establish equity between socio-economic
groups and geographic regions within the country. This broad
principle has been translated into policies which have been
implemented in the last three years. No where is this more
evident than in the government's approach to housing, and its
policy regarding standards.
For the government of Zimbabwe, standards are among the most
visible signs of its ability to provide the population with an
improved quality of life compared to the pre-independence period.
In the case of Zimbabwe, windfall gains from a diversified
economy combined with the infusion of international assistance
for housing programs contributed to the post-independence
euphoria behind the launching of the government's ambitious
housing program. Ironically, by insisting on programmatic
requirements to ensure that the quality of dwelling units
approximate what it considers as socially and politically
29 For instance, well over 50% of all government financing
in 1986 for housing was derived from external assistance which is
a very high proportion when compared with other developing
countries. Source derived from Coleman and Lintz, Housing Finance
in Zimbabwe, prepared for submission to the Office of Housing and
Urban Programs, U.S. Agency for International Development,
Washington, D.C., April 1985.
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acceptable, the government is making it increasingly difficult
for lower-income households to afford the government's housing
solutions.
Standards from the Perspective of the
Building Societies
In order to protect the interests of their shareholders and
depositors, as well as the interest of the home buyers, the
building societies lay down a standard minimum building
specification. This specification, which normally conforms to
the local authority by-laws, is intended to ensure an acceptable
level of structured standard and durability. Moreover, the
requirement regulating the speed of construction enables building
societies to secure the value of their investment within the
shortest time possible, thereby reducing the risk associated with
lending to low-income households.
To respond to the increasing number of lower-income groups
in the local government areas, the societies adapted a new
specification, known as Grade B specification, which allows for a
lower standard in regard to internal finishes. However, with
regards to structural requirements, these specifications differ
little from the higher specification.
This lower specification allows a greater number of houses
in the local government areas to be considered for a building
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society loan. While no monetary value is attached to the minimum
B Grade specification, it would be true to say that a house
constructed to these minimum standards would cost in the order of
Z$7,000 to Z$8,000 at 1981 building cost -- well above that
affordable to low-income households.30
For a number of reasons building societies are reluctant to
accept a lower minimum specification to include more houses in
the very low cost range. These are as follows:
(a) The building societies have a responsibility to their
shareholders and depositors, and they do not consider that houses
constructed to standards lower than their minimum B specification
provide adequate security for the funds invested by their
shareholders and depositors;
(b) The building societies consider that they have a moral
responsibility to house buyers to ensure that the house is
structurally of a type which, in their view, will remain
habitable for a period well beyond the 25-year repayment period
without major maintenance expenditure; and,
(c) The present administrative structure of the building
societies is such that they would find it extremely difficult to
administer a very large number of small loans. To undertake such
30 Whitsun Foundation, A Credit System for Financing Low-Income
Housing in Zimbabwe, (Zimbabwe: Salisbury, 1981).
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a tasks would require a greatly increased staff, leading to an
increase in administrative cost which, in turn, would lead to an
overall increase in the present interest rate structure. In
the past, the participation of building societies in the low-
income housing market was limited to the provision of block loans
to government and municipalities for the development of low-
income housing estates.
In this light, the government's enforcement of present
building standards could easily be a secondary quid pro gu for
the participation of building societies in low-income housing.
The government's insistence that the 4-room unit be completed
within eighteen months reduces the risk to building societies
lending to economically vulnerable clients. Finally, as pointed
above, the Grade B specifications do not differ from higher
specifications, thus ensuring that the quality of housing built
within low-income projects are structurally similar to housing
for upper-income households.
The Impact of Standards on Lower Income Households
The Ministry of Public Construction and National Housing has
indicated that it would like to provide standard housing to all
urban area residents within a period of 15 years and to all rural
areas within 30 years (Manson and Katsura, 1985). This ambitious
housing program has imposed a tremendous strain on the financial
capability of the government, as well as on lower-income
households who are in most need of housing. In an effort to
maintain these standards, the government has, in recent times,
shifted part of the burden of financing housing to the building
societies. In turn, the societies have shared this financial risk
with the local authorities through a mortgage guarantee program.
As will be shown in subsequent chapters, the reluctance of the
local authority to assume this risk has posed a potential
impediment for low-income, self-employed applicants from
obtaining a guarantee, and therefore, from participating in the
projects. Clearly, in the long run, the brunt of the financial
risk created by excessive standards is ultimately borne by
project participants who are confronted with restricted housing
and tenure choices. The next section discusses the impact of
building standards and other programmatic constraints on low-
income families.
Building Standards
The fundamental issue behind building standards is its
affordability to the target population. Are the standards
affordable given the participant's ability to pay? Is it
realistic to expect low-income families to comply with the
required standards without subsidies? Is a policy of full cost
recovery of both capital and recurrent expenditures realistic and
practical? From a policy perspective, who ultimately pays for
the standards? Can the government afford the political price of
unmet housing expectations? How will it compare this price to the
public cost of subsidizing its public image as major supplier of
quality housing?
In 1985, Manson and Katsura (1985)31 studied the housing
needs of Zimbabwe to determine, among other things, whether the
current level of standards is affordable both from the
perspective of population as well as the government. 32 The study
calculated what percent of the population would require subsidies
are the current level of standards, and how large a
subsidy will be necessary to maintain a housing program of this
scale.
From the perspective of the government, the study indicated
that the costs of an ambitious housing program in Zimbabwe are
currently not affordable. Providing every family with at least a
4-room core within the next few decades would require massive
31 Manson, Donald and Harold Katsura, Meeting the Housing
Needs of Zimbabwe: An Assessment of the Alternatives, a report
prepared by the Urban Institute for the United States Agency for
International Development, Washington, D.C., February, 1985.
32 The methodology that has been applied in this analysis is
the "Basic Needs" approach described in Guidelines for the
Preparation of a Housing Needs Assessment (USAID, 1984). Using
data on the demographic and economic characteristics of the
population, along with estimates of the cost of constructing
housing units that meet acceptable standards, this methodology
estimates the annual production and investment requirements
needed to provide adequate housing within a given planning
period.
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resources that are currently not available to the government.
Manson and Katsura (1985) have estimated that between 1985 and
1989, 126,640 housing solutions will be required annually to meet
the housing needs of Zimbabwe. Out of the total number of
households nationwide requiring a housing solution in 1989,
90,810 households will require subsidies to afford housing at the
existing minimum standard. This subsidy requirement can be
measured as a share of central government capital spending. Under
the current condition, 67.24% of public expenditures, or 9.44% of
Gross Domestic Product will have to be allocated for housing
investment. Considering the other publicly-funded development
programs, such as health and education, this level of subsidy is
bound to be unattainable.
In the end, low-income households must bear the burden of
excessive standards and housing shortage as they must double up
to compete for scarce housing. Continuation of the standard 4-
room core unit solution requires the acceptance of the current
practice of lodging as fees obtained from tenants are used by the
primary occupants to offset the payments they make on the
dwelling. The study thus concludes that the affordability of a
4-room core by median-income households is only achievable by
increasing occupancy rates through lodging. Moreover, complete
cost-recovery is unlikely to be achieved if all households are to
be housed in accordance with existing standards. Low-income
households will require some assistance, particularly given the
downward trend in real urban household income due to the current
pattern of rural-to-urban migration. The enormous investment and
subsidy requirements of a program that provides at least a 4-room
dwelling for all households suggests that a modest and
incremental approach should be taken in regards to housing. This
calls for a reduction in housing standards as well as the
creation of new jobs and other social investment that would raise
general income levels.
To put the issue in the perspective of other housing
solutions offered in the past, Mutizwa-Mangiza (1984) related
the low-income household distribution to alternative housing
options to determine the affordability of a 4-room core to the
majority of these households. The affordability curve is
presented in Figure 1. Using the government's assumption that
families will devote 27.5% of their income to housing, he also
calculated the monthly household income necessary to afford
recurrent expenses and building loan charges associated with the
construction of a 4-room core at Kuwadzana in 1982. Of Harare's
low-income households, 16% could not afford any of the available
housing options; 37.5% could afford a serviced plot without a wet
core; 9% could afford a one-room core; 5.5% a 2-room core; 3% a
3-room core; and 16% a 4-room core.33 In the specific case of
3 Moreover, it should be noted that the households
constituting the upper end of the income distribution curve shown
in Figure 1, although located in the high-density areas, cannot
be regarded as low-income. They are among the middle and
high-income blacks in Harare who were forced to reside in the
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Kuwadzana, with Z$175.00 as the cut-off point for participation
in 1982, the most that households in this income group could
afford without financial assistance is a 1-room core. Moreover,
the long-term construction loan is, based on the affordability
criteria set by the government, only sufficient to cover a
fraction of total construction cost. It would thus appear that
the standards embodied in the 4-room core is beyond the financial
reach of a vast majority of Harare's low-income population,
particularly considering that those households currently on
housing waiting lists are also likely to have the lowest incomes
within the low-income category. The following interview excerpt
demonstrates that, for many poor families, the assumption that
only 27.5% of income will be spent for housing is not realistic.
The Seamstress' Story
Mrs. C is a single mother with three
children. She was born and raised in the
Chivu district of Masvingo. She earns her
living as a seamstress although she also
sells clothes, through her mother, in her
village.
As a seamstress, her income fluctuates with
the season. On average, however, she earns
Z$30 to Z$40 monthly. The sale of clothes
brings in an average net income of Z$100
monthly. She also raises vegetables in her
plot for food consumption.
She is not interested in joining a savings
high-density areas or 'African Townships' because of the
prevailing tenure system. Many of these blacks did not move into
the low-density areas after independence.
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group since her precarious financial
situation makes regular contributions
difficult to meet.
She waited seven years on the municipal list
before being allocated her present stand. She
cleared the land herself and dug the
foundation trenches. It took her two months
to complete these tasks. She was able to
complete three rooms before her funds from
the loan and savings were used up. She is
anxious to complete the fourth room for fear
of losing her stand, but is unable to
financially.
She complained that about 80% of her income
from selling clothes is used to pay for plot
charges, builder' and materials' credit.
Moreover, she owes the Municipality Z$40 in
back payments for sewage services. She
complained that the municipality has made it
difficult for her to pay her overdue account
by refusing incremental payments. However,
the irregularity of her income makes it
difficult for her to pay her debt in full at
once.
Pace of Construction
As with many other developing countries, Zimbabwean policy
makers are extremely sensitive to the rate at which progress is
made in improving housing circumstances of the urban poor. The
government regulates the start up period as well as the length of
construction. The Ministry of Public Construction and National
Housing requires beneficiaries of aided self-help housing
projects to complete a habitable 4-room house (with plumbing)
within eighteen months of being allocated a stand. This policy
is incorporated into the Agreement of Sale between the
municipality and the project beneficiaries. Thus, beneficiaries
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make a legal commitment with the government to construct a 4-room
unit within the specified period of time regardless of income.
The Agreement provides that, at the discretion of the local
authority implementing the project, this period can be extended
to six additional months, depending on satisfactory progress
having been made during the first eighteen months. The same
Agreement also require beneficiaries to begin construction within
six months of allocation. In order to be granted a loan,
beneficiaries are obliged to complete the digging of the
foundation trenches for their houses.
Most allottees began construction between one and four
months after allocation, and the signing of the loan agreement
took place anywhere from two weeks to two months following the
trench digging". Moreover, those who were allocated stands in
the early months of the program took longer to begin construction
than those who were allocated stands once the program was well
underway. The start of the foundation typically began within one
34 Wegge, Jon, "Kuwadzana Construction Progress Report - A
Report on Progress by Kuwadzana Allottees Who Have Has Stands for
at Least Eighteen Months," a paper prepared for the USAID and the
ministry of Public Construction and National Housing to
facilitate review of project implementation, (Harare, Zimbabwe:
Ministry of Public Construction and National Housing), December
11, 1985. The report looks at the levels of construction reached
by the first allottees at Kuwadzana who have owned stands for at
least 18 months. Of the 1,040 allottees who purchased stands
during from February to April of 1984, 924 (or 89%) are in the
process of constructing a house. The remaining 116 have either
withdrawn from the project or had their agreements of sale
cancelled because of inability or unwillingness to make necessary
monthly payments.
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month of securing the first loan installment. The evaluation
report notes that "it took beneficiaries who were allocated
stands between February and May (1983) on average three months to
start digging the trenches. It took those allocated stands
during June and July about two months to commence this work.
Between August and October, beneficiaries took on average one and
a half months to start construction. It is likely that the
beneficiaries who were allocated stands in the early months were
more timid about beginning construction and perhaps less
knowledgeable about the process than those who came later and had
the benefit of seeing the first group accomplish this task"
(Holin 1986: 38).
Borrowers typically waited for three to six months after
allocation to request loans. However, if it is assumed that the
initial loan is necessary to serve as seed capital to initiate
the building process, then one would expect a shorter period
between stand allocation and initial loan request, as well as a
relatively fast draw down rate. In fact, evidence indicates that
there is a three to six months delay in the first allocation
request. Data from the case studies indicated that this is due
in part to the fact that households usually clear the land and
dig the foundations themselves, and then apply for the loan.
However, most are only able to do these on their free time. For
those formally employed, ground preparation is done on weekend;
for those self-employed, even the weekends may be difficult. The
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process is especially difficult for women, mostly widows or
divorcees, who undertake the labor themselves to reduce costs.
Women and children also played an important role in transporting
materials from the project depot to their stands using
wheelbarrows borrowed from the depot.
In terms of construction time, a survey of 924 allottees in
Kuwadzana (Wegge, 1985), undertaken eighteen months after the
start of the project, indicated that 31% met construction
requirements, 53% completed or nearly completed their 4-room
house, and 64% completed or nearly completed the necessary
sanitary work (Wegge:1986). In terms of "habitability", i.e.
the completion of at least one room with plumbing installed or
underway, 62% of households had reached this level within 18
months. Of these, 31% were houses of at least four rooms. In
other words, only a third of the beneficiaries were able to meet
the program requirement of completing four rooms plus plumbing
within the prescribed period of time.
35 Breaking down these findings according to stages of
construction, it can be seen that 82% had completed 4-room floor
slabs; 4.9%, a floor slab for only three rooms; 5%, a floor slab
for only two rooms; and 2% slabs for only one room. With regards
to the walls, 52% of respondents had completed the walling for
four or more rooms; 7% for only three rooms; 22% for only two
rooms; and 4.8% for only one room. Finally in terms of roofing,
37% of respondents had completed the roofs for at least four
rooms; 8% for only three rooms; 24% for only two rooms; and 7.9%
for only one room. With regards to drainage, 56% had completed
plumbing; 7.6% were in the process of installing plumbing; and
35% had not started plumbing work.
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Allottees who have not been able to comply with the
requirement can be broken down into three categories. The first
group of eight households did not request or obtain loans. All
of them, however, are eligible for a loan large enough to
complete their work to at least the minimum habitable level of
one room and ablution facilities. None were at arrears at the
time of the study, indicating that they were managing financially
and could obtain normal loans if they so desired.
The second group, consisting of 92 allottees, have
undertaken some construction but have not yet drawn down their
entire loans. Despite having incomes and loans slightly above
average for the entire group of 924, on average these allottees
had experienced and are experiencing considerable difficulty
making the payments they have been obligated to make. In many
cases, their difficulties with arrears have made it difficult for
them to obtain loan installments. By being sent to the Overdue
Accounts, nearly half have come to the verge of having their
agreements of sale cancelled. Despite not having completed
housing to a habitable level, four of the partially completed
structures were occupied; two with plumbing but without permanent
roofs, and two with permanent roofs but without plumbing.
It is interesting to note that the project implementation
team felt that providing additional loans to this set of
beneficiaries seems risky and likely to force some of them into
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arrears. Instead, they strongly suggest that... "the most
feasible way of assisting this group is simply to give them more
time to reach a habitable level, and to require that all loan
funds they obtain from their present loans be used solely to
achieve habitability with one room" (Wegge, 1985).
The third and largest category of beneficiaries consists of
207 allottees who had drawn down all their loan funds without
having completed a habitable unit. Although their average income
was lower than average for all 924 beneficiaries in the sample,
this group made serious efforts to construct houses and make
regular payments. They have not reached a habitable
level with their houses because they have attempted to build more
housing than they need, much less afford.
The imposition of the 4-room within 18 months leads
households to over consume housing. This places a tremendous
strain on their cash flow, forcing some to rent out one of the
four rooms, not so much to earn a profit, as to simply pay back
the mortgage loan. This is illustrated in the case below:
The Tailor's Story
K is a tailor with six children. His
family resides in the rural area during the
tilling season.
He felt compelled to begin construction of
four rooms at once to comply with the
government requirement. In the absence of
such a requirement he would have preferred to
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start off with two rooms, and to extend his
house gradually as resources became
available.
The 4-rooms in 18-months requirement has
placed a tremendous pressure on his income.
He exhausted his savings, and applied for a
municipal loan. He plans to rent out two-
thirds of his house to repay his loan, and
defer bringing his family to the city on a
permanent basis.
He complained that the loan is not large
enough to enable someone like him to complete
four rooms within the prescribed period. At
the same time, he realizes that a larger loan
would only burden him with larger installment
payments. According to him, the government
should be more realistic in terms of how long
it requires families to complete the four
rooms.
Providing additional loan funds to the above group on the
rationale that they have made serious efforts to build but failed
for lack of money would not be fair to other beneficiaries who
were able to construct smaller but habitable units with the funds
available to them. It would thus appear that the best form of
assistance that can be extended to these beneficiaries would be
to give them more time. It seems very likely that most if not all
of them will continue to find private funds and, if they need
badly to occupy the house, to use those funds to bring the house
to a habitable level.
The period of construction was slightly shorter in the
smaller pilot projects in Kwekwe and Gutu. House construction
begun in January 1984 in Kwekwe and in March 1984 in Gutu. By
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August 1985, 62% of the sampled units in Kwekwe and 44% in Gutu
had been completed. In terms of schedule, some 45% of total
beneficiaries accepted the 18-month deadline, while 30% to 40%
felt twelve months would be adequate to construct the four rooms.
Those who preferred a longer time period cited shortage of
building materials and adequate funds to hire labor as the most
important reasons for slowing down the building process.
What is most interesting about the results of these two
studies is the apparent divergence in each group's ability to
meet the required deadline. In Kuwadzana, the building period of
eighteen months for the completion of four rooms plus ablution
was beyond the resources of a significant number of the
beneficiaries. This fact is clearly recognized by the
Municipality of Harare given survey results indicating that only
31% of the beneficiaries were able to meet the requirements
eighteen months after being allocated their stands. Moreover, the
municipality believes that the vast majority will certainly
complete their houses but simply require more time to do so. "It
is clear that the pace of construction is determined by the
individuals' ability to mobilize both public and private funds,
and cannot be "scheduled" by the authorities" (Harare City
Council, 1986:6).
Inter-project differences with regards to construction time
preference could be attributed to the slightly higher average
income of Kwekwe allottees over Kuwadzana participants as well as
to the nature of the projects themselves. 36 While both are what
36 Data from M.J. Holin, Evaluation of the Kuwadzana
(Parkridge-Fountainbleu) Low-Income Shelter Project, Phase I
prepared for submission to the U.S. Agency for International
Development, Regional Housing and Urban Development Office,
Kenya, october, 1985, and ENDA, Evaluation of the Kwekwe and Gutu
Low-Income Housing Projects, (Harare, Zimbabwe: Ministry of
Public Construction and National Housing), 1985.
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the government calls "aided self-help" schemes, they differ
significantly in scale and supervision. When completed Kuwadzana
is expected to house some 13,000 families while the Kwekwe and
Gutu projects, with a population of some 1,300 families, are more
experimental in nature. Thus, as the UNCHS Team claims, they can
exercise greater control over problems regarding builders and
building materials which have been cited as a major factor, after
lack of financing, in slowing down construction.
In a 1985 survey of Kuwadzana participants, residents were
questioned whether they would have built their houses any
differently if there were no specific time frame for completing
the house. 37 The responses are summarized in Table 3. They
indicate that in the absence of a time constraint, the
construction process and consequently, the investment pattern and
financing requirements would have been different.
The problem associated with the 18-month requirement is
reiterated in the second case study excerpt.
The Grinder's Story
Y was born and raised in Mashonaland East.
His parents were subsistence farmers on the
communal lands. He migrated to Harare in 1966
to earn dowry money, and in the course of his
stay, took on several temporary jobs.
After almost fifteen years on the municipal
housing list, he was allocated his present
200 sq.m. stand at Kuwadzana.
According to him, the most difficult phase in
building is the extension of the core unit
after the municipal loan has been exhausted.
With his limited income as a grinder and
virtually non-existent savings, construction
37 M.J. Holin, 1985.
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has been very slow. He strongly feels that
the 18-month requirement should be extended
and the 4-room standard lowered. According to
him, families should only be required to
build two rooms at most, and given an
indefinite period of time to extend the
house.
Restriction Against Living On-Site Before
Completion of Habitable Unit
The timing of the start of construction also differed
between those living at Kuwadzana at the time of the survey, and
those who were not living on-site. During almost every
allocation period, the non-resident group took one or more months
longer than the resident group to start construction. Moreover,
the delays in trench-digging for the former generally led to
further delays in obtaining the loan and starting the
construction of the foundation (Holin, 1985).
A simple explanation for the difference in the performance
of these two groups may be that by not living on site, a
beneficiary is less likely to save funds for house construction.
The government prohibits families from living on-site prior to
the completion of a one-room and toilet. Of the sample
interviewed for the evaluation, 31% were living at Kuwadzana at
the time of the survey without having completed the required
facilities (Holin, 1985). These individuals have chosen to
ignore the requirement to improve their financial condition.
Unfortunately, those who have abided by it are more likely to be
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Table 3.-- Construction Preference in the Absence of
an 18-Month Deadline
Responses Cases Percent
1. Build 1 or 2 rooms 27 64.2
first and extend the
house later
2. Use building materials 7 16.7
of higher quality
3. Build more rooms at once 5 11.9
4. Use own plan and build 2 4.8
house more cheaply
5. Delay start of construction 1 2.4
in order to save more
money
Total number responding that
they would build differently 42 100.0
Source: M.J. Holin, Evaluation of the Kuwadzana (Parkridge-
Fountainbleu) Low-Income Shelter Project, Phase I, prepared for
submission to the Regional Housing Office, U.S. Agency for
International Development, Washington, D.C., October, 1985.
in a more difficult situation as the need to pay monthly charges,
plus transportation to and from the project, may prohibit them
from acquiring additional funds for construction. The study
indicated that most of them were devoting a substantial part of
their income to these items. This is presented in Table 4.
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Table 4.--Percentage of Non-Resident Income Devoted
to Housing, June 1985 38
-----------------------------------------------------------------
% of Income # Non-Residents % Non-Residents
--------------------------------------------
16-20% 4 3.8
21-25% 2 1.9
26-30% 11 10.4
31-35% 17 16.0
36-40% 23 21.7
41-45% 23 21.7
46-50% 14 13.2
51-55% 6 5.7
56-60% 4 3.8
61-65% 1 .9
66-70% 1 .9
Total 106 100.0
--------------------------------------------
Source: M.J. Holin, Evaluation of the Kuwadzana (Parkridge-
Fountainbleu) Low-Income Shelter Project, Phase I, prepared for
submission to the Regional Housing Office, U.S. Agency
for International Development, Washington, D.C., October, 1985.
Furthermore, Wegge's survey (1986) of Kuwadzana residents
indicate that more than 70% of the allottees studied had 
been in
arrears at least once, with the lowest-income groups being the
"best payers". The record of arrears has been attributed 
to the
problem of having to pay "double rents" which is aggravated 
when
households, endeavoring to construct four rooms at once, 
run out
of loan funds before completing a habitable unit, much 
less a
4-room unit. As a result, they end up having to pay for rent
elsewhere, in addition to paying for municipal charges and loan
3 Includes mortgage repayments at Kuwadzana, rent currently
being paid and mortgage cost of transportation to project
site.
107
repayments. This situation inevitably leads to arrears. This
problem is illustrated in the interview excerpt below:
The Postman's Story
L was born and raised in Murewa. His parents
were peasant farmers. Desiring a better life
for himself, he migrated to Harare in 1974 in
search of work. It took him two years to
obtain his present position as a postman.
During this 2-year period, he periodically
returned to the rural area to assist with the
tilling of the land.
He registered on the municipal waiting list
in 1975 but was not allocated his stand until
1984. Not having enough resources to build
the required four rooms, he applied for a
municipal loan. To this, he added his
personal savings of Z$500 and Z$600 from the
sale of crops. The latter had originally been
set aside for his children's education. He
doesn't know when he can start savings again
for his children's education with the new
cost incurred in the construction of the
house.
He complained of having to pay rent for his
lodging while the house was being built. He
stated that his potential savings from rent
could have been used for building the house.
Moreover, his presence on-site would have
prevented material theft.
The Agency Perspective
The financing problems created by the imposition of high
standards are translated into implementation problems for local
authorities. Interviews with local officials indicate that, like
project participants, it would be more advantageous for both
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themselves and the families if program constraints were relaxed.
The study takes this position a step further and argues that not
only should the government relax its requirements and offer more
flexible housing solutions, it should also broaden access to
land, and encourage the development of different tenure
arrangements that would be more responsive to the changing needs
of low-income families at different stages in their life cycle.
For instance, with regards to the enforcement of the
18-month requirement, the Ministry of Public Construction and
National Housing authorities states that while it has the
discretion to grant a 6-month extension period to those
struggling to meet the deadline, giving extensions on a
case-by-case basis is a very burdensome administrative task since
each case will have to be reviewed at the end of six months.
Interviews with the Kuwadzana proiect team indicates that they
would prefer to give a "blanket" extension of time to all but
those who have made little or no effort in erecting a structure.
Further, they believed that it would be more desirable to cancel
the 18-month construction period clause in the agreements of
sale, rather than provide six-month extensions which could
require further review. "To ensure that development does take
place, further agreements should contain a "three months to
start" clause, so that non-developers can be "weeded out" fairly
quickly (Wegge, 1986)". Moreover, as noted above, the
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municipality believe that the vast majority will certainly
complete their houses but simply require more time to do so.
These responses from the implementing agencies indicate an
awareness of the difficulties encountered by participants in
complying with program requirements. However, while
recommendations are being made to relax some of these standards,
particularly, those regulating the construction period, the
shortage of housing is still cast as a either a standards, or a
financing problem by municipalities who perceive themselves as
being an integral player in the government's larger role as
supplier of low-income housing.
Summary
This chapter has shown that standards and other project
requirements have made it more difficult for poor families to
participate in housing programs for the following reasons. First,
it has been shown that the standards embodied in the 4-room core
are beyond the reach of a vast majority of the low-income
population. Second, less than half of project participants were
able to meet the program requirement of completing four rooms
plus ablution unit within eighteen month. When asked how they
would build in the absence of a time constraint, most responded
that they would start with a 1- or 2-room core, and extend the
house gradually. Third, the prohibition against on-site residence
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during the initial period of construction exacerbates the
financial problem for poor families who end up paying double
rents. Finally, the existence of these standards and project
constraints create a painful dilemma for households who, because
of small loan-to-value mortgages, are unable to construct a
standard dwelling unit even with mortgage financing. The problem
is worse for poorer households who, by being restricted to
smaller mortgage loans, must raise a larger part of the
construction finance on their own due to the rigidity of existing
standards.
111
CHAPTER VI
MORTGAGE FINANCE AS A NON-ISSUE IN
THE HOUSING PROCESS
This chapter argues that the need for mortgage finance is
artificially created by the government's strong programmatic
emphasis on standards and rate of construction as described in
the preceding chapter. The government's misconception that
finance, not land, is the critical bottleneck to construction has
led to implementation and institutional coordination problems and
a general reluctance by households to avail of the mortgage
program.
Mortgage Finance Programs: The Reality Behind
Mortgage Finance Programs for
Low Income Families
Interest in mortgage finance programs for low-income housing
is based on the assumption that by augmenting effective demand,
long-term credit increases the rate of homeownership. Since
housing generates a relatively long-lived stream of services, a
long-term loan can be issued against the value of the property.
This principle enables households to match their housing
consumption with their income stream. In his life cycle
hypothesis, Modigliani (1963) argues that although an
individual's current income will vary during one's lifetime,
borrowing against future income through mortgage
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financing will enable one to maximize consumption even before
current income has reached its peak.
This position draws its merits largely from the experience
of the industrialized countries, in particular, the United States
where the development of the conventional long-term mortgage
instrument increased the rate of homeownership from 49% to 63% of
all households between 1930 and 1970 (U.S. Congressional Budget
Office, 1983). Prior to the introduction of long-term fixed
mortgages, loans were not amortized, with balloon payments made
at the end of the term. This schedule of payments, with its
limited 5-year maturity and high interest rate, made it extremely
difficult for families to fulfill their mortgage obligation. The
problem was aggravated by the refusal of mortgage lenders to re-
finance the mortgages coming due, thereby leaving the home
mortgage industry in a state of virtual collapse.
The success of the American housing finance system in
increasing the rate of homeownership has inspired international
lending agencies and policymakers to introduce long-term credit
in low-income housing projects. Advocates of the program argue
that by reducing the average cost of borrowing (through lower
interest rates) and average installment payments (through longer
amortization periods), mortgage finance will enable a larger
number of households to afford a larger debt, and hence a higher
quality house (Annez, 1981). An underlying premise of this
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assumption is that installment payments would be sufficiently
lowered so that they approximately equal what a borrower would
normally pay for rent, thus ensuring the affordability of the
mortgage instrument (Rodell, 1987).
Another argument for mortgage finance is the belief that, by
enabling households to purchase or build a house upfront,
mortgage finance enables families to realize the gains from the
economic use of space earlier than possible without mortgage
finance. In the cities of the developing world, one-tenth to a
quarter of dwellings have enterprises on the premises.3 In a
survey of over a thousand households and home-based enterprises
in Lima, Peru, it was found that income from these enterprises
contributed to as much as forty percent of household income.40
With regards to rental income, Renaud (1984:19) notes that
renters play a crucial role in the progression of housing
investment by allowing owner-investors to control a greater
amount of the housing equity sooner than would otherwise be
possible, until they reach the required level of sustained
income. This early realization of income from letting out rooms
and home-based enterprises has often been used as an argument in
favor of mortgage loans.
39 Paul Strassman,"Types of Neighborhoods and Home-Based
Enterprises: Evidence from Lima, Peru," (East Lansing, Michigan:
Michigan State University), undated draft.
40 Ibid., 32.
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The Relevance of the Mortgage Finance Instrument
To Low-Income Households
The thesis argues that the critical constraint to housing
construction is the lack of access to land and the existence of
excessive standards. The argument that long-term credit will
make homeownership more affordable to a larger number of
families, who would otherwise rent, does not consider that for
poor families, (a) investment spending is greater than rent and
typical credit payments because of standards and small loan-to-
value ratios, (b) the bulk of spending is concentrated within a
short period of time because of program requirements, and (c)
incomes are erratic. Thus, in spite of the availability of long-
term credit, a substantial gap remains between what households
are able to pay for housing and the cost of constructing a
standard dwelling unit. These points are discussed below.
A central element of the theoretical reasoning behind the
argument for mortgage finance is the belief that buying on credit
is the only affordable alternative to renting and long-term
credit increases the number of families who would rather own than
rent. It is assumed that in shifting from renting to
homeownership, households allocate what is typically spent for
renting towards credit. However, affordable house rents are not
likely to coincide with mortgage payments. Rent is the price of
using a house for a short period while mortgage payments
effectively buys the use for an indefinitely long period of time.
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The costs of the house itself is financed by the developer or
owner/builder. Families living with relatives, squatting, or
renting a room typically live rent-free, or may pay only a
fraction of the equivalent mortgage installment within a
government-sponsored housing project. Thus, low-income households
are unlikely to spend the same amount for rent as they would for
mortgage payments, unless a larger part of the cost is
subsidized. "They build with very little credit; and the
affordable amounts of money they spend do not even superficially
resemble a regular affordable monthly rental payment tending
toward what may be hypothesized as an underlying affordability
coefficient" (Rodell, 1987).
Moreover, relative to the period of time, the bulk of the
family's spending is concentrated in a series of short phases,
and is more often than not erratic, not only in the sense that
month-to-month and year-to-year spending fluctuates compared to
regular downpayment and credit installments of mortgage holders,
but also in the sense that the length of the spending period
itself is not pre-fixed by contractual obligation and probably
differs markedly among families at the same income level (Rodell,
1987). In unregulated settlements, these fluctuations are
reflected in the incremental nature of housing construction. The
problem is exacerbated within a project context where
construction is highly regulated in terms of building standards
and the speed of construction.
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The underlying theory supporting the conventional mortgage
instrument is basically static and is best suited to borrowers
with stable incomes that are sufficient to buy or build complete
housing units (Christian, 1980:25-26). In contrast, poor families
typically have an unpredictable cash flow stream, resulting from
multiple and variable sources of income. Thus, lending
institutions have typically excluded the poor from their mortgage
programs. Moreover, income and housing consumption varies at
different stages in a family's life. Lee (1987) states that the
conventional mortgage instrument, while being the easiest type of
loan to administer and understand, is not the most appropriate
for low-income households whose incomes and propensity to consume
housing are likely to vary over time... "It (income) changes from
one year to the next... as children mature, start work and
contribute to the household income, and later leave home and stop
paying into the family kitty... .41 While investment decisions
vary at different points in a family's life cycle which, in turn,
correspond with different motives for owning a house.
A borrower's cash flow stream is the single most important
determinant of one's debt-carrying capacity. Because of the
erratic nature of income sources, financial institutions are
41 Taken from a paper entitled "The Affordability Criterion:
Inefficient, Inequitable and Immoral?", by Michael Lee, presented
at the International Seminar on Income and Housing in Third World
Development, 30 November - 4 December, 1987, New Delhi, India.
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reluctant to lend to low-income families. Unpredictable incomes
combined with volatile interest rates and non-indexed instrument
combined makes it financially risky for these institutions to
extend long-term loan commitments to low-income families. Thus,
housing finance institutions in both industrialized and
developing countries have typically catered to the needs of
upper-income households.
As a result of lending agency impetus, banks and building
societies in developing countries have expanded their clientele
to include low-income households. However, as a result of low
levels of current discretionary incomes, low-income borrowers
typically only qualify for a small loan-to-value ratio. The
dilemma for low-income households arises when they are provided
only a fraction of construction cost, through the mortgage, and
are forced to raise the bulk of the construction finance
informally over a relatively short period of time. In contrast,
within the spontaneous settlements of the developing world where
financing is entirely from savings and informal sources,
consolidation can take many years, depending on the availability
of resources and the tenure situation. In this sense, low-income
families in the project setting are worse off than middle-income
households whose housing costs are largely met by the mortgage
loan, and informal settlers who, while not having access to
formal finance, are able to build in accordance with their
ability to pay. While advocates of mortgage finance programs
118
posit the existence of substantial "hidden" savings that can be
mobilized to complement the initial loan, relatively little
research has been done to determine the potential of low-income
households to accumulate savings. Moreover, it is difficult for
families at subsistence or near subsistence level to accumulate
savings. Most often, meager savings are wiped out by a single
major expenditure on a downpayment or unexpected emergency. Given
constrained and unpredictable income sources, it is not uncommon
for poor families to interrupt construction in spite having
stockpiled on building materials or invested heavily on the
construction of a section of the house.
Project participants are also unlike mortgage holders in the
conventional sense in that they are neither purchasing a complete
dwelling upfront as their counterparts do, nor are their income
levels likely to remain constant, much less increase, to enable
them to fulfill mortgage requirements with a high degree of
predictability. Since affordability considerations limit the size
of the mortgage loan to the cost of a 1-room core, households are
forced to mobilize a substantive amount of resources on their own
to complete the remaining three rooms. In contrast, aside from
the requirement of a 10% to 20% downpayment, mortagage loans
issued to middle-income households can typically cover as much as
80% of the total purchase price.
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To illustrate, the average cost of a typical 4-room core in
Kuwadzana is Z$4,871 (Holin, 1986). 42 Of this Z$3,735 is for
materials and Z$911 for the builder. The rest is for the plumber
and transport costs. The size of the loans offered to
beneficiaries ranged from Z$294 to Z$3,320. On average, each
must raise Z$2,262 in addition to the loan to complete the 4-room
house. With an income of Z$150 and a 300 sq.m., an allottee is
required to pay Z$22 per month for stand and user charges. Since
Z$41.25 is the equivalent of 27.5% of Z$150, he/she could pay
Z$19.25 per month for a building loan. At an annual interest rate
of 9.75% over 25 years, the amount of the loan to which this
beneficiary would be entitled to is Z$2,457. As a result, the
family must raise Z$2,387 or roughly half of the estimated cost
over an 18-month period to meet program requirements. When
Z$2,387 is divided over eighteen months, it becomes clear that
the household must allocate an average of Z$132 per month from
its monthly income. At income of Z$200, this would consume over
50% of household income. Within this scenario it is
understandable why households resort to letting out rooms to
defray part of the construction costs. Without a loan, the same
household must raise the same amount over eighteen months, or an
average of Z$269 per month. This exceeds the monthly household
42 This estimate takes into account the cost of a brigade-
built house and synthesizes the 14 house designs available at the
project into one prototype design. The cost of materials as
provided by the Kuwadzana supply store are also factored into the
estimate cost of a structurally complete 4-room house.
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income and explains why households, in their fear of losing their
plot of land, feel compelled to apply for a mortgage loan.
Given the fact that a dynamic construction sector thrives in
the absence of formal credit in the low-income settlements of the
developing world, and the questionable relevance of the
conventional fixed term mortgage to the situation of poor
families, there is a need to re-think the role of mortgage
finance vis-avis other programmatic interventions in the housing
process. The study will show that in Zimbabwe, the real issue is
access to land and the need to provide a variety of affordable
housing solutions.
Given an economy where self-building is common, simply
designing long-term credit programs and increasing the number of
families who theoretically can afford to buy a house has very
little social utility as long as every year there are ten or
twelve times as many willing buyers as there are houses sold on
so-called affordable terms. There is also the need to ask whether
informal building is as, or more efficient that building using
institutional financing. If so, then perhaps there is less
urgency than is still assumed for the housing policy to mobilize
families' savings or displace their investments through over
consumption by requiring them to build dwelling units on credit.
Finally, given the diversified need for housing and the growing
evidence debunking the unfavorable characterization of non-formal
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finance mechanisms, it would strongly appear that the focus of
policy intervention is more appropriately on land development and
the means of facilitating access to land rather than finance,
particularly when the need for finance is artificially driven by
program constraints. Together with increased access to land
should be a diversification of housing solutions to respond to
the needs of a highly differentiated low-income housing market.
For instance, Rodell (1987) notes that the target of most public
low-income, self-help projects does not typically include
predominantly small families or single-person households,
families or individuals who are old and without work, or young
and desperately searching for work to earn money. To the extent
that such families constitute a large portion of the
households at the very bottom of the income distribution, then
the housing policy is not responsive to housing needs.
Participant Response to Mortgage Finance
Given the ups and downs of their economic situation, low-
income families are generally reluctant to apply for long-term
mortgage financing. The study argues that families have applied
for loans not so much because it is the" hottest item in town",
as much as it is the "only game in town". Access to land is only
possible through participation in government-sponsored projects.
With a more flexible land supply mechanism, families can better
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match their housing needs at different stages of their life cycle
with their cash flow stream.
The imposition of standards within the project context has
strained the ability of households to finance housing. The
difficulties faced by families struggling to make ends meet
brings to question the intention of the government in sponsoring
low-income housing projects. Finally, the discussion leaves
unanswered the obvious question of why, if the conventional
fixed-term mortgage is truly meritous, isn't it being extended to
low-income families in the United States?43 This question
demonstrates that the issue is not so much the applicability of a
"first " world model to a "third" world context, as it is the
relevance of a finance program designed for upper-income groups
to low-income households who, in the long run, have to borrow, or
better said, enter into a cycle of debt accumulation, in order to
obtain long-term credit.
43 It should be pointed out that alongside the development
of the conventional long-term mortgage in the United States, the
federal government launched a separate of housing assistance
program aimed specifically at low-income families. These separate
programs were intended to increase the number and types of
affordable units through developer incentives, revision of zoning
and building codes, rental subsidies, and administrative
streamlining of housing programs.
44 The similarity in the housing finance market of
industrialized and developing countries was pointed out by
Langley Keyes in a review of an earlier draft of this study.
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Based on the case studies, the response of project
participants to mortgage finance will be analyzed under the
following themes. First, the thesis will explain why, in spite of
excessive standards, do households still participate in
government-sponsored housing schemes? Given the constraints
imposed by the structure of the mortgage instrument, why do
families still apply for a mortgage loan? Second, what problems
did families encounter in regards to the loan, and what
strategies did they employ to surmount these difficulties? Third,
how would families have ideally preferred to construct their
homes in the absence of programmatic constraints? Fourth, how did
non-borrowers finance the construction of their houses? Were they
successful in meeting programmatic requirements?
Theme 1: "The Only Game In Town"
Why, in spite of excessive standards, do households still
participate in government-sponsored housing schemes? The answer
to the first question was provided by the preceding chapter on
institutional constraints to access to land for low-income
housing. This chapter explained that while there is currently no
physical shortage of land for urban housing, access to land is
only possible through participation in a government-sponsored
housing project. Spontaneous settlements are regularly razed down
or bulldozed to the ground. Those unable to enter a project, due
to the large shortfall in the supply of serviced stands, are
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currently absorbed into the rental market. By regulating access
to land in this manner, the government is, in effect, pushing the
neediest members of its population into the rental market, as
providers and users of rental housing.
Limited Tenure Choices
The present constraint on tenure choices available to low-
income households has its roots in the country's socio-economic
past. In particular, the migrant labor system, which envisaged
the black worker as a transient dweller in urban commercial and
industrial areas, and the Land Apportionment Act which severely
restricted the areas in which blacks could own property,
accounted for the shortage of low-income housing at the time of
independence in 1980.
While the government has since shifted its policy away from
constructing rental housing for migrant labor towards more
widespread home ownership schemes for a growing class of urban
blacks, the economic disruptions of the recent war of
independence and competing investment needs are making it
increasingly difficult for the government to expand its program
in time to meet the growing demand for housing.
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Hoek-Smit's survey (1983) of Harare households indicated that
of the tenant, lodger and squatter households in the high-density
areas, approximately 50% to 60% prefer to own a house. This
shortage of housing opportunities is borne out in the case
histories. Former lodgers, squatters, and extended family members
stated having been on the municipal housing waiting list for as
long as ten years or more before being allocated a stand. The
problem of housing is particularly acute for squatters as
demonstrated in the following interviews with a former squatter.
The Migrant's Story
T was born and raised in Lilongwe, Malawi.
He migrated to Kwekwe 1962 where, after a few
odd jobs, he became employed as a storekeeper
for Z$20 per month. During this period he
rented a room in the Amaveri suburb of Kwekwe
for Z$3.50 per month. The room was nothing
more than metal sheets assembled together
into a makeshift room. A few months later, he
transferred to another store in the Golden
Ridge area within the same city where he
worked as a shop assistant for Z$22 per
month. He lived in a pole and dagga hut
thatched with grass behind the shop. Since he
constructed the house himself, it was
essentially rent-free.
From Kwekwe he moved to Mberengwa where he
worked in yet another store for Z$36 per
month. His living accommodation consisted of
two brick-built rooms under asbestos sheets
which was provided rent-free by his employer.
After six months he returned to Kwekwe as a
driver, bringing his family over from Malawi.
45 The objective of this study was to gain insight into the
socio-economic structure and housing preferences and potential
demand for home ownership of below-median income groups in
Harare, Kadoma, Marondera and Chinhoyi.
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In 1972 he lost his job, and his family was
forced to squat in a makeshift shelter behind
the Amaveri main bus terminal for six months.
He described the difficulties of squatting,
such as the lack of sanitary facilities and
the ever present fear of being removed by the
government. His family barely subsisted on
his meager earnings as a part-time tailor for
various shops in the town. He was desperate
to find a relatively steady source of
employment to enable them to rent a room.
After several weeks, he was hired by a
tailoring shop. He immediately moved his
family to a rented room for which he paid
Z$3.5 per month. In 1975, he registered on
the municipal waiting list in 1975 and was
allocated a 2-room rental unit in 1976. He
remained on the list in the hope of
eventually being allocated his own plot of
land on which to build his family a home.
The second question raised is why, given constraints imposed
by the structure of the mortgage instrument, do families still
apply for a mortgage loan? The answer to this question is
discussed more fully in the chapter on standards. Suffice to say,
households are forced to obtain a mortgage to satisfy program
requirements. The pressure to comply with standards is
exacerbated by the magnitude of demand for housing as evidenced
by the waiting period on the municipal housing list, which is, on
average, ten years. Thus, the positive response to the mortgage
program should not be misconstrued as an indication of the
latter's success, so much as it is a response to the artificial
need created by excessive standards and limited access to land.
To illustrate this point, majority of the households in a
survey of Phase I of the Kuwadzana project (Holin,1986) stated
127
that they feared their stands would be confiscated if they did
not finish four rooms within eighteen months. The range of
responses are listed in Table 5.
In addition, many respondents expressed uncertainty
regarding the consequences of non-compliance. The three-year
period of project negotiation was clouded with debate on housing
policy, and the form it would take in future projects. Thus,
many participants experienced uncertainty regarding the
government's response to a failure on their part to satisfy the
18-month requirement. Since Kuwadzana and the UNCHS projects were
the first major sites-and-service projects to be executed after
the introduction of this requirement, their
beneficiaries were the most likely to be strongly influenced by
this new set of program guidelines.
Theme 2: Problems Associated with the Mortgage Structure and
Strategies Used by Families to Surmount Them
As explained above, there are two types of problems
encountered by low-income families with regards to the mortgage
loan. The first problem relates to the issue of affordability.
The assumption that long-term credit makes
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Table 5.-- Participant Perception of Consequences Resulting
from Failure to Meet 18-Month Requirement
-------------------------------------------------------
Responses # Reporting %
--------------------------------------------
1. Stand would be confiscated 137 62.6
2. The time period will be
extended 20 9.1
3. Council will help us/
Council will consider the
circumstances 7 3.2
4. Nothing will happen 8 3.7
5. I do not know what will happen 43 19.6
6. Other responses 4 1.8
Total 219 100.0
--------------------------------------------
Source: Holin, M.J., Kuwadzana Evaluation Report, 1986.
homeownership more affordable by enabling households to shift
what is typically spent for rent towards credit installments was
shown to be irrelevant for families living in rent-free, or
overcrowded, cheap and illegal rented accommodations. Moreover,
the structure of the mortgage instrument itself imposes a
considerable strain on the cash flow situation of low-income
families. The second problem is the small loan-to-value ratio
which requires families to mobilize most of the needed resources
on their own in order to meet standards and other program
requirements.
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Tangible and Intangible Costs of the Mortgage Loan
The mortgage loan instrument imposes both tangible and
intangible costs to low-income borrowers. These costs are high
enough to discourage the average borrowers from applying for a
mortgage. For instance, finance institutions typically charge
mortgage borrowers front-end costs in addition to interest
payments. The repayment schedule requires households to pay a
fixed or progressive charge every month. The additional cost of
front-end charges, and, in particular, the rigidity of the
repayment schedule impose a severe strain on the often erratic
cash flow stream of low-income households. Moreover, the typical
small loan-to-value ratio requires households to mobilize
additional resources on their own to satisfy program
requirements. As a result, most households enter a cycle of debt
accumulation to satisfy both mortgage and program requirements.
In the following case study, a household head is forced to apply
for a mortgage loan in order to construct a 4-room dwelling unit.
He complains about the long repayment period as well as the
interest rate.
The Security Guard's Story
The stand owner is a security guard for
Tobacco Export Corporation Africa. He
currently earns Z$49 per week as a security
guard and Z$75 per month as rental income
from three rooms. He also hawks clothes,
earning about Z$50 monthly, and maintains a
10-acre homestead which is farmed by his wife
and children.
He registered on the municipal waiting list
in 1980 and was allocated his 200 sq.m. stand
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on March 1984. He had no choice but to apply
for a mortgage loan since he did not have
sufficient savings to finance a 7-room unit.
He started building a slab for seven rooms,
but realized in the course of the
construction that his resources were not
adequate to complete the unit. He would have
preferred to start off with two rooms, and
extend it as his finances permitted him. He
feels uncomfortable carrying a debt for
twenty-five years, and possibly passing on
the burden of repayment to his children. In
addition, he feels that the interest rate is
too high. He estimates that by the time he
pays back the loan, the interest payments
would easily be twice the size of the
principal.
The rigidity of the payment schedule also imposes a severe
strain on the cash flow stream of low-income households. This
is demonstrated in the following case study excerpt.
The Fence-Maker's Story
X was born in Chiduku with five children.
Like many families, he maintains both an
urban and rural home. His income comes from
several sources. In addition to fence-making,
he also rents out three rooms in his house,
while his wife hawks clothes during the time
that the family spends with him in the city.
In spite of these multiple sources of income,
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he saves little due to his considerable
financial obligations.
In fact, he is very concerned about his
family's financial situation. He cites
housing construction and education for his
children as the most critical elements of his
monthly expenditures. To lower costs, his
family resides in the rural area where they
do subsistence agriculture. This has made it
possible for him to rent out two-thirds of
his house.
He cited financing as the major constraint to
construction since he did not have enough
savings to start building. Even with the
loan, he did not have enough money to build
four rooms, and have to resort to builder's
credit.
Due to his irregular income sources, he fears
not being able to meet his installment
payments on time. He would prefer a more
flexible repayment arrangement, or a smaller
loan provided the government lowered its
standards and allowed him to build his house
incrementally.
The problems encountered by participants are in large part
due to the current policy's focus on finance which have diverted
the government from dealing with the more fundamental problem of
access to land. Towards this end, different financial innovations
have been introduced. These innovations represent tradeoffs
between tangible and intangible costs, without offering low-
income families more choices in housing solutions. For instance,
private sector (building society) loans are offered at a higher
interest rate of 12.5% compared to 9.75% for municipal loans.
Moreover, two variations of the mortgage instruments were
introduced: the conventional, fixed mortgage and the graduated
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payment mortgage. The conventional mortgage, amortized through
periodic payments of equal amounts throughout the term of the
loan, assumes that the borrower's income will remain unchanged
through time. It is best suited to borrowers with stable
incomes, and is not generally useful for the needs of low-income
families, households with unstable incomes from self-employment,
or families whose incomes may presently be low but can be
expected to rise in the future. At Kuwadzana, the City of Harare
administered the conventional fixed term mortgage at the lower
interest rate of 9.75%, while the World Bank projects offered the
same mortgage instrument through the building society, at the
higher interest rate of 12.5%.
In contrast to the fixed-rate mortgage, the graduated
payment mortgage assumes that over time an individual's income
will increase, stabilize at mid-life, and ultimately decline with
the approach of retirement age (Melton, 1978). The principal
advantage of the graduated payment mortgage is to lower initial
payment costs to enable a greater number of low-income households
to afford formal financing, and for those in this group who may
be eligible for conventional financing, to enable them to obtain
a larger loan than they would otherwise be able to under the
conventional fixed-term mortgage. It establishes a fixed level
mortgage payment somewhere near the middle of the loan term when
the graduated payment becomes equal to the level of payment
required to amortize the loan at a fixed maturity. In Kwekwe,
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mortgage payments made in Year 1 are set at 75% of the normal
level and increased by 5% per annum thereafter (Technical Support
Services, 1986).
A typical progressive annuity formulation is illustrated in
Table 6 which shows that the original balance of Z$2,000 peaking
to Z$2,588 at Year 12. Moreover, throughout the 25-year
amortization period municipal charges can also increase as well
as interest rates which are dictated by government policy. The
combined effect of these increases poses a considerable financial
burden to the borrower. The graduated payment mortgage makes the
risky assumption that incomes will rise by 5% per annum over 25
years which will enable beneficiaries to meet the increase in
loan payments. However, neither historical evidence nor current
economic predictions support this assumption (Technical Support
Services, 1986:111-5).
Using the example of Z$2,000 as the principal amount, the
relative costs of the mortgage under three different scenarios
are summarized in Table 7. This table shows that the graduated
payment mortgage has the highest interest rate while the
conventional fixed-term mortgage offered in the Kuwadzana project
had the lowest. The fact that the size of the interest payments
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Table 6
Amortization of a Graduated Payment Mortgage
Constant Annual Progression: Annual Amortization
Annual Interest Rate: 12.5%
Annual Progression Rate: 5%
Term of Mortgage (yrs.): 25
Initial Capital Borrowed: Z$2,000
Initial Annual Payment: Z$182.52
Initial Monthly Payment:Z $15.21
Anortization Table
Year $4onthly Annual Interest Interest Principal Balance
Sayrment Payment Owed. Paid Paid
. 1 15.21 - 182.52 250.00 182.52 -67.48 ,067.48
2 15.97 ,191.64. 258.44 191.64 -66.80 2,134.28
3 16.77 201.24 266.79 201.24 -65.55 2,199.83
4 17.61 211.32- 274.98 211.32 -63.66 2,263.49
5 18.49. .221.88 282.94 221.88 -- 61.06- 2,324.55
6 19.41 232.92 -290.57 232.92 -57.65 2,382.20
7 20.38 244.56 297.78 244.56 -53.22 2,435.42
8 21.40 256.80 304.43 256.80 -47.63 2,483.05
9. . -22.47 269.64 310.38 269.64- -40.,74 .2,523.79
10 23.59 2 3.08 315.47 283.08 -32.39 2,556.18-
11 24.77 297.24 319.52- 297.24 -22.28 2,578.46.
12 26.01 312.12 322.31 312.12. -10.19 2,588.65
13 27.31 327.72 323.58 323.58 4.14 2,584.51
14 28.68 344.16 323.06 323.06 21.10 Z,563.41
.15 30.11 361.32 320.43 320.43 40'.89. 2,522,52
16 31.62 379.44 315.32 315.32 64.12 .2,458,40
17 33.20 398...40 -3Q7.30 307.30 .91.10 2,367.30.
18 34.86 418.-32- 295.91 295.91 122.41 7,244.89
19 36.60 439.20. -280.61 280.61 158.5? .2,086.30
20 38.43 461.,16 260.79 260.79 20p.37 1,885.93
- 21 40.35 484.20 235.74 235.74 248.46 1,637..47
22 42.37 508.44 -204.68 204.68 '303.76 1',333.71
23 44.49 533.88 .166.71 166.71 367.17 966.94
24 46.71 560.52 120.82 120.82 439.70 526.84
25 49.05 592.70 65.86 65.86 526.84 0.00
Final Month's Payment
(month )2 of year 25): $53.15
Total Interest Principal
.Payments: Paid: Paid:
$8,714.42 ' $6,714.42 $2,000.00
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Table 7. --Comparative Project Costs
--------------------------------------------------------
Mortgage Int. Principal Accrued
Project Structure Yrs Rate Amount Interest
---------------------------------------------
UNCHS GPM
1  
25 12.50% $2000 $67142
USAID Fixed 25 9.75% $2000 $3346
World Bank Fixed 25 12.50% $2000 $4542
---------------------------------------------
1 Graduated Payment Mortgage
2 Plus 10% for front-end cost
did not discourage many from applying for the loan indicates that
allottees needed the loan to help them meet program requirements.
This is illustrated in the following interview excerpt with a
security guard from the Kwekwe project:
The lack of finance was the major obstacle I
encountered in completing the required 4-room
house. I had no choice but to apply for the
maximum loan I could qualify for. I even
applied for an employer loan. To these I
added all my savings of several years. With
all my resources, I still did not have enough
money to build four rooms.
I know that the loan carries a high interest
rate, and that by the time I repay it I would
have paid more than double the principal I
borrowed, but I simply had no choice. With
more people moving into the city, I would
never get another chance like this again.
In addition to the tangible costs associated with the
project loans, there are other intangible costs to the borrower
which vary with the type of mortgage used. Compared to the fixed
mortgage, the graduated payment mortgage is more financially
complex to explain to low-income, often uneducated borrowers, and
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more cumbersome to administer for the municipality or building
society. An arrangement whereby mortgage payments are adjusted
every year over the 25-year amortization period creates a complex
system not easily understood by borrowers. For instance, the
evaluation of the Kwekwe/Gutu projects (ENDA, 1985) indicates
that 21% of Kwekwe respondents (12% in Gutu) claimed to
understand very little or nothing at all of the loan mechanism.
Moreover, although 79% of Kwekwe respondents (89% in Gutu)
believed they understood clearly or at least partially the
graduated payment mortgage, some 92% of these same respondents
(36% in Gutu) stated that they did not know whether or not they
would be repaying the same amount over the life of the mortgage.
A particularly difficult feature to explain to beneficiaries
is the cost of interest. For the first 13 years of the loan, a
borrower will only be paying for interest charges without
reducing the principal amount. In fact, the balance will
increase over the first 13 years during which time the
beneficiary's payments will be less than the rate of interest
accumulation. Thus, a borrower will find that at Year 13,
outstanding payments have increased rather than decreased. In
addition, the split administration structure whereby construction
loans are paid to the building society and plot charges to the
municipality compounds the intangible costs faced by a typical
low-income borrower. Figure 2 illustrates the steps that
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Figure 2
The Procedures Required to Enable a Low-Income
Plot Holder to Obtain a Mortgage from
a Zimbabwean Building Society
S T E P S
1. Allottee receives invite for interview
2. Allottee attends interview
3. Allottee requested to select stand
4. Allottee selects stand at project
5. Allottee receives provisional allocation
6. Apply for a government guarantee
7. Select desired house plan
8. Authorize employer's reference
9. Identify preferred building society
10. Accumulate savings for building costs
11. Request employer's reference
12. Determine method of building
13. Obtain local authority house plan
14. Ministry assesses guarantee application
15. Open savings account
16. Employer completes reference
17. Obtain quota for works
18. Building society receives employer reference
19. Deposit made for front-end costs
20. Government offers guarantee
21. Apply to building society for mortgage advance
22. Building society assesses mortgage application
23. Building society approves mortgage application
24. Allottee accepts mortgage offer
25. Building society requests preparation of
bond by legal department
26. Building society requests municipality to
transfer plot
27. Building society prepares guarantee for
signature
28. Bond sent to Deed Registry
29. Employer signs guarantee
30. Municipality prepares agreement of sale
31. Allottee signs agreement of sale
32. Title transferred and sent to Deed Registry
33. Deed Registry registers documents
34. Allottee advised of bond registration
35. Allottee applies for first drawdown
36. Building society pays municipality for stan
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borrowers must typically follow in applying for a loan. The
interview excerpt from the case history below typifies some of
the likely problems which the application of graduated payment
mortgage can lead to.
The Cook's Story
Y and his wife are bitter about the terms of
the graduated payment mortgage, and prefer
renting to a homeownership scheme bound by
the financial constraints imposed by the
loan.
Y is a cook and earns between Z$105 to Z$150
per month. To augment the family income, his
wife sews, hawks clothes, and raising poultry
and vegetables. In addition, she is a
traditional healer, drawing most of her
clientele from the local community. She is
a member of a 4-member savings group, using
part of her loan to build the house. Each
member typically contributes Z$25 per month.
Y migrated to Kwekwe in 1968, first renting a
room in Amaveri and later residing in
municipal housing in Old Mbizo I. They
registered on the waiting list in 1982 and
obtained their 200 sq.m. stand two years
later. The husband paid a cash deposit of
Z$50 from his savings and applied for a
materials loan of Z$1600. He has so far
completed four rooms.
Both husband and wife cleared the land, dug
the foundation and transported the materials
to the site themselves. As both of them were
also working, these activities took place
over a period of two months. They had to buy
additional materials, using Z$350 of their
savings with the building society, and Z$300
from the sale of their old sofa. The wife
contributed 65% of her total earnings for
construction. They bought the materials using
the loan, and hired a builder and plumber.
They are bitter about the terms of the
graduated payment mortgage, and prefer
renting to homeownership under the financial
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constraints imposed by the loan. They are
suspicious that the materials they received
were not equivalent to the loan amount.
Moreover, they believe that the Municipality
did not properly explain the graduated
payment mortgage instrument to them. As a
result, they have unwittingly committed
themselves to a long-term mortgage which will
impoverish them. Had they known the cost of
the loan, they would not have participated in
the project altogether. They prefer renting
to homeownership with option to buy. They
claim that such an arrangement would provide
them with more flexibility and free them from
a life long financial commitment. They are
especially distressed by the rigidity of the
payment schedule. As a low-income family with
numerous extended family obligations, it
would be extremely difficult to adhere to
such a strict payment schedule. They were
particularly surprised to see their monthly
payment rise from Z$15 to Z$23. Not only was
the building society cheating them, so did
the Municipality. As they understood it, they
were not to pay supplementary charges until
after 18 months. However, they were surprised
to discover that after two months, they had
accumulated arrears of Z$50 to Z$90. They
disliked the notion of having to pay both the
Municipality and the building society.
They have no plans to extend the house in the
near future due to the unavailability of
funds. They have a very dismal view of the
future, anticipating more difficult times and
bracing themselves to survive during this
period. If the new government is truly
committed to alleviating poverty, then it
should lower the cost of living, and in
particular, eliminate the sales tax on basic
commodities.
The case history above indicates that lack of understanding
of the mortgage instrument can cause considerable anxiety on the
part of the borrower who experiences a loss of control over the
forces that shape his/her future. The complexity of bureaucratic
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procedures can sufficiently overwhelm the individual to the point
when one gives up on the notion of homeownership in favor of
renting. There is a need, not only to ensure that the credit
instrument is well understood by the borrower, but more
importantly, to offer the public more choices not only in credit
instruments, but also in housing solutions.
Another intangible cost faced by both borrower and lender is
also administrative in nature. Loans are generally given in
tranches of Z$500, with the release of each tranche being
dependent on the approval by either the municipality or the
building society of the preceding construction phase. In the
case of the graduated payment mortgage, each stage must pass
inspection not only by the municipality but also the building
society. Inconsistency in the decision of each inspector can
lead to unnecessary costs to the borrower, as demonstrated in the
following interview excerpt.
The office Messenger's Story
The owner, Mr. M, is a messenger in the
government. He has been on the municipal
waiting list for ten years before being
allocated his 200 sq.m. stand in 1984 at
Kuwadzana. He decided to construct four
rooms at once to comply with government
requirement but encountered two major
problems: (a)lack of safe storage of building
materials due to prevalent theft, and (b)
inconsistency among building inspectors in
their evaluation of the wall construction.
While it passed municipal inspection, the
building society insisted that the walls had
to be turn down and rebuilt. This
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reconstruction has cost M money he could not
afford, and set him back in his construction.
The preceding case illustrates the need to coordinate
building society and municipal inspection efforts. It is
inconvenient enough for households to pay two separate entities;
the situation is exacerbated when costly housing materials are
damaged because of uncoordinated, and therefore inconsistent
judgement on housing standards by two separate entities.
Insufficient Loan and Excessive Standards
These tangible and intangible costs are compounded by the
size of the loan which is inadequate to comply with standards and
other programmatic requirements. In a recent survey of Kuwadzana
participants, most households indicated a fear of program
restrictions, and attempted to construct a 4-room unit at once
instead of building one room at a time (Holin, 1986).
Approximately 65% of respondents were building all four rooms
simultaneously. However, since mortgage finance was not
sufficient to finance the cost of a 4-room core, it is not
surprising that many had only completed half-built 4-rooms
dwellings at the end of eighteen months. The financing problem
was exacerbated because households had to pay "double
rents" since they were prohibited from living on-site during
construction.
Households attempted to build four rooms simultaneously, not
only because of the fear of losing their stands, but also
because house plans obtained from the Ministry depicted four
rooms. Moreover, builders naturally encouraged allottees to build
as large a house as possible from the outset of construction.
Finally, project officials, especially Building Liaison Officers,
who help to "set out" houses, in effect, were both encouraging
and looking for construction of 4-room houses. In addition, few
beneficiaries, especially the first allottees to enter the
project, understood what the costs would be to construct a 4-room
house, neither did they aspire to construct a 1-room unit. This
situation is illustrated in the following case excerpt.
The Seamstress' Story
The head of the household, a seamstress,
resides in a 3-room house which is used
partly as a sewing room. The third room is
let out to a lodger and his wife. The owner
waited seven years on the municipal housing
list before being allocated her present 200
sq.m. stand in Kwekwe.
Due to lack of funds, she decided to build
one room at a time, using her savings of
Z$600, a building society loan of Z$1,500 and
a builder loan of Z$60. She negotiated to
pay the builder Z$100 for every room
completed, and purchased all the materials
from the materials depot using the building
society loan.
Due to the shortage of funds, she was only
able to complete three rooms before the loan
and her own resources were exhausted. She is
anxious to complete the fourth room before
the 18-month deadline is up for fear of
losing her house to the municipality.
However, she is unable to raise the necessary
resources due to her meager earnings.
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Being self-employed, the seamstress had very little choice
on the size of the initial unit. It is clear that she perceived
the 18-month requirement seriously, and would have complied with
the 4-room requirement, if her finances permitted her. Aside
from this restriction, there appeared to be no immediate need for
her, from an economic and/or social standpoint, to construct 4-
rooms initially. Rather it would appear that a minimum 2-room
unit would have sufficed until funds became available for
expansion.
Occasionally, a household will start off with a slab large
enough for the intended four rooms, only to find out later that
funds are inadequate to complete the unit. Thus, despite a huge
investment and sacrifice on the part of the household, it later
discovers that it has not even completed a "habitable" unit
because of the lack of a roof. Since the roof is a major
expense, the delay can be costly since the household is paying
rent elsewhere while struggling to accumulate enough resources to
build the roof. This is demonstrated in the following excerpt.
The Steel Factory Worker's Story
The household head is a laborer in the steel
factory adjacent to the project site in
Mbizo. He also repairs shoes on the side
with the assistance of his brother. He runs
his business from the veranda of his 3-room
house. He would like to expand this shoe
repair business outside the project.
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The owner waited ten years on the municipal
housing list before receiving his 200 sq.m.
stand. With the help of his brother he
cleared the land and dug the foundation
trenches over a period of three weeks. He
decided to build four rooms at once to comply
with government requirement. Although the
initial slab was intended for four rooms, it
became obvious to the owner that by the time
the sill level had been reached, there would
not be enough materials to complete four
rooms. He was confronted with the choice of
building four rooms to the sill level, or
completing three rooms to the roof level.
His main constraint was shortage of funds for
building materials. He claims that even with
the loan, an additional Z$1,000 would have
been needed to complete the house-- an
expense which he was unable to meet from his
current income sources, especially since his
family had come to stay with him from the
rural area. He negotiated with the
municipality for an additional two months to
complete his house. Meanwhile he has been
incrementally buying materials from his
earnings and those of his wife's. He is even
prepared to sell a head of cattle to raise
additional funds. When he has accumulated
adequate materials, he will hire a builder to
complete the last room which he intends to
rent out to pay for the mortgage loan.
Given these hardships in raising monies to supplement the
mortgage loan, there are those who believe that if the government
required project participants to complete four rooms within 18
months, then the size of the loan should have been large enough
to enable them to satisfy this requirement. Loan amounts are
currently calculated on the basis of income, with the proportion
accruing towards housing expenditures equal or less than 27.5% of
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the base income.46 It has a regressive impact in that the poorer
the borrower is, the smaller the loan he or she is eligible for.
However, standards are not flexible so as to accommodate the
situation of very poor families, and are universally applied
throughout the projects, regardless of income differences.
Participant objections to programmatic constraints reflect a
conflict between what the government defines as an affordable
loan for low-income borrowers, and what it requires in terms of
housing standards. The dilemma faced by households is
illustrated in the following interview excerpt:
The Mill Grinder's Story
The owner has been a grinder with Zimbabwe
Mills for the last seventeen years. He
migrated to Harare in 1966 in search of
employment to pay for "lobola", a form of
bridal dowry. After a few odd jobs, he was
hired by the mill as a general laborer and
was later trained to become a grinder.
He signed up on the municipal housing list in
1969 and was allocated his stand in 1984. He
paid for the Z$60 deposit from the Z$100
savings he kept at home, and applied for a
municipal loan to construct his house. The
loan was, however, only adequate to complete
two rooms. Fearing that the government would
take away his property, he is anxious to
complete the additional two rooms. However,
46 For instance, a beneficiary with a monthly income of
Z$150 and a 300 sq.m. stand is required to pay Z$22 per month for
stand and user charges. Since Z$41.25 is the equivalent of 27.5%
of Z$150, he/she could pay Z$19.25 per month for a building loan.
At an annual interest rate of 9.75% over 25 years, the amount of
the loan to which this beneficiary would be entitled to is
Z$2,457.
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with his low salary of Z$190 a month and
virtually no savings, construction has been
very slow.
He strongly feels that the 18-month
requirement should only apply to the first
two rooms in order to give allottees an
indefinite period of time to extend their
houses. According to him, the most difficult
phase in building is extending the core unit
after the loan is exhausted. Therefore if
government will require the poor to complete
four rooms within a short period of time,
then it should provide them with either more
time, or a larger loan.
This view is reinforced by the following excerpt:
The Machinist's Story
K, a tailor by profession, is a machinist
with Fashion Enterprises in Harare. He also
runs his own tailoring shop from his 4-room
house in Kuwadzana. He is married with six
children. His family resides in the rural
area during the tilling season.
He complained that the loan from the
municipality was not large enough to enable
someone like him to construct four rooms
within an 18-month period. At the same time,
he realizes that a much larger loan would
further strain his cash flow. Therefore he
argues that the government should be more
realistic in terms of how long it requires
low-income allottees to complete a 4-room
core. In fact, he does not even understand
how the government decided on four rooms.
"Why not three rooms, or even two rooms?"
The above excerpts indicate that households are encountering
financial difficulties in meeting the requirement of four rooms
within 18 months. Moreover, the most difficult phase in
construction is extending the house after the loan has been
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exhausted. Not surprisingly, some allottees felt that if
government were to insist on its present standards, it should
increase the loan amount; otherwise it should accept more
realistic building standards vis-a-vis the ability of households
to pay for housing.
Theme 3: Preferred Construction Methods & Loan Programs
Having examined the difficulties faced by households in
satisfying both mortgage and construction requirements, the
thesis examined the case studies to find out how families would
have ideally preferred to construct their homes in the absence of
programmatic constraints, and the types of loans they felt were
more appropriate to meet their needs.
When asked how they would have built in the absence of the
18-month requirement, majority of Holin's respondents stated a
preference for incremental building which corresponded with their
ability to raise the necessary financing from time to time.
Families also expressed their preferences for lending terms.
These preferences relate to the length of the payment period, the
size of the loan, the amount of interest, the administrative
mechanism, and the mortgage structure. For instance, one owner
stated that he considered the interest rate of his municipal loan
as too high and the repayment period too long. If there were no
constraints on construction time, he would prefer to build
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according to his own pace, and if he needed to borrow, limit his
credit to small amounts so that he can repay it over a relatively
short period of time. He also expressed a strong preference for
cash versus materials-only loans. The latter, he claims, would
give him more freedom in programming his construction.
Another respondent disagreed with the government's policy of
using income from formal employment as the sole basis for
determining affordability, and in particular, the size of one's
plot. He believes that income from informal activities, while at
times unpredictable, can contribute significantly to household
income. Moreover, rental income should offset the irregularity
of income from secondary economic activities. Once his house is
completed, he will concentrate his efforts towards paying the
loan within the shortest time possible to reduce both the
interest payments and the psychological burden associated with
the thought of passing the debt on to his children.
In a similar vein, one interviewee observed that the
criteria used by the municipality in allocating stands and
determining what is an affordable loan discriminates against the
poor and the self-employed: the poor because the less income one
has, the smaller the size of the loan; and the self-employed
because of the reluctance on the part of the local authority to
provide guarantees for building society loans-- a requirement for
eligibility --to those in the informal sector.
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A fourth respondent, experiencing problems in buying the
window and roofing to his house, expressed a need for small
specialized loans, in addition to the long-term loan, that would
enable him to purchase windows and roofing material for his house
after his major loan has been used up.
Other respondents preferred a bigger loan sufficient to
complete all seven rooms at once. One respondent indicated he
would like to rent out at least four rooms to repay mortgage
charges. According to him, providing people with small loans
leads to smaller houses (less rental space), and a slower pay-
back period.
One respondent preferred the employer loan over that of the
municipality, and regretted that his employer loan was not large
enough to finance the entire seven rooms. He considered the
interest rate on the council loans too high compared to his
interest-free employer loan. He would like to repay both
loans as soon as possible so that his family will not be burdened
by them in case he gets ill or dies.
Table 8 presents a summary of the attitudes of, and
suggestions offered by project participants on credit programs.
It is interesting to compare them with the recommendations made
by St. Mary respondents, who while not eligible for such loans,
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comprehend the socio-economic constraints faced by their project
counterparts, particularly those involved in the informal sector.
Table 8. -- Summary of Borrower Attitudes on Mortgage Finance
1. "The 25-year repayment period is too long and the interest
rate is too high... since by the end of the 25th year, I would
have paid more than twice the amount of the loan. Moreover, I
dislike the idea of passing on the financial burden to my
children."
2. "I earn a living by hawking clothes and other merchandise...
since the demand for my goods vary from month to month, I am
afraid of not being able to meet my monthly payments from time to
time... Moreover with the children entering school, I will have
to start saving for their education as well."
3. "Building 4-room core within eighteen months imposed a
tremendous burden on my family's cash flow, forcing us to rent
out some rooms to generate additional income to meet mortgage
payments."
4. "I think the municipality should be stricter in their
selection of project allottees since middle-income families can
afford to build their houses elsewhere."
5. "I think the deposit is too high. I've known of families who
were forced to drop out after being allocated a plot because they
couldn't raise the deposit for it."
6. "I couldn't understand the conditions of the loan. I sometimes
think I am being cheated by the municipality as well as the
building society... I wish the government would take more time to
explain the loan to us, especially since most of us had had only
few years of education."
7. "I prefer material to cash loans. I think the poor are more
likely to misuse cash, particularly during enrollment time."
8. "My wife earns more than I do from hawking. I wish the
municipality included her earnings in calculating our loan so I
could build a larger house faster."
9. "In calculating the loan, the building society should consider
the rising cost of building materials. By the time I get my loan,
it would be hardly enough to build two rooms."
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10. "I am in arrears with my municipal loan. I would like to pay
in small increments, whenever I make a small profit from selling
vegetables, but the municipality will only accept a full payment.
I wish its repayment conditions were more flexible."
11. "My husband and I prefer to start off with a one-room house,
rather than having to build a house from the
foundation.. .however, we don't have much choice under the current
housing projects of the government."
12. "The municipality/building society should consider that even
after we have completed the 4-room core, we are not only repaying
the construction loan, but also the builders and suppliers of
building materials."
13. "If government requires us to complete a 4-room core within
eighteen months, it should either increase the size of the loan
(adequate enough to build four rooms), lower its standard, or
extend the construction period."
14. "Personally, I prefer a larger loan so I can complete seven
rooms at once. I's like to rent out these rooms and repay my loan
at the soonest time possible."
15. "I am hesitant to take out such a large loan. What if I get
sick? I prefer smaller loans, say just for the roof or the
windows, which I can repay right away."
16. "If government charges interest on building loans, then it
should reduce taxes on basic commodities, including building
materials."
The statements from the respondents presented in the
preceding table echo similar concerns as those expressed by
residents of St. Mary's Township. There is the general reluctance
in applying for a long-term credit because of the instability of
income sources and a preference for smaller, more manageable
loans. Similarly, project participants expressed difficulties in
complying with standards and pace of construction -- the same
152
problems which residents of St. Mary's associated with rigid
project requirements. Finally, project allottees expressed a
preference for a greater variety in housing solutions, and
freedom to build incrementally. A concern about the rising cost
of tax on primary commodities, including building materials, was
also articulated by both sets of respondents.
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CHAPTER VII
STRATEGIES EMPLOYED BY FAMILIES TO SURMOUNT THE
PROBLEMS ASSOCIATED WITH PROGRAM CONSTRAINTS
AND THE MORTGAGE INSTRUMENT
Faced with the financial strain imposed by the structure of
the mortgage loan and the costs of meeting programmatic
requirements, project participants have sacrificed other
household priorities, assumed additional debts, divided the
family structure, and taken on second jobs to meet both mortgage
and program requirements. The resourcefulness of these families
should not be used as a justification for mortgage finance
programs, but as an indication of the families' determination to
survive in the face of adversity. Programs should be designed to
enhance the ability of households to house themselves in
accordance with the financial ability and need for housing, and
not to coerce them into solutions which the government feels they
should have, and should be able to pay for.
This chapter examines the strategies employed by project
participants to satisfy mortgage and project requirements. The
extent to which households have been able to mobilize the needed
resources depended in large part on their particular socio-
economic situation at the start of the project. It is interesting
to note that only a small minority opted not to apply for
mortgage assistance. Where did this group obtain the necessary
resources, and under what conditions? This question is addressed
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in the first section of this chapter. It will be followed by a
discussion on the strategies used by households to reduce
construction costs as well as mobilize the resources needed to
comply with government requirements.
Project participants differ from the residents of St. Mary's
in several socio-economic aspects. Average incomes at the start
of construction are generally higher for project participants who
are more likely to be employed by the private sector. The
evaluation surveys of the UNCHS project in Kwekwe and the USAID
project at Kuwadzana indicated that 68% of participants in the
former scheme were salaried employees (ENDA, 1985). In Kuwadzana,
Holin (1985) reports that all but three surveyed residents
reported that they are presently employed. In contrast, the
original residents of St. Mary's were former squatters who were
unable to qualify for government-sponsored rental housing in the
colonial regime because of lack of formal and secure employment.
Currently, majority of the original residents have remained self-
employed or have started small commercial (tuckshops) and
manufacturing enterprises based on-site, with one or two
assistants. Most, however, earn the substantial part of their
livelihood from rental income. Similarly, approximately 80% of
project participants were former renters, while residents of St.
Mary's were former squatters who resided rent-free in their self-
constructed dwellings before being relocated to their present
site. The housing situation of project participants also differs
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from that of St. Mary dwellers who were not restricted by current
program requirements on housing standards and construction speed.
Project participants are not only required to build a 4-room core
within eighteen months, they do not also have the flexibility to
live on-site during construction and to build incrementally using
available (local and self-made) building materials.
The Non-Borrowers
The fact that only a minority of allottees did not avail of
the loan indicates that they are more the exception than the
norm. Of those interviewed, only three households from Kuwadzana
and four from the World Bank project in Harare 48 did not borrow
a municipal or building society loan. The situation of the St.
Mary dwellers and of project borrowers is more typical, and
represents two diverse responses to the shortage of housing
opportunities. In the absence of program requirements,
households typically build incrementally, phasing construction
activities in tandem with the availability of resources,
effectively negating the need for financing. However, within the
48 The Harare component of the World Bank project. There
were no representative cases from Kwekwe.
49 Comparing the quantity of resources at the start of
construction is not possible across the projects, including St.
Mary's, not only because they started at different points in
time, but particularly because in the latter case, dwellers were
unable to recall how much savings they had when they started
building their houses in the early 1960s.
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project context, households are forced to apply for a loan since
resources are often inadequate to finance the completion of the
4-room core within the time limit set by the government. Non-
borrowing project participants who succeed in completing 4-rooms
in eighteen months are atypical in that they have not only
accumulated savings to start construction but are able to
mobilize additional resources to complete it. Similarly,
recipients of employer assistance are able to substitute employer
loan for the municipal or building society loan.
Alternative Sources of Financing
How do non-borrowers construct the required 4-room house in
the absence of formal finance ? Respondents offered several
explanations for refusing the mortgage loan. One stated that he
did not think he would be able to pay back the loan. Another
indicated that she feared discrimination from the municipality
since historically only men, who were legally employed, were
permitted to reside in urban areas. A retired allottee
anticipated that his loan request would be turned down because he
was no longer employed. In general, all indicated that they did
not like the repayment plan.
Instead of borrowing from either the municipality or a
building society, these beneficiaries had instead tapped other
sources of funds, such as savings, sale of assets, employer
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loans, intra-family transfers, etc. Some stated that savings
substituted for the loan, while another indicated that the
employer loan offered more favorable terms than the municipal or
building society loan. These views are illustrated in the
following case history excerpt.
The Divorcee's Story
The owner was born and raised in Masvingo.
She migrated to Harare 1976 where she was
married and later divorced. Due to
financial difficulties, she had to send her
child back to the rural area to be raised by
her mother while she looked for a job. She
eventually found employment as a domestic
helper in the servants' quarters. She
recently resigned from her job to devote her
full time to knitting and hawking. She buys
clothes at wholesale prices and sells them on
credit to clients from different farming
areas outside Harare. She presently earns
more from her own business than she did as a
maid.
She registered on the municipal waiting list
in 1974 and was allocated her stand ten years
later. Eager to rent out some rooms for
additional income, she decided to construct
five rooms at once (including a room for
lodgers), and hired a builder to undertake
the construction. It took five months to
complete the construction of the house,
possibly shorter if she did not have to
canvass around for materials. She was unable
to assist in the construction because her
business required her to travel often. During
this time, her former employer allowed her to
live rent-free in her old accommodation.
She hired two sets of builders altogether.
The first builder was hired on condition that
he was to construct five rooms at once and
will be paid according to the level of work
completed. She advanced him Z$500 to
complete the construction until the sill
level, but he ran away before completing the
job. She had to hire a second builder to
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complete the work to the roof level, and
paid him Z$200 for the work. Rather than
buying her materials from the project's
store, she decided to canvass around for the
cheapest price. She used second hand window
and door frames which she obtained at an
auction.
To finance the construction, she used all her
savings, approximately Z$4,000 plus an
employer loan of Z$300. The later was
quickly repaid within a month. She decided
not to apply for the loan because of fear of
discrimination due to her divorcee status.
It is only recently that single women were
given homeownership rights in the country.
She was also wary of the loan conditions
which she did not fully understand. Finally,
given her substantial savings, she
encountered no difficulty in completing the
house using her own resources. Nevertheless,
she prefers a wet core to a serviced site.
She believes that this would make it easier
for beneficiaries to move to the site
immediately and avoid having to pay dual
rents.
She plans to extend the house to 7 rooms and
to keep two sets of lodgers permanently to
pay for the mortgage charges as well as
defray the cost of food consumption. However,
the initial unit had consumed all her
savings, and the extension will depend on the
rate with which she is able to accumulate
enough savings to commence construction
again.
In the above case, the decision not to apply for a loan was
dictated by a combination of socio-economic factors. In addition
to the small employer loan, the owner had accumulated substantial
savings both from her previous employment as a domestic help, and
from her secondary sources of income. Another factor which
deterred her from applying for a loan was the fear of
discrimination given her divorcee status since it was only after
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independence that women were permitted to acquire a stand within
a municipal project. Finally, she complained that she did not
fully comprehend the loan program. Fortunately, she had
accumulated substantial savings to enable her to build her house
without a municipal loan. Her rate of savings accumulation was
assisted in part by rent-free accommodations provided by her
employers prior to moving into the site.
The Widow's Story
Mrs. X is a widow whose husband died shortly
before they were allocated their stand in
Kuwadzana. She did not apply for a municipal
loan because her husband's pension combined
with their past savings were adequate to
construct the minimum required unit.
X and her husband, a policeman, resided rent-
free inside a police camp in government
housing. She continued living there until she
moved her family to the project site. She
hired a builder to construct four rooms, but
was only able to complete three rooms due to
a shortfall in funds. The fourth room is in
the process of being completed. The materials
were bought in cash.
To finance the construction, she exhausted
their savings of Z$4,000 on the first three
rooms. She did not want to apply for a
municipal loan, even with the fourth room
only half finished, to avoid the burden of
monthly payments. Instead, she sets aside
half of her pension money for construction.
She estimates her expenditures to date as
Z$5,780. When the fourth room is completed,
she plans to rent it out to pay for plot
charges.
In the preceding case, a pensioner's widow was able to
raise enough resources for construction from savings prior to her
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husband's death and from his pension. She did not apply for a
loan, even with the fourth room half finished, in order to avoid
the burden of monthly payments.
Preference for Employer Loan
Of those who received employer loans, 2 received between
Z$3,000 to Z$3,500; six between Z$1,000 to Z$2,999; and one
obtained Z$300. Considering that the average cost of a 4-room
house is Z$2,655 in Kwekwe and Z$4,844 in Kuwadzana, the size of
these loans as a proportion of total housing cost is significant.
Realizing the predicament of their employees, some employers have
offered interest-free loans to their workers, often repayable
through monthly salary deductions. In the interview with the
office messenger, the allottee indicated that he decided to build
four rooms at once to comply with government requirement. A
substantial portion of funds were provided through a Z$3,000
employer loan as explained in the following excerpt.
Office Messenger's Story
At the start of construction, the owner had
savings of Z$700 with a building society.
Part of this money was used as deposit. The
rest was used to purchase the first set of
materials required for the slab as well as to
provide an initial advance to the builder.
He did not apply for a municipal loan because
of the interest rate. Instead he approached
his employer of five years for assistance.
The latter approved a Z$3,000 interest-free
loan which he repays through direct salary
deductions of Z$40 from his Z$200 monthly
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salary. He stated that this system of
repayment is not only convenient; it also
provides him with an added sense of job
security since future payments are contingent
on his continued employment.
The preceding excerpt illustrates the important role that
employers can play in providing housing finance. Employer credit
typically offers more favorable terms than project loan in terms
of interest rate and repayment schedule. However, the loan is
limited to those who are formally employed and whose employers
are generous enough to assist.
In the following case history, the owner feared that his
request for a loan would be turned down by the municipality.
Having lost his job due to an accident that left him partially
paralyzed, his prospects for a steady employment have been
drastically reduced. He is, thus, very grateful to receive the
accident compensation loan of Z$4,000 which he used in lieu of a
municipal loan.
C is partially paralyzed and unemployed. He
has no savings and is dependent on rental
income of Z$60 per month from three lodgers
in his 4-room house at Kuwadzana. He worked
for a construction company for many years
before his accident left him partially
paralyzed.
He was allocated his 200 sq.m. stand after
ten years on the municipal waiting list.
Given his semi-paralytic state, the land is
very important to him and to his family's
future. Being unemployed he was hesitant to
apply for a municipal loan. Fortunately he
was compensated by the company for his
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accident, and this enabled him to invest
Z$4,000 towards the construction of his 4-
room house. His relatives lent him an
additional Z$200 and he obtained a material
loan from a local supplier for Z$150. The
house was completed to the barest minimum
standard.
He feels very bitter about the government's
requirement of four rooms within eighteen
months. He reasons that without the
compensation money, he would not have been
able to afford the stand and house. In the
absence of such a requirement, he would have
preferred to start with two rooms.
C's hesitation to approach the municipality because of his
unemployment is similar to the situation of one allottee in the
World Bank project who was refused a loan by the building society
because he was forcibly retired by his employer for health
reasons. He claims that the building society discriminates
against the unemployed as well as those in informal employment
which account for a substantial portion of low-income households.
This poses a problem for implementing agencies who are caught
between the need to provide affordable programs to low-income
households and the requirements of building societies for
financial viability.
For instance, under the conditions of the loan agreement
between the Government of Zimbabwe and the World Bank 30% of
plots shall be allotted to households with incomes between Z$201-
Z$400, and 70% to households with incomes less than Z$200.
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Interviews with local project coordinators indicate that in
reality, the ratio is closer to 60% for higher-income households
and 40% for low-income families. Part of the reason is the
preference of building societies for less risky, higher-income
borrowers. It would therefore appear that using this financing
mechanism on a project intended to benefit very low-income group
presents a contradiction that manifest itself in the poor
targeting of beneficiaries. In this context, the very poor are
twice disadvantaged. Given low income levels, families qualify
for smaller loans, and if they happen to be unemployed or self-
employed the likelihood of obtaining a building society loan is
considerably lessened. Thus, the non-borrowers that "survive"
the rigorousness of project and program requirements are likely
to have access to more funds than their poorer cousins with very
limited alternative financing sources.
Table 9 compares the sources and quantity of resources
available to non-borrowing participants in the Kuwadzana and
Sunningdale projects. It shows indicates that households in the
World Bank project have accumulated more savings than their
counterparts in the Kuwadzana project and were also able to raise
considerably more funds from the sale of assets and loans from
relatives and employers. Those who did refuse the loan generally
indicated that not only did they dislike the repayment
conditions, in particular the interest rate and long maturity,
but they also estimated that their savings were adequate enough
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to build the standard core and/or could be supplemented
substantially from other financing sources with more favorable
lending terms such loans from an employer or a relative.
Moreover, there is a substantial difference in the size of
required deposit between the two projects, indicating the upper-
income bias of the project design. Compared to a maximum deposit
of Z$60 under the Kuwadzana project, participants of the World
Bank project were required to deposit as much as maximum of
Z$1200. Even adjusting for the inflation, this is easily a 200%
increase in the required deposit amount. A participant has the
option of either paying in cash or charging the deposit against
the building society loan. Those interviewed indicated that it
the former is preferable because one could start developing the
stand right away. In the latter case, one needs to wait for
the loan to be approved before one could initiate plot
development. In addition, the inclusion of the deposit in the
loan increases the borrower's total debt burden which could be as
high as Z$120 per month over a 25-year period. The end result is
a substantially higher income group who are building higher
quality housing within the context of a more expensive project.
165
Table 9.-- Savings and Other Financing Sourced Employed
by Non-Borrowers in lieu of the Mortgage Loan
Non-Borrowers Sources of Financing Z$
-----------------------------------
Kuwadzana (1984)
Case 1: Savings from income 400
and rent-free housing
(employer housing);
Employer loan 300
Case 2: Accident Compensation 4000
Loans from relatives 200
Case 3: Savings 4000
World Bank Harare (1987)
Case 1: Savings 4600
Case 2: Husband's savings; 2500
Wife's savings 720
Case 3: Husband's savings; 4000
Wife's savings; 800
Sale of two cows; 450
Employer loan 4000
Case 4: Husband's savings; 9000
Sale of car 1600
Case 5: Husband's savings; 5000
Wife's savings; 400
Employer loan 1000
Loan from brother 500
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Strategies Employed by Project Participants
to Reduce Costs and Mobilize
Resources for Housing
The imposition of project requirements has created a
tremendous financial strain on low-income households. This is
demonstrated in the following case study excerpt.
The Widow's Story
M is a 45-year old widow who is dependent on
her daughter and'her limited earnings from
crocheting. Her cash-flow stream has always
been strained by the financial burden of
educating her children and more recently of
constructing her house. At the start of the
project, she only had enough money to pay for
the deposit. Consequently had no other
recourse but to apply for the loan although
she thought the interest rate was too high.
Unfortunately the loan was only enough to buy
materials for two rooms.
However, she was intent on completing four
rooms of which two were to be rented out for
additional income. She renegotiated for a
larger loan. Her request was approved through
the sympathetic intervention of the project
manager.
In addition to the loan, she paid the builder
in phases allowing her to spread labor costs
and incrementally stockpiled building
materials as money became available from her
crocheting. These large expenditures have
depleted her meager savings, and as a result,
she feels economically vulnerable. She
considers rental income and her daughter's
contributions as already committed funds to
meet housing and educational expenses,
leaving her with no cushion in the event of
an emergency.
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In the preceding case history the widow, constrained by her
already limited resources, was forced to liquidate her meager
savings and to rent out a room in an attempt to meet construction
costs. Her situation is not unique. Contrary to the belief held
by policymakers and lending agencies, the case studies did not
reveal many households with substantial "hidden" savings or rural
incomes that could be liquidated for housing construction, and
therefore taken out of their "unproductive" use. This section
briefly discusses the strategies and informal financing sources
used by project participants to meet project requirements.
Savings and Sale of Assets
A number of factors affect the rate at which households are
able to accumulate savings for housing such as restrictions
against living on-site during construction. Other factors
include the type of jobs held previously and previous forms of
accommodation.51 Savings are considered as ready money or
50 The restriction against on-site residence prior to the
completion of a 4-room unit slows down a household's ability to
accumulate savings since it will have to continue paying rent
elsewhere.
51 Residing in rent-free accommodations, such as employer or
kin housing, enables the household to accumulate savings which is
then tapped for housing. Similarly former squatters enjoy the
benefit of rent-free accommodation. Not surprisingly, savings
from rent-free accommodation have been known to substitute for
project finance.
168
cash. The case histories showed that most allottees used all the
savings they had on deposit and advance to labor at the initial
phase of construction. In later stages, savings set aside from
current income are be used for both labor and materials.
Since savings, which among the case studies varied from
Z$150 to Z$2,000, are clearly not enough to finance a 4-room
core, it is often supplemented from the sale of urban assets
(furniture, bicycle, sewing machine, etc.) and/or rural property
(land, crops, cattle, poultry). Money raised through this
method ranged from Z$50 to Z$1,200, and was used for all expenses
associated with the housing construction including living
expenses during the construction period. The following excerpt
shows that the sale of a major asset, in this case a former
house, can account for a substantial proportion of housing
finance:
The Businesswoman's Story
S is a self-employed business woman who makes
her living by buying consumer goods from
Botswana which are sold in Kwekwe, a
profitable undertaking given strained trade
relations between Zimbabwe and South Africa.
When she is not travelling, Mrs. S is a [art-
time seamstress. She receives customers from
her house at Kwekwe.
Unlike most beneficiaries who were lodgers
before entering the project, Mrs. S and her
husband previously owned a 3-room house in a
development adjacent to the project. Their
case is however unique and warrants retelling
in full.
52 The municipal loan could either be cash or material
installments equivalent to Z$500. The building society loan was
only provided in the form of materials. Thus it was not uncommon
for most households to use the loan entirely on building
materials.
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Prior to their migration to Kwekwe, the
family lived in Bulawayo where the husband
worked as a general laborer for a textile
company. Unfortunately he was laid off in
1975. Unable to find employment, he decided
to move his family to Kwekwe where he had
heard of job openings at the steel factory.
With their six children, they rented a room
in Mbizo Section 3 and paid a monthly rent of
Z$6. The room was too small to accommodate
the entire family, and Mr. S was forced to
leave three of the children with a relative
until better quarters were found. In 1977,
they were able to transfer to a 3-room
company house in Mbizo Section 6 where they
paid a monthly rent of Z$25. In 1984 these
houses became part of a homeownership scheme,
and the family bought the house using their
savings of Z$1,200. Nevertheless, the house
remained too small to accommodate a family of
eight. Thus when Mrs. S heard of the new UN
housing pilot project which presented the
option of building to a maximum of seven
rooms, she eagerly applied to the project.
She registered on the waiting list in 1984, a
time when some of the beneficiaries had
already started building their houses. She
had been on the waiting list for three months
before she was notified by the Municipality
that she had been allocated a 300 sq.m.
stand. This was a stand formerly allocated
to another allottee who failed to raise the
required Z$50 deposit.
They decided to start with the construction
of seven rooms at once since, based on their
rough calculation, they felt they had
adequate resources to complete all rooms.
According to Mrs. S, the lump sum investment
they needed to initiate construction came
from the sale of their old house and the
building society loan.
While rural land and/or cattle are less likely to be sold to
raise money for construction, savings from the sale of
agricultural crops have been an important source of financing. In
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several case histories, the amount of accumulated savings from
the yearly sale of crops has been as high as Z$1,000 to Z$2,000
at the start of construction. In one case, the standowner owned
five acres of land adjacent to his parents' farm. The latter
grows maize on both lands, and sends him the annual profit which
last year amounted to Z$400. More commonly, it is the wife and
children who till the land and sell the produce. Profit, net of
household expenses and agricultural inputs, is normally saved,
and used as part of the initial investment.
However, most project participants are not fortunate enough
to own such a large size of rural land. occasionally, a family is
forced to sell an asset, such as a sewing machine or a bicycle,
that is critical to its livelihood, in order to raise money for
housing construction.
Household resources are rarely supplemented by loans or
donations from relatives or friends. Due to the relatively recent
phase of urban development and the historical impoverishment of
blacks, few of those interviewed indicated having relatives in
the urban area, and those with relatives stated the latter as
being too constrained by their own economic conditions to be of
much help financially. Assistance from relatives is more likely
to be provided in the form of labor during construction.
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Gardens
Gardens play an important role in the household's overall
financing strategy as a source of food during the initial phases
of construction when most of household resources is diverted to
finance building materials and labor. This is evidence by the
presence of vegetable gardens in almost all the stands, with some
households selling their surpluses in front of the house. The
importance of vegetable gardens increases inversely with the size
of the household income as illustrated in the case of a widow who
supports herself and her five children by crocheting and raising
a vegetable garden. The vegetables are consumed by the family,
and the surplus sold to buy milk and bread. Her savings were
used up in building the house, and rental income is used
primarily to meet plot and mortgage charges. Thus, while her
garden may not directly contribute to the financing of the house,
it enables her to shift what is typically spent on food to meet
expenses associated with house building. To this extent, home
gardens are vital to the household economy.
Informal Savings and Credit Groups
Unlike in St. Mary's where savings and credit groups were
popular especially among female-headed households, there were
very few instances when membership in a savings and credit group
was mentioned as a source of housing finance. Five of those
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interviewed stated being members of a rotating savings and credit
group, making monthly contributions between Z$25 to Z$50 per
month. Membership was generally limited, ranging from two to ten
members, due in part to the fact that the projects are relatively
new, and the social bond and trust required for creation of an
informal savings groups have not yet been developed. Most are
small informal associations which exercised little control over
the use of the funds. Only two specifically indicated using the
loan for housing construction. Others merely stated that the
loan was used to meet general living expenses. In Kuwadzana, an
allottee stated membership with a savings group of nine members
at his workplace. Each member contributes Z$30 per month.
With a monthly salary of Z$130, he said it is difficult to make
the regular contributions. A housewife contributes Z$20 monthly
to a 3-member savings group while her husband saves with a
building society. Another housewife was forced to withdraw from
her 9-member group after her husband's pay schedule changed from
a weekly to a monthly basis. She said that the
change in pay schedule made it difficult for her to meet her
contribution on a weekly basis.
In contrast, another respondent has given up entirely on the
idea of joining a savings group because "I just have enough to
make ends meet", or as another couple in Kwekwe stated with
regards to the mortgage loan, "all income is already committed
for future expenses". Still another respondent said he has
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withdrawn from the group after a member absconded with the
group's savings. Perhaps the most interesting response to the
question came from a household head who stated that membership in
such a group did not pay the equivalent of an interest, and that
only the first borrower gets the real value of her money due to
the eroding effect of inflation.
In general there are two different attitudes with regards to
savings and credit. One perspective views a positive link
between savings and credit as the major advantage for membership
in this group. The opposite position, illustrated in the last
example above, is more concerned about earning interest on her
savings rather than access to credit. It would seem helpful from
a policy perspective to develop a financing mechanism which would
link both savings and credit, while providing interest on savings
to attract the relatively bigger savers in the community. Credit
could be channeled towards a form of housing finance which
members can tap into for short-term home improvement or extension
loans. Such an organization would need to be grass-roots based to
be accessible to its clientele.
Dual Household Structure
Frequently, families are forced to sacrifice their living
space in order to make room for renters to pay for housing, or to
divide the family structure to allow more room for letting out as
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well as to reduce expenditures during the construction period. In
the latter case, the immediate family resides in the rural area
with the household head remaining in the city. In the field
survey, families with a dual household structure owned between 1
to 10 acres of land, and 2 to 15 heads of cattle.
The existence of the dual household structure is an
outgrowth of the colonial past where only the male members of the
households were permitted to work and reside in urban areas.
Wives and children typically resided in the Tribal Trust Land
where they tilled the soil for subsistence. Having achieved
independence only in 1981, much of the country's Black population
are still making the transition from a rural to an urban life.
Seasonal and circular migration are a common phenomena. The wife
and children typically live with the husband after the harvest
season, and return to the rural homestead during the tilling
period. Income from the sale of crops is typically used for the
maintenance of the family and to purchase inputs for the planting
season. These earnings may be supplemented by a small maintenance
allowance from the husband.
It is only in recent years that urban life has become
possible as a permanent way of life for blacks, rather than
merely as a privilege contingent on one's employment. Since the
projects are relatively recent, interviews with participants do
not shed any conclusive insight on the relationship between
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homeownership in the urban area and preference for rural life.
However, the case histories do reveal that a some savings from
rural investment is being used to finance the construction of the
urban house. It is not clear whether this is indicative of a
trend, or merely a "one shot" financing with subsequent profits
from agriculture being re-invested in the rural areas.
The Driver's Story
B, a driver for a local bakery, migrated to
Harare with his parents when he was 14. His
parents were domestic helpers who resided on
their employer's compound. Five years later,
his parents returned to their rural homeland
to cultivate his uncle's 6-acre land.
Although B remained in the city, he maintains
very strong ties with his village where he
owns 5-acres of land that is currently being
cultivated by his parents and kin. Profit
from the sale of maize is saved. Last year,
this amounted to Z$400.
At the start of construction, he had Z$2,000
in personal savings from the sale of maize.
He also obtained a municipal loan of Z$1,500
and an employer loan of Z$600. Without his
initial savings, he doubts that with a
monthly income of Z$196 he could have
financed the construction of his 4-room
house. He is currently renting out one room
to pay for monthly mortgage charges.
Due to the rapid urbanization trend predicted by
international agencies for Zimbabwe, the government is pursuing
an aggressive rural resettlement program as a way of stimulating
the agricultural sector and regulating urban growth. It is
therefore not clear either whether the dual household structure
is a transitory or a permanent phenomenon. The answer to this
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question will obviously have serious bearing on whether the rural
component of the household will continue to function as a source
of housing investment. The case histories by themselves cannot
provide definite conclusions but they do suggest that at least
during the initial phases of construction, maintaining a dual
household structure reduces cost construction, and may even
augment total housing investment.
The following excerpts are derived from two cases with one
family expressing a desire to maintain the dual household
structure even after the completion of the house, and the other
stating a strong preference for urban life.
The Postman's Story
The owner, a postman, resides in his 4-room
house in Kuwadzana with his eldest son and
one lodger. His wife and five children
typically live in the rural area during the
planting season to assist his parents who are
peasant farmers. He built the house in
Kuwadzana specifically to enable his sons
establish a foothold in urban society. He
wanted them to have a house as they start
looking for jobs in Harare. Nevertheless, he
regrets having to burden them with the
remaining mortgage payments after he retires.
He prefers to keep his wife and daughters in
his 2-room rural homestead to cultivate his
5-acre land even after the house at Kuwadzana
has been extended to seven rooms. It is in
this way that he has chosen to reconcile the
urban and rural aspects of his life.
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In the preceding excerpt, the postman has bifurcated his
household structure with the female members residing in the rural
homestead, and the males in the city where they are expected to
support the family through paid employment. In this family
structure, it is likely that the sons and their families will
become permanent city residents, with the father eventually
returning to the rural area. This illustrates that for some
families, entry into the project and consequent access to urban
land provide a medium for the next generation's entry to urban
society. In contrast, the second household, severing rural ties,
has vowed to become a true urbanite.
The Steel Factory Worker's Story
N is a steel factory worker and a part-time
cobbler. He is 39 years old and has worked in
the factory over the last six years. He hopes
to be promoted to assistant foreman very
soon. To supplement his income he repairs
shoes and slippers in his spare time. His
wife is sews and hawks clothes within the
project site. N migrated to Kwekwe from Gutu
in 1975 in search of work. He first earned a
living by repairing shoes until he was hired
by the steel factory on a salary basis.
He considers himself a townsperson and has
since brought his family to live permanently
with him in Kwekwe. Although he possesses
five heads of cattle and is eligible to own
land in his tribal home, he has no interest
in working the land. His chief aim in life
is to expand his business and to improve the
standard of living of his family. He sees no
future in living in the rural area. Instead
he has asked his brother to assist him in
expanding the shoe repair business and has
even approached the municipality about the
possibility of opening a stand in the
proposed shopping area within the project.
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In the third example, the household head plans to return to
his village after receiving his education in the city. He plans
to rent his house in the city in the future, and to live
permanently in his village.
The Fence-Maker's Story
M is 32 years old, married with three
children. He maintains strong rural ties
since his family resides there during the
planting season. He owns a 3-room house in
Kwekwe and 10 acres of land in Gokwe with two
heads of cattle.
M is currently studying for his '0' levels
through evening classes. During the day, he
works as a fence-maker. He first came to
Kwekwe in 1980 to further his studies. He
would like to qualify for admission to the
Teacher's Training College and train to teach
at the local primary school in Gokwe. He
pointed out that he prefers the rural
environment to urban life because the cost of
living is lower in the former. Meanwhile he
is busy completing his house which he
considers to be a good investment. He plans
to rent it out when he returns to Gokwe. He
intends to continue the fence-making business
through his brother who plans to reside in
Kwekwe permanently.
The interviewee preferred the rural life because the cost of
living was cheaper than in the city. However, he was also
cognizant of the increasing value of urban property, he plans to
rent out the house and to continue the thriving fence-making
business he started by having his brother, a dedicated urbanite,
supervise his two assistants in his absence.
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Builder's Credit
With the exception of one self-built house, and two
brigade-built houses, all those interviewed hired informal
builders whom they paid in phases. Payment in stages is critical
to maintain a positive cash flow during the building process.
Normally, the initial bulk of funds is utilized for down payment
and for the purchase of building materials. In fact, majority of
the loans were set aside specifically for the latter purpose.
Coupled with the cost of maintaining a room or a house elsewhere
during construction, a household's cash flow at this stage is
spread out very thinly. Thus, it is not infrequent for families
to defer payment for labor until enough resources have been
accumulated from current income sources to pay for labor. Staged
financing is therefore a common strategy used by families to
spread out the cost of a house. This is illustrated in the
following story of a household who availed of builder's credit:
To finance the construction of his house, Mr.
M drew from different sources of funds phased
over an 18-month period. The first major
expense was the Z$50 deposit which was paid
from his savings. The second major expense
was labor. Fortunately the builder he hired
was desperate for work and agreed to extend
him credit. Under this agreement, the owner
advanced the builder Z$100 from his savings
to construct a 4-room core. It was
understood that the remaining Z$300 would be
paid in installments of Z$50 every month
after construction. They did not sign any
contract since the builder lived on the
project site himself.
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Informal builders provide both building and material credit.
They invariably supply their own initial capital. With the
exception of two beneficiaries, all paid the builders after the
completion of a every stage-- usually from floor to sill level
--at an average installment of Z$300 for every stage. When
households are unable to pay on time, builders often agree to
defer payments without charging interest. They also provide some
small short-term material credit to keep the construction going.
Realizing that without a regular supply of building
materials, their work and source of income would be disrupted,
builders often accept partial or deferred payment terms, and are
forced to finance part of their own labor cost. Although builders
could, at their own choice, halt if they went unpaid, they are
often willing to accept these payment terms provided they had
enough to live on and to pay their workers. In Kuwadzana, living
expenses for builders are relatively low since many live on the
project site with their families residing in the rural areas.
Nevertheless, in the early stages of the project, many builders
complained that owners who had agreed to provide them with food
were not doing so regularly. This indicates the limited
resources which builders have themselves.
Average labor costs for a 4-room house is Z$900 in Kuwadzana
and Z$413 in Kwekwe, but there are considerable variations from
case to case, depending on how many sets of builders are actually
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hired by the owner. In the case studies, builders' charges vary
from Z$650 to about Z$1,200 in Kuwadzana and between Z$300 to
Z$950 in Kwekwe. This could be, as stated by Holine (1986), the
result of a fairly high turnover of builders. Since few of the
owners have resources to complete four rooms at one time, one
builder leaves the job when materials run out and, when work
begins again, a different builder is hired.
Interestingly, the survey on informal builders in Kuwadzana
indicated that builders perceived their job as constructing a
4-room core, and set their charges accordingly (USAID, 1986).
When asked to break down the charges on a room-to-room basis,
they were unable to do so. It is also very likely that
considerable negotiation takes place between the owners and
builders about the amount to be paid as construction proceeds.
Builders are typically paid by stages of construction reached,
and require payments which are higher, relative to material
costs, for the initial stages than later stages of construction
in order to recover the cost of performing non-labor tasks
necessary to get the construction going.
While the availability of building credit helped
beneficiaries alleviate their cash flow problems during the
initial phase of construction, it presented a cash flow problem
for builders. Since builders have to pay their laborers upon the
completion of each stage regardless of whether they themselves
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have been paid or not, builders are often forced to take several
"contracts" at a time, juggling the work in accordance with the
likelihood of being paid a given amount at a given time.
Clearly, the limited abilities of the owner to obtain materials
and make regular payments to builders contributed substantially
to the phenomenon where many houses were built in "fits and
starts".
Rental Income
Another important source of financing is the rental of
rooms. Letting out rooms is a common strategy practiced by
households to stabilize their typically irregular cash flow
stream in order to meet regular monthly mortgage charges. There
is a particularly lucrative market for room rental because of the
shortage of housing options in Zimbabwe as evidenced by the
length of the housing waiting list in each municipality. Although
the government restricts rents to a maximum of Z$8 per room in
high density areas, this legislation is not currently enforced.
The average rent charged by those interviewed varied from Z$20 to
Z$25 per month and is based on the number of rooms and not on the
size of the lodger family residing in the room. Rental income is
used to pay mortgage charges and plot charges as well as to
extend the house and meet other living expenses.
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Holin's survey (1986) provides some figures on the extent of
renting in Kuwadzana. At the time of her survey, 14 of the 129
resident families (11.7%) were renting rooms to one or more
lodgers. Some 14 beneficiaries reported renting rooms to two
families; the remaining stated having only one set of lodgers
each. In all 18 lodger families consisting of 44 persons were
living with the beneficiaries in the sample. The average size
of these families is 2.4 persons and the rent charged varied from
Z$10 to Z$25 per room (Holin, 1986).
While only 11.7% of these households living on-site reported
renting to lodgers, about 80% of the sample resident households
reported that they have rented or will rent rooms. Of those who
have not yet moved to the project site, 76.5% indicate they will
rent rooms. In all, an overwhelming 78% (181 of the 235 sample
size) indicate a willingness to rent rooms.53
Thus room rental will clearly provide an important income to
beneficiaries in the Kuwadzana project in spite of the fact that,
unlike St. Mary dwellers who can build separate rental units on
the same stand, project participants are able to expand their
53 In the smaller pilot project at Kwekwe, a UN survey
indicated that only 35 (14%) reported having lodgers, with the
majority (84%) having only one lodger family. The lodgers are
paying between Z$15 and Z$30 a month for rent. Only 6% pay more
than Z$30 as monthly rent.
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house only to a maximum of seven rooms. For those paying a
monthly charge of Z$45, the cost of payment could be reduced on a
monthly basis by almost one-half. In addition, the level of
rental activity that can be anticipated will significantly
increase the size of this project by looking at the number of
lodger families that the beneficiaries have indicated a
willingness to house. Majority of beneficiaries (35%) stated
plans to rent rooms to two lodger families. Some 25% will house
one set of lodger, while 13% intend to rent rooms to three
families (Holin, 1986). A few even indicated plans to rent rooms
to four or five families. Moreover, it is not the smallest
families that are more likely to rent rooms to three or more
lodger families. The average family size of those interested in
renting three or more rooms is five which is about the average
family size for all beneficiaries in the survey. These trends
are reflected in the case histories as the following interview
excerpt indicates:
The Tailor's Story
The household head is a tailor who runs his
shop out of his 4-room house in Kuwadzana.
His income varies with the season. He claims
that the volume of business is bigger in the
winter while summer brings in a predictable
lag. To stabilize his cash flow, he
maintains two sets of lodger whose payment is
used to meet plot charges. When his 4-room
house is fully extended to seven rooms, he
intends to rent out an additional two more
rooms to repay the mortgage and reduce food
expenditures. On average he earns Z$210 per
month from tailoring, and Z$50 from his
lodgers.
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It is evident from the preceding excerpt that rental income
reduces the proportion of household income normally devoted to
housing expenditure. Rent is often used to pay mortgage and/or
municipal charges, allowing the household to devote
their resources to the extension of the house as well as to meet
family emergencies.
Renting of rooms a way of satisfying the rigid requirements
of the amortization schedule questions a project's implicit
objectives. A housing needs assessment study done by the Urban
Institute (1982) concluded that the national goal of providing
all households with the current standard 4-room core will be
impossible without higher occupancy levels and the present
practice of lodging. This implies that, by raising the cost of
homeownership through its housing standards, government will
effectively make it necessary for the very low-income households
families to rent out rooms in order to afford the standard 4-room
house. This trend is clearly reflected in the design of the
second (and proposed) USAID project which includes anticipated
rental income is its affordability calculation. Table 10
presents an affordability analysis developed for a 2-room core
(300 sq.m. stand) under a contractor-built and self-help built
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option. 54 It shows that two- and three-room cores are more
affordable than 1-room cores because of the potential for rental
income.
Informal Sector Activities: Secondary Sources of Finance
Almost all of the households interviewed had one or more
members active in informal activities, with income from the
latter often exceeding that earned from formal employment.
Nonetheless, households are reluctant to give up paid employment
because of the stability and security it offers, a consideration
that is important when faced with a long-term debt. The
following case history excerpts illustrate that secondary income
constitutes a significant portion of total household income.
However, current government policy does not typically include
secondary income in the affordability analysis. 55
The Tailor's Story
The owner, a full-time security guard,
repairs and hawks ready-made clothes to the
adjacent farm areas on credit. He earns Z$196
from his first job and as much as Z$300 from
his secondary occupation. Although he earns
more from the latter, he is reluctant to
54 It illustrates the minimum household income levels required
to afford a loan for one-, two-, three- and four-room cores with
and without one lodger. It is assumed that a lodger would increase
a household's income by Z$25 per month.
55 However, when households are required to meet a set standard
of construction regardless of their ability or inability to raise
the lump sum investment necessary at the initial stage of
construction, the use of a rigid and static affordability formula
is equally irrelevant.
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Table 10
Affordability of Self-Help Core House
(USAID, 1986)
Interest rate: 12.5% Repayment period (years): 25
Item I Rm 2 Rm 3 Rm 4 Rm
A. Plot & loan charges
1. Sale price of plot 1200 1200 1200 1200
2. Sale price of house 3172 4100 5200 6240
3. Deposit 437 530 640 744
4. Loan balance 3935 4770 5760 6696
Monthly payment 42.90 52.01 62.80 73.01
B. Monthly service charges
1. Sewerage 3.53 3.53 3.53 3.53
2. Refuse collection 1.05 1.05 1.05 1.05
3. Minimum water 2.25 2.25 2.25 2.25
4. Supplementary 5.65 5.65 5.65 5.65
C. Total monthly charges 55.39 64.49 75.28 85.49
D. Minimum required income
assuming 27.5% to housing 201 235 274 311
E. Front-end cash required
incl Z$350 for closing 767 880 990 1094
F. Minimum rental income
required to maintain
affordability at
various income levels
Income level (Z$per month)
100 28 37 48 58
110 25 34 45 55
120 22 31 42 52
130 20 29 40 50
140 17 26 37 47
150 14 23 34 44
160 11 20 31 41
170 9 18 29 39
180 6 15 26 36
190 3 12 23 33
200 0 9 20 30
210 - 2 7 18 28
218 - 5 5 15 26
220 - 5 4 15 25
230 - 8 1 12 22
240 -11 - 2 9 19
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resign from his first job because "it
provides me with a sense of security."
The Municipality did not include his
secondary income in calculating the size of
his loan. Had he qualified for a bigger
loan, he would have been able to complete his
7-room house faster, and been able to rent
out at least three rooms earlier to repay the
loan.
The Story of the Photographer
The household resides in his 7-room house
with his family, his mother and two brothers.
He derives economic security from his job
with an air freight company but earns much
more from his part-time work as a
photographer. He earns a regular salary of
Z$350 per month while his income from
photography fluctuates from month to month.
However, at best he earns as much as Z$600
per month especially when he is hired to
cover special occasions such as weddings.
From his gross earnings, he subtracts around
Z$30 for transportation and film. He
typically charges Z$3 per photo and makes a
minimum profit of Z$157 on each assignment.
He feels no economic need to rent out a room
in his house. He believes that he has a
bright future in photography and encourages
his relatives to explore opportunities in the
informal sector for which there is no tax.
He has set up a photo shop in his house and
draws his clients from within and outside the
project site by word-of-mouth as well as from
references made by his former employer, an
established photographer who has since
retired.
He wished that the Municipality had
considered his income from photography in
determining the size of his loan. This would
have enabled him to complete his 7-room house
faster.
Photography and tailoring are only of the few home-based
economic activities that thrive within the project site. A
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variety of other economic activities exist, including tailoring
and sewing, crocheting, fence- and brick-making, selling
vegetables, traditional healing, furniture-making, carpentry,
shoe repair, and hawking. Income is rarely taxed and operators
neither pay for rent for the workspace, nor for a trade license.
A housing project also typically attracts builders, vendors,
material suppliers, and other small entrepreneurs from the
outside. Some of them eventually reside on-site as renters,
generating additional income for residents of the project. In
either case, income from the economic activity is fed back into
the project, in effect, creating a micro-economic system
consisting of interrelated informal economic activities with
informal traders and artisans forming their own savings and
credit group as a way of financing the expansion of their
enterprise.
The Story of the First Tuckshop Owner
B is a tuckshop owner in Kuwadzana. With his
wife and three children, he rents a room for
Z$25 in a 5-room house within the project
site.
He migrated to Harare in 1973 and worked as a
waiter at a local sports club which provided
him rent-free accommodation. In 1978 he
resigned and returned to his rural home in
Buhera. He returned to Harare in 1978 and
resided with his brother rent-free. He earned
his living by practicing traditional
medicine. In 1984 he was employed by a
government ministry as a concrete grinder.
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He held this job until 1985 when his brother,
the bar manager for the sports club, lent him
Z$2,000 to open a tuckshop at Kuwadzana.
To this loan, he added his savings of Z$450
as initial capital. He spent Z$400 on
construction materials and Z$200 on labor.
He buys all his goods from wholesalers in
town and uses his brother's car for
transportation. The car is lent to him for
free, but he pays for petrol and maintenance.
During good times, he earns between Z$150-500
in profit. He claims that business is
generally good because he runs one of the
largest and well stocked tuckshop on the
site. He doesn't fear his competitors,
arguing that as long as one has the
essential commodities in stock, like bread,
milk and mealie meal, one could always expect
to make some profit.
At present, he is not paying rent for the
premises, neither are his earnings taxed by
the government. He and the other twelve
tuckshop owners plan to form a cooperative
society to which they will each contribute
Z$25 monthly. This money will be deposited
into a joint account with a building society.
Once they have accumulated adequate funds,
they would like to build a supermarket and
operate it on a cooperative basis in
Kuwadzana. They have set a meeting date to
finalize the organization of their society.
His goal in life is to expand his business
and to obtain a stand in Kuwadzana. He has
already registered on the municipal waiting
list and anticipates being allocated a stand
in subsequent phases of the project. He has
no intention of moving his business out of
Kuwadzana since he foresees a bright future
for himself as long as the government does
not tax his earnings.
The Story of the Second Tuck Shop Owner
M is a tuckshop owner in Kuwadzana. He
migrated to Harare in 1980 and worked as a
till operator in a cafe. During this time,
he rented a room in Highfield. In 1985, he
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moved to Kuwadzana where he is renting a room
for Z$25 per month in a 4-room house with
another lodger. He has registered his name
on the municipal waiting list.
M. jointly operates a tuck shop with a
friend. They started the business in 1986 on
premises rented at Z$15 monthly. They
initially contributed Z$75 each towards the
capital. After a month in operation, they
borrowed Z$200 from his partner's uncle to
purchase more stocks for the shop. They have
already repaid this debt in full.
In their original agreement, they agreed to
set their salaries once they have determined
the range of their monthly income. However,
they have not been able to do so to the
present time since all earnings are ploughed
back into the business. They would like to
stock their shop with all the essential
commodities to keep up with the demand. At
the moment they only draw allowances of Z$40-
60 per month to live on. They have a
provision that a partner can increase his
equity in the business and the profits will
be allocated in accordance with the amount of
capital invested.
All the goods are bought from wholesalers and
transported on-site by buses. They earn
between Z$200 to Z$300 monthly. M pointed
out that in the tuck shop business, monthly
earnings are heavily dependent on the
quantity of goods stocked in one's shop. As
a result, they are presently not saving any
of their earnings. They plan to hire a
helper once net profits have stabilized at
Z$105. He stated that "a child has to sleep
in the tuck shop every day to guard against
thieves". He and his partner are part of the
effort to form a cooperative of tuckshop
owners on-site.
His long-term ambition is to own a house in
Kuwadzana since he is optimistic about the
future of his business. He wishes that the
municipality provided housing and business
loans that catered to the self-employed which
would enable them to expand their business.
He argues that renting reduces one's profit
while creating a feeling a insecurity.
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The stories of the two tuckshop operators demonstrate the
process by which a small business is started using financing from
either a relative and/or a friend. Due to the expanding market
within the project, the business thrives to the point where
individual tuckshop owners decide to form a cooperative, pooling
their resources together through an informal savings group
mechanism in order to build a large supermarket that would enable
them to reduce their individual overhead costs. Currently,
tuckshops exist in the form of several makeshift
sheds located in a row at strategic locations within the project.
As such, owners feel the need to "hire a child to sleep inside
the tuckshop everyday to guard against thieves". Obviously one of
the rationale behind the plans to build a supermarket would be to
reduce this risk as well as to obtain a larger variety of goods
in bulk at wholesale prices.
The second example is particularly interesting because it
illustrates the process behind informal business partnerships.
Constrained by the lack of capital, two friends pool their
resources together and decide to open a tuckshop. Although their
starting capital is smaller than the first tuckshop, it is
striking that they do not fear competition because of the high
demand for basic commodities generated by an expanding market, a
market that will continue to grow as the project enters into its
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later phases. They agree in concept to set aside part of the
profit as "salary" for themselves, but have not yet been able to
generate enough profits to cover investment. However, part of
their operating costs is a fixed "living allowance" that is
separate from the salary. A sophisticated feature of the
partnership is the provision that enables each to increase one's
equity, with the profits being allocated in proportion to one's
investment in the business. Not surprisingly, both partners
express a desire for the government to offer a small business
loan to enable them to expand their business, a suggestion that
has been echoed by dwellers in St. Mary's who are themselves
active in the informal sector.
Encouraged by their thriving business, these tuckshop
operators, currently lodgers in Kuwadzana, are eager to become
permanent residents. As the project expands and attracts more
diverse economic activities, it is likely that the lodger
population of the project will likewise expand, serving as a pool
of future homeowners who are, in turn, both producers and
consumers of informal services and goods.
The Cobbler's Story
In 1978 Y started coming to Kuwadzana to
repair shoes while residing with his brother
in Highfield. Prior to the project, business
was very slow, generating income of only Z$40
monthly. With the start of the project,
however, demand picked up, and he moved on-
site as a lodger in 1985. He rented a room
in a 3-room house at Z$25 per month. His
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family resides in the rural area where his
wife is active in subsistence agriculture.
He is a member of an informal savings group
composed of ten members involved in similar
informal activities. The member who draws
the lot gets Z$40 for that particular month,
and is able to use the money as he pleases.
He is very optimistic about the future of his
business as the project continues to grow,
and plans to hire two assistants in the
future. He would like larger premises for
his business. He does not perceive any
threat from his four other competitors as the
market is large enough. His immediate goal
is to obtain the birth certificates of his
children so that he can register as a lodger
and be on the municipal waiting list. He
would very much want to own his own house and
feels exploited as a renter. He is very
bitter about the criteria used by the
municipality for allocating houses and loans
which, he claims, have no provision catering
to the needs of those in the informal sector.
The above stories indicate that the growth of Kuwadzana has
attracted economic activities, lodgers, and prospective home
owners. Given the magnitude of demand, neither the cobbler nor
the tuckshop owners perceive any threat from their competitors,
and both plan to expand their businesses in the immediate future.
Simultaneously, they would like to change their tenure status
from renters to homeowners, provided they can overcome the income
barriers to homeownership. They also expressed a demand for a
small business loan to enable small entrepreneurs like themselves
to expand and improve their activities. This suggestion echoes
the recommendation made by the St. Mary respondents who, like the
above, typically work within the informal sector.
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Employer Loans
Employer loans serve as an important source of supplementary
housing finance for those formally employed.56 In the case
histories, the loan size varied from as much as Z$1,000 to as
small as Z$200. Typically the loans offer a lower interest rate
or no interest at all. Payments are made through monthly salary
deductions. Although their assistance is limited to those
employed, employers ease the financial burden for families during
the initial phases of land acquisition and construction. In the
following case study, the respondent, an employee of the
University of Zimbabwe, augmented his municipal loan with a loan
from the University. The latter is a sizeable amount with
interest rates lower than that offered by the municipal loan.
The Janitor's Story
Mr. M. is a janitor at the university. He is
married and lives in his 3-room house at
Kuwadzana with his wife and three children.
M. migrated to Harare in 1970 from the Honde
Valley in Manicaland. He first worked as a
servant in Avondale where he occupied a 2-
room unit rent free. Two years later, he was
hired as a caretaker for a block of flats. he
was paid a higher salary and provided rent-
free accommodation. In 1975 he got married
and was hired eventually by the university as
a general worker at a higher salary. During
this period, he and his wife rented a room in
an li-room house with seven other lodgers.
56There are cases where employer loans have substituted for
municipal loans.
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As his family grew, they experienced a need
for a larger living space. He registered on
the municipal waiting list in 1975, but was
not allocated his 260 sq.m. stand until 1984.
Although he would have preferred to hire a
building brigade to build his house, he did
not have adequate funds on hand to buy all
the materials at once to enable the brigade
to complete four rooms. He hired a private
builder instead who charged him Z$1,050 for
four rooms, ablution unit and plastering. He
paid the builder in stages, according to the
various levels of construction completed
which met the approval of the council
inspector.
He qualified for a municipal loan of Z$2,1060
based on his Z$200 monthly salary. He also
applied for a university loan of Z$1,000. It
only took one month for the latter to be
approved. The university loan carried an
interest rate of 9% and was paid from Z$25
monthly deductions from his salary. To this
he added Z$250 from his savings with the
building society. He purchased all his
materials on a cash basis. Once the four
rooms are complete, he intends to rent out
three rooms, charging Z$25 for each. He will
request permission from the Municipality to
build up to nine rooms, and plans to use the
rental income generated from the three rooms
to pay for the construction of the remaining
rooms.
He would like to see project loans increased
to as much as Z$10,000 with greater
flexibility in repayment terms. In
particular, he prefers a shorter period in
order to lessen his interest payments. He
argues that a large loan will enable one to
complete the house, and take in lodgers
sooner. In this way, repayment for the
larger loan will not be a problem since these
will be met from the lodgers' fees.
The respondent has a very clear objective in maximizing his
loans. He would like to build his house at the shortest time
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possible in order to generate rental income. Like rent levels,
the cost of construction are well known in the area enabling
households to make a simple estimate of perceived costs and
benefits on which to base the decision to borrow and build. As
illustrated above, the janitor had a general idea of the cost to
build four rooms, and clearly realized that the municipal loan
would not be adequate to meet this objective. Fortunately, he
was able to avail of a substantial employer loan at more
favorable financing terms which enabled him to build most of the
housing unit. Since his objective is to convert most of his
house into rental accommodation, securing this secondary loan to
accelerate construction was critical particularly given his
limited savings and salary, as well as the limited size of the
municipal loan.
Employer-assisted housing is likely to acquire a bigger
role in public housing schemes in the future. For instance, the
second phase of the Kuwadzana project is witnessing an increase
in employer-funded houses. Under this arrangement, companies
purchase serviced sites from the Municipality on condition that
beneficiaries meet the latter's income criteria. The companies
frequently hire a contractor to construct the basic core which is
sold to the employee through a loan agreement. Under this
agreement, the latter repays the company through regular pay
deductions. The company holds title to the property until the
full payment is made. As of 1986, 7 companies had purchased 197
stands for their employees. More recently, the government has
launched a pilot project based on employer-assisted housing. An
employer or consortium of employers can service and develop the
stand, or jointly apply for a scheme under a building society.
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Summary
This chapter has demonstrated that while project
participants are economically better off than their counterparts
In St. Mary's Township, and therefore more likely to be able to
comply with project requirements, only a small minority of
families were able to construct their homes without a mortgage
finance. This indicates that the costs associated with existing
standards are generally unaffordable to project participants,
thereby creating the artificial need for finance. To supplement
the mortgage loans, borrowers employ cost-reducing strategies and
tap informal financing sources similar to those used by the
residents of St. Mary's. It is conceivable that in the absence of
project restrictions, these families would have been able to
build and consolidate their homes, using the same informal
mechanisms, without the need for long-term credit.
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CHAPTER VIII
INSTITUTIONAL RESPONSE TO IMPLEMENTATION
PROBLEMS
In addition to the argument that the need for mortgage
finance is artificially created by the government's strong
programmatic emphasis on standards and rate of construction. The
thesis argues that the government's misconception that finance,
not land, is the critical bottleneck to construction has led to
institutional and coordination problems which exacerbate the
difficulties faced by project participants.
Drawing heavily upon interviews with officials of lending
and implementing agencies, this chapter will demonstrate that
local authorities and building societies are equally reluctant to
participate in long-term credit programs for low-income
households. However, they have little choice because, like
project participants, the framework of housing policy established
by the government, requires them to "play by the rules". To avoid
the financial risk associated with the application of mortgage
programs to poor families, implementing and lending institutions
have adopted a series of design and management innovations
characterized by (a) a subtle but definite shift in the target
group from lower-income, high risk borrowers towards middle-
income, lower risk project participants, and (b) an increasing
formalization of the lending as well as the building process.
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This study argues that the increasing sophistication of
institutional arrangements will not eliminate project
implementation problems. These are rooted in the mismatch between
the financial services that institutions can provide on the one
hand, and the equity base and borrowing capacity of low-income
households. 5 5 The need for finance is brought about by the
present level of standards and other programmatic constraints.
The need for finance can only be reduced by increasing the
choices in tenure and housing solutions. The fact that the same
implementation problems have repeatedly emerged in spite of such
arrangements indicate that the government's focus on financial
programs only exacerbate the problems that have arisen from the
enforcement of excessive standards. Focusing on finance, and
institutional solutions to the problems associated with
implementing a mortgage finance program for low-income housing
detracts from the real issue of access to land. Indeed, the
belief held by the government that by increasing access to
55 This conflict between what households are able to afford
and what financial institution require to remain financially
viable relates to the constraints associated with income
qualifications required from potential borrowers. such as an
adequate level of income, regular stable employment, a verifiable
income and satisfactory collateral, i.e. collateral in the form
of conventional marketable assets. There are also restrictions
on loan terms which make access to financing difficult such as:
minimum sizes of loans that are too large, high downpayments in
absolute terms and small loan-to-house value ratios, very long
maturities while low-income households operate short-time
horizons, requirements for fixed and regular amortization
payments, inconvenient office locations, high housing finance
cost burdens, complex loan terms and conditions which are
difficult to adhere to and understand (United Nations, 1978).
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finance, it could bring housing standards within the reach of
low-income households has proven costly not only for project
participants, but for lending and implementing institutions as
well.
Mortgage Finance - The Only Game In Town:
The Other Players
Building Societies
Building societies are reluctant to offer long-term credit
to low-income households, but have little choice given the
decline in their traditional upper-income market and deposit
base. Private sector financing for this primary market has been
relatively stagnant in the past six years. Lack of new housing
construction for middle- and upper-income families has confined
the societies to financing purchases of homes from the existing
housing stock. This is primarily due to the emigration of
middle- and upper-income groups since independence, which has
increased the supply of this category of existing housing stock.
Moreover, unattractive deposit rates vis-a-vis those offered by
the government-sponsored Post Office Savings Bank have prevented
the building societies from capturing additional domestic savings
which would permit them to increase the flow of private capital.
Besides unattractive deposit rates, other factors, primarily
regulatory in nature, have adversely impacted upon the building
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societies in recent years, draining their resources and
increasing their operating costs.
On the whole, the societies have been able to cope and they
have continued to operate in the black. However, without
significant changes in the regulatory and control areas, the
building societies faces a progressive decline in their
resources. Towards this end, they have indicated a willingness to
serve lower-income families as a guid pro guo for a more
favorable interest rate structure that would allow them to
compete with other financial institutions and to earn a fair
return on their investments. Low-income housing projects have
provided the building societies with the opportunity to offer
direct loans to low-income families for housing construction as a
means of obtaining the needed concessions from the government.
However, with no prior experience in low-income mortgage
financing, building societies do not have the administrative
capacity to process a multitude of small loans. One regional
officer of a building society complained that... "It's been quite
a nightmare. Imagine this man trying to fill in a basic
application form. He doesn't even know even how old he is or his
last name..."
In the past, building societies provided block loans for
housing to the government. In recent projects where they have had
to work side-by-side with the local authorities, they have
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encountered conflicts in such areas as eligibility and
coordination. To illustrate, in the UNCHS-sponsored projects,
participants paid the local authority for the user/plot fees, and
the building society for the mortgage charges. This implied that
the allottee had to undergo two separate application process, and
project eligibility for the project did not automatically qualify
one for a building society loan. The problem in defining a
mutually acceptable eligibility criteria is demonstrated in the
following interview excerpt:
The Municipal official's Story
This whole eligibility requirement is proving
to be a headache. It's not a clear cut issue
that could be settled by looking at income
alone. For instance, do you disqualify a man
from a 30-year mortgage loan because he is
too old.. .We had two cases, a sixty year old
woman whose seven sons built her a 7-room
house, and another seventy year old man who
is unable to complete his house without a
loan... do you make an exception in his
case...?"
Clearly, local authorities and building societies differ in
their motives for participating in a low-income housing project.
The latter is primarily concerned with ensuring a positive return
on its investment, whereas the municipalities
are more sensitive to the socio-economic constraints faced by
low-income residents.
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To reduce the risk associated with the low-income mortgage
loans, the building societies have required a guarantee program
from the government. In turn, the local government has been
reluctant to provide such guarantees to very low-income or self-
employed applicants due to its own fiscal vulnerability.
The reluctance of the building societies to provide long-
term mortgage financing directly to low-income households, in
spite of government guarantees, is indicated by the fact that
only one out of three societies participated in the UNCHS and
World Bank housing schemes. In spite of different institutional
arrangements introduced to streamline loan and project
administration, the building society in the UNCHS projects
encountered similar problems in the World Bank schemes.
Despite these difficulties, building societies have little
choice in the matter, as illustrated in the following case study.
The Building Society Official's Story
"...The project has been a traumatic
experience for us as well. Imagine yourself
as a loan manager, used to lending out to
higher and middle-income groups, suddenly
faced with 20,000 households with incomes of
less than Z$1,200 a year.. .and you have to
invest your dollars on them... but in spite of
this, we would like the project to succeed.
It's literally a question of survival with
the government controlling interest rates on
our deposits...If we had a choice, we'd much
rather lend to the middle-income group and
employers...we're not set up institutionally
to handle the flood of low-income applicants.
It's been too much, too soon..."
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Local Authorities
For their part, local authorities have been reluctant to
guarantee mortgages because the size of their financial risk
increases with the length of the repayment period. While a
housing guarantee program already exists, it has traditionally
catered to middle-income civil servants. The extension of this
program to low-income households, particularly the self-employed,
poses a problem for local authorities given their own weak
financial position. In effect, the guarantee mechanism shifts the
financial risk away from building societies to local governments.
Given the reluctance of municipalities to accept such risk, the
neediest members of society are further excluded from the housing
process.
The Ministry official's Story
The guarantee requirement for building
society mortgages is an administrative
nightmare for the housing ministry as well as
for municipalities. Personally, I think it's
only a magic piece of paper but it helps
building society believe that they will not
entirely lose their investment. Self-employed
and unemployed allottees have to apply to the
local authority for this magic paper... With
their falling revenues, do you think the
authorities will be happy to give out those
guarantees...? The local authorities would
prefer to sell serviced stands to employers
or building societies wholesale rather than
guarantee individual mortgage loans..."
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Given these conditions, it is therefore not surprising that
some local officials prefer the Glenview Model where the
government offered families short-term, renewable loans. Such
loans would limit the financial exposure of local authorities as
well as low-income borrowers.
In addition, building societies have been unable to process
loan applications at the same rate with which the municipality
has been servicing the plots -- a problem that was evident in the
World Bank scheme in Harare. In theory, the project provides that
no more than one fourth of the total stand in the project will be
offered by any of the participating municipality in any one month
to ensure controlled building situation over the 4-year period
of the scheme.56 The reality is quite different. Delays in
mortgage approval have resulted in a loss of revenue for
municipalities who are unable to recover their plot development
costs. This has slowed down their ability to service new stands.
The Project Administrator's Story
.The Bulawayo project started in 1985 and
has to be completed within four years. With
a target of 4,500 stands, the council needs
to develop an average of 1,200 plots a year.
This means that at least 100 houses must be
built per month to meet this target. So far
(a year later), only 52 houses have been
constructed...
56 Theoretically, this rate of allocation can be adjusted to
take account of the participation of other building societies
aside from the Beverley Building Society.
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... Our Municipality has spent Z$3 to Z$4
million in servicing and developing the
stands. Theoretically, this cost is to be
repaid through two types of charges:
supplementary charges and repayment of
capital costs. However, these charges are
paid only after the house has been occupied.
Since only 52 houses have been built and
occupied, we are being repaid only for these
52 houses...
... It is unfortunate that the Bank does not
allow us to sell any of the serviced stands
to private companies or developers. The use
of these tied funds is very difficult. It
does not only have to be repaid in US$ at 15%
interest, international lenders also tell us
how the monies are to be allocated within the
projects. With all these delays, the loan
would have been decapitalized by the time we
have to repay it..."
In spite of their reluctance, local authorities have no
choice but to participate in the government's housing program due
to their shortage of independent funding sources. To meet the
increasing shortfall in housing supply, the government has made a
new source of housing finance available to local authorities,
albeit indirectly, through direct building society loans to
project participants. In general, the government, through the
National Housing Fund, provides local authorities with funds to
finance and develop stands. The authorities are reimbursed for
the cost of developing the stands by the building societies from
long-term mortgage loans made to individual allottees-- enabling
the local authorities to roll over the funds to develop more
stands. The success of this arrangements is predicated on the
building societies' having sufficient funds and the capacity to
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administer the multitude of small loans. Recent experience has
shown neither of the two to be true.
Not only did the building society stagger under the
administrative burden of processing a multitude of loans, it also
fell short of resources to back up the mortgages it had approved,
inhibiting plot development on the part of local authorities, and
house construction on the part of the borrower. As a municipal
official from the City of Harare stated, "The building society
entered into an Agreement with the World Bank in principle
without having worked out the mechanisms by which loans would be
made available to project beneficiaries." In the World Bank
project in Nketa, Bulawayo, project records indicated that of the
1,083 stands allocated in August 1986, 792 applications have been
referred to the building society. Of these applications, 154
bonds have been registered. Interestingly, 164 families have
started construction on the site. This implies that 10
households had commenced construction without waiting for their
bonds to be registered. Of the applications referred to the
building society, 25% came from the middle-income bracket with
families earning between Z$351-Z$400 per month.
209
Strategies to Avoid Financial Risks
Towards a Higher-Income Clientele
Given the mismatch between the financial services that
institutions can provide on the one hand, and the equity base and
borrowing capacity of low-income households, it is not surprising
the agencies have gradually shifted their clientele towards those
with higher incomes. This is true for both local authorities as
well as building societies. For instance in the World Bank
project, the most problematic feature of the project design for
local authorities was the requirement that 70% of the plots be
allocated to households with incomes less than Z$200, and 30% to
those with incomes between Z$201-400. So while the donor agency
insisted on the 70/30 split, the municipality shifted the quota
to 50/50 in favor of higher income households. They claim not to
have done so would have resulted in an irreparable financial
disaster.
The Local Project Administrator's Story
"The project is a financial disaster because
building society loans at a 12.5% annual
interest are being offered to low-income
households who can typically only afford to
be renters.. In Bulawayo, we have a fifty-
fifty split... our approach to the income
quota is quite flexible. We allocate stands
to those with income as high as Z$450 because
we do not believe in penalizing an individual
for being promoted at a higher salary just
before being awarded the stand... The World
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Bank is strict about adhering to the income
quotas because of the Bank's policy...It's
been a very touchy point with us.. .However,
the Municipal Council believes that the Bank
will have no choice but to adjust its quota
requirements in the last phase 57..."
The Project Coordinator in Bulawayo further complained that
the delay in bond registration has resulted to the
decapitalization of funds. The Harare component was encountering
similar problems at the time of the interview as the rate of bond
registration fell short of the pace with which the sites were
being serviced. Finally in Mutare and Masvingo, the projects were
having difficulty attracting applicants, in spite of the housing
shortage because of the large downpayment and construction costs.
Municipalities are more inclined to collaborate with
building societies in mortgage programs for middle-income
households. The local authority often acts the role of a
developer and/or contractor. While this is a role better
performed by the private sector, the willingness of local
authorities to undertake this role can be understood given their
obligation to maintain a fixed number of building brigade
laborers regardless of fluctuating demand for brigade-built
housing. The concept of a building brigade was born from the
government's vision of itself as being a major supplier of
57 The World Bank project in Bulawayo has four stages. The
first stage consists of 1,089 stands, the second with 1,500
stands, the third with 2,000 stands, and the fourth with 3,000 to
5,000 plots.
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housing rather than as a facilitator of individual building
initiatives, despite its rhetoric in favor of "aided self-help".
This is unrealistic given the mix of construction method of which
the brigade system has proven to be the most expensive. The local
authority's developed/contractor role is best illustrated in the
Commonwealth Development Corporation's housing project.
To avoid the problems experienced in the preceding projects,
the Commonwealth Development Corporation with the Central African
Building Society initiated a housing finance program that catered
primarily to middle-income households without totally excluding
low-income households. 58 As a developer/contractor, the
municipality services the stands and/or builds houses in response
to building society contracts. In this way, municipalities are
assured of a ready market, enabling them to fully utilize their
existing brigade. It must be noted that brigade members are
regular municipal employees who are paid a regular salary whether
there is a demand for their labor or not.
It has been argued by the designers of this project that
this institutional arrangement avoids the "timing" problems
encountered in the World Bank projects where the speed of lot
development by the municipality out paced the rate of bond
registration by the building society. In the case of Kwekwe,
58 Under the scheme, low-income households can apply for
serviced stands.
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where municipal-funded construction loans preceded mortgage loan
application which led participants to delay their mortgage
applications. In reality, it is not the institutional mechanism
that reduces the "timing" problem as much as it is the shift from
a more to a less risky clientele. In the case of the Commonwealth
Development Corporation project, by catering to a predominantly
middle-income clientele, the building society was able to provide
the municipality a ready and secure market for serviced stands or
brigade-built dwelling units.
This trend has been carried over to the second phase of the
Kuwadzana housing scheme where an agglomeration of serviced
stands are being sold to employers for company housing provided
their employees satisfy municipal eligibility
requirements. In this way, the municipality is assured of
recovering its capital investment upfront.
The Project Administrator's Story
"...So far, four companies have signed an
agreement with the municipality to buy plots
provided that their employees meet our income
requirement. We service the stands which are
then sold to the companies. The employee
holds the title to the land and repays the
employer, often through direct salary
deductions. We have no qualms with this
method of allocation. Since we are
reimbursed upfront by employers for the
serviced stands, we are able to recycle the
monies faster to service other stands.
Moreover, some employers even go as far as
constructing the houses for their employees.
They have hired a private contractor who
builds several houses at once at a lesser
213
cost to the employee. We like to see this
fast pace of construction. Politically, it
shows that the project is advancing well...
... In fact, employers perform much the same
role as the building societies in the newer
projects... except that in the former, the
mechanism for administering and collecting
the loan is already set up.. .As long as the
companies understand the objectives and
requirements of the project, I see no problem
in selling serviced stands to them...
Formalization of the Lending & Building
Process
The series of projects launched after independence under the
auspices of international assistance agencies can be
characterized by the increasing formalization of the mortgage
lending and building processes. This trend results in large part
from the requirements of the building societies which are, in
turn, tied to the nature of the mortgage finance instrument and
the societies' need to secure their investments. To illustrate,
in the World Bank and USAID projects, a participant employing the
self-help approach will have to complete a priced material
schedule; if an informal builder is used, a form of contract must
be drawn up. If a building brigade or formal contractor is
selected, the allottee has to obtain a written quotation for the
complete job which will include a priced materials schedule. For
the low-income household, the formality required to undertake an
otherwise highly informal process is staggering. For instance,
the mortgage application requires a salary reference, and a
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materials and labor schedule, in spite of the widespread practice
of hiring informal builders and purchasing a mix of second-hand
and new materials. It must be remembered that predicting future
cash flow expenditure allocation, as required in the material and
labor schedule, is difficult for the self-employed and the very
poor who, as demonstrated in the case histories from St. Mary's,
build incrementally using a wide mix of recycled, new and old
materials as well as a combination of labor inputs depending on
the phase of construction. Moreover, informal builders as general
labor contractors (i.e. with one or two 'daga' boys) operate, by
definition, rather informally and binding them to a labor
schedule may not be realistic given the structure of the informal
building market.
For the beneficiaries the result of these trends can only be
detrimental. As the lines form outside city hall, a municipal
official bemoans, "Many of them have already told their landlords
that they were leaving, and have consequently been threatened
with eviction.. .this delay will jeopardize their housing
situation..." The effects of this delay on participants are both
tangible and intangible. For instance, there is the real cost
created by increasing costs of building materials. In addition,
beneficiaries suffer from anxiety and insecurity about their
future as illustrated in the narrative below:
The Beneficiary's Story
"...When we informed our landlord that we
have been allocated a stand at the project,
he got jealous and threatened to evict us.
It was therefore imperative for us to start
building as soon as possible but the loan
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held us up. I applied for the building
society loan six months ago, and I have been
told that it has not yet been approved. This
leaves me with little choice but to start
building without building society approval...
... I have been informed by the municipality
that another building society has joined the
project because Beverley did not have enough
funds to back up our loans. But in the last
public meeting with the municipality, we were
told that we had to re-apply for a new loan
all over again from CABS , even if we had
already sent in our papers to Beverley... If
CABS will have to re-evaluate our loans, it
will take another six months before we can
start building... many of us who have told our
landlords we were leaving do not have this
time..."
The Local Project Coordinator's Story
"..The problem is how to sustain the
enthusiasm of the beneficiaries throughout
the process. It's a downright obstacle
course for them... the procedure for acquiring
a stand is too tedious, involving ten
separate actors, representing ten different
points where a bottleneck is likely to occur.
The application must go through the building
society solicitors, the council solicitors,
the office of the town clerk to authorize the
sale of the stand, the general surveyor's
office in Harare, the registrar of deeds, the
Ministry of Housing or the local municipality
for the guarantee, etc, etc.. .Moreover,
applications from the four major project
sites must go through four common agencies:
the building society solicitors, the surveyor
general, the registrar and the Ministry of
Housing. These four offices must be geared
to handle this volume of application,
including those from other on-going
projects... Is it worth it? How long will it
take to streamline the process?.. .Consider
until two years ago, we were short of
surveyors in the country... our engineers,
59 Central African Building Society
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surveyors and architects are still in the
university undergoing training..."
Summary
This chapter demonstrated that, like project allottees,
building societies as well as local implementing agencies are
equally hesitant to participate in the housing delivery process
currently in place in Zimbabwe. The implementation and
institutional coordination problems have resulted from the
project orientation of the government, particularly its strong
emphasis on standards and finance. These problem, in turn, render
it more difficult for low-income families to participate in
projects because of costly and unnecessary delays, risk-reducing
guarantee requirements, and increasing formalization of the
construction and financing process.
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CHAPTER VIX
CONCLUSION AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
The study of mortgage finance programs in Zimbabwe has shown
that the government's strong programmatic emphasis on the
importance of mortgage finance is artificially created by the
enforcement of building standards and the pace of construction.
This focus on mortgage finance raises the costs of project
participation for borrowers, and creates secondary problems in
implementation and institutional coordination. Most importantly,
it shifts the focus of housing policy design away from the real
issue of facilitating access to land, and the need for a variety
of affordable housing solutions for low-income families.
The thesis concluded that it is unlikely that the Government
of Zimbabwe can maintain its present system of housing delivery
given its economic and fiscal constraints. The Ministry of Public
Construction and National Housing has indicated that it would
like to provide standard housing to all its urban residents
within a period of 15 years and to all its rural population
within 30 years (Manson and Katsura, 1985). As the program is
currently planned, for the next fifteen years, more than 9% of
the gross domestic product would have to be directed towards
housing investment. In the subsequent five years, when the
program for the metropolitan and other urban areas is planned to
have reached completion, investments as a share of gross domestic
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product will decline by just two-thirds of one percent. This
level of investment exceeds by two to three times the share of
the share of gross domestic product that economies in developing
countries are generally able to direct to housing. To go beyond
that level requires foregoing other consumption and investment
needed to sustain economic growth.
Thus, providing every family with mortgage financing in the
construction of a 4-room core dwelling within the next few
decades would require massive resources which are not available.
As the population grows over time, larger investments will be
needed. Moreover, continued migration is likely to decrease
average urban household incomes and increase the need for urban
housing. Falling incomes will create a situation of
deteriorating affordability and a requirement for greater
subsidies.
The problem lies in the fact that the cost of a 4-room core
units exceeds that which is affordable by a majority of
Zimbabwe's family households. Insistence by lender agencies on
full cost recovery exacerbates the problem for low-income
families. At least half of the households in urban areas and
virtually all of the rural area households cannot afford
dwellings of this type without varying levels of subsidy. Given
expected levels of future income-- even assuming that households
devote an unrealistic 27.5% of their earnings to housing expense
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--Z$200 million would be required in 1989 (Manson and Katsura,
1985). Given this context, it is unlikely that the government can
maintain its present system of housing delivery.
The situation of Zimbabwe in this regard is not unique. It
is not rare for newly independent countries, responding to post-
independence expectations, to set high standards in housing and
to institute a housing delivery system where government plays a
dominant role as supplier of housing. However, it is equally
common for countries to fall short of these goals, particularly
in the light of competing development objectives. The thesis
argued that in the case of Zimbabwe, the current magnitude of
investment need for housing could be dramatically reduced if the
government shifted the focus of its policy from financing and
standards to facilitating access to land for low-income housing.
Zimbabwe is unique in that the supply of land does not yet pose a
constraint to housing expansion. The fact that this surplus
situation could exists side by side with a shortage in housing
solutions suggests the need for an institutional, rather than a
financial, intervention in the housing market. As post-
independence expectations for better living standards accelerate,
the demand for housing opportunities is likely to become
transformed into political agitation which may force the
government to eventually confront the fundamental issue of land
allocation for low-income housing.
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For the reasons mentioned above, it has been argued that the
Zimbabwean government's dominant control of land access for low-
income housing may be a short-lived solution to its housing need.
In this regard, the study provides a cursory review of the types
of interventions that the government can undertake with regards
to the allocation of land for low-income housing. One distinct
form of intervention is a socialistic approach to landownership
whereby land is owned and controlled by the public sector. This
implies a continuation of the status quo, which as pointed out,
would be financially and politically costly for both the
population and the government. In contrast, under a capitalist
system, landownership is entirely private with land being
allocated through market forces. Under this scenario, the
Government of Zimbabwe could conceivably turn is ownership and
control of land over to private market forces, as well as relax
its standards and other housing programmatic constraints. Its
task would be to ensure that the increase in land values will not
force out low-income families from having access to strategically
located plots since the market will tend to allocate land to the
highest bidder.
As a result of this concern, the government may decide on a
range of intermediate interventions with varying degrees of
public and private control of land ownership. The fundamental
principle underlying these interventions should be to enable
households to select the land tenure arrangement and housing
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solution most appropriate to their circumstances. For instance,
it is not uncommon to find households who own the dwelling unit
but rent the land, or who own both the structure and land but
sublet part of the structure, or who neither own the land nor
structure but merely rent out a room, or who own and occupy the
structure and land, etc. The possibilities of housing and land
tenure arrangements are as broad as the housing needs are of
families at different phases of their life cycle and their
varying economic circumstances.
In addition to the variety of tenure arrangements, the
government could offer technical and financial support to low-
income families. It could provide a public or private
construction loans program to assist families in their home
improvement efforts through the appropriate legislative
environment that would encourage financial institutions to
provide this range of financial services. The government could,
as it does now, maintain a division within the Ministry of Public
Housing and National Construction in charge of ensuring that
building materials are available to low-income households at bulk
prices. Currently the focus of government research is on cheaper
building technologies. While noteworthy, this approach continues
to treat housing as a technical problem, rather than an
institutional issue. In addition to its current research, the
government could explore feasible forms of public-private land
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arrangements with the end in view of increasing access to land
while reducing the cost of housing.
Within this framework, the fundamental role of government is
that of facilitator, in support of private initiative in the
building process, rather than supplier of housing. This implies
the need for the government to change its housing goals, and to
view housing as a process, rather than a product, in which access
to land is an integral component. In its role as facilitator, the
government shifts most of the responsibility of supplying housing
into the hands of the private sector, and in particular,
individual families. Evidence from St. Mary's and other informal
settlements in the developing world have shown that low-income
families are able to consolidate their homes in the absence of
formal housing finance programs. By facilitating access to land,
the government will enable families to build, extends, and
improve their homes as, and when they choose -- when it is needed
and when it can be afforded.
This approach is supported by (Turner 1967) who argues that
the appropriate focus of public policy should be in providing
low-income families with access to the various resources they
need in creating housing, such as land, materials and labor.
In Zimbabwe the most important resource in the housing process is
land. Although the government has so far been able to control
squatter proliferation, its housing situation is not different
223
from that of other developing countries confronted with a
burgeoning housing need. In the last two decades, the predominant
vehicle for government intervention in the housing process has
been through projects, with an emphasis on expanding the volume
of housing finance for low-income households. However, the
limited success of this approach in alleviating the housing
shortfall in developing countries to date would suggest that
perhaps it makes more sense to shift the focus away from the
project context to the broader question of land management and
allocation. The importance of land to the housing process is
emphasized in such works by Doebele (1987), Angel (1983), and
Dunkerley (1983), to mention just a few. This approach focuses on
the institutional and political arrangements necessary to give
the poor access to affordable housing through the provision of
access to urban residential land. In the case of Zimbabwe,
unless the government re-examines its current land policy,
historical forces may give the government little choice in terms
of its role in the housing delivery process. What started off as
its palliative to satisfy post-independence expectations could
ultimately contribute to its downfall.
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APPENDIX A
Informal Financial Sources
This appendix provides a brief literature review of some of
the recent studies on informal housing finance in developing
countries. It is by no means exhaustive since the bulk of
information gathered on the subject are often best found in
unpublished field studies.
Savings
Because of low incomes, savings are often not adequate to
finance the entire construction. Thus, most households use more
than one method to finance their housing investment. Income from
different economic activities provide a source of savings over a
period of time. In Naksook's study (1987) study of relocation
sites in Bangkok, respondents reported keeping savings at home or
in financial institutions. In many cases the amount kept in saving
at home was as much as that saved with the bank. The research
indicated that most dwellers used all the savings as ready cash for
the payment of deposit on land and for the installation of
utilities-- items which needed to be paid for before the house was
built, including construction materials. Gold items were also
often purchased and kept as a form of saving and insurance against
emergencies. About one out of every six respondents in the study
used this method as a means to finance housing or to live on during
construction.
Money-lenders
A last recourse for loans for the lowest-income groups in
developing countries has been money-lenders who are known to charge
a high interest rate. In the Philippines, usurers in urban market
places are known to command interest rates of several hundred
percent per month on their loans. Usurious conditions have
persisted in other market places such a Bombay where women hawkers
are known to pay a daily interest of 10% on small loans of around
fifty rupees are repaid by the same evening.
Naksook (1987) notes that money-lenders in Bangkok, living
within the relocation sites, are a convenient source of credit
because they are able to approve the loans within a short period
of time. Lenders are well known in the community, especially among
former borrowers. An interest rate between 2% to 20% is charged
on a monthly basis. One money-lender cited the high risk involved
in unsecured loans as the reason for charging high interest rates.
At higher interest rates, the amount of the loan is lower. Thus
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while the dweller is able to pay the interest monthly, he/she is
unable to reduce the actual capital borrowed. For the new borrower,
an informal lender requires a "go between" or a middle man to
provide a form of guarantee. The latter matches lenders with
borrowers within the community, and benefits from a lower interest
rate when he/she needs a loan.
Daily Repayment Loan
A popular kind of informal loan found in most project sites
and needed by many dwellers to meet emergencies is a type which
requires repayment daily. In Thailand, loans in this category had
a maturity of 24 to 30 days with a 20% interest. A dweller can
obtain another loan when the previous loan has been repaid. When
the borrower is unable to repay it, the money lender often
reschedules the loan for another 24 days in the form of a new loan
at a smaller sum with a 20% interest rate, thereby demonstrating
the flexibility of some money-lenders.
Loans from money-lenders was used mainly for construction
materials and labor. Loans at higher interest are often used to
meet urgent needs or as a access to formal loans from cooperatives.
Dwellers in the Bangkok study were generally
anxious to repay the loans especially those with higher interest
rates and those from lenders who lived on-site.
Pawning
Pawning is another important source of finance. of the 163
dwellers in the Bangkok study, 20% used pawning as a means of
accumulating money for housing. The items pawned are most often
gold jewelry and television sets, but also include refrigerators,
radio sets, sewing machines, carpentry equipment and guitars. In
the case of gold, the money obtained is almost equal to the value
of the items. But for other items, the money is less than the
purchase price. Money from pawning was used for buying urgently
needed construction materials and labor. Although interest rates
on the unpaid portion may be quite high, such credit arrangements
help low-income groups obtain items without having to pay their
sale price in one lump sum.
Share Games
An interesting source of financing encountered in the Bangkok
study are share games through which one obtained money equal to an
amount which could be saved on a regular basis over a period of
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time. In order to get the sum sooner for some urgent reason, a
person has to compete for the interest rate in the game with other
players. In a share game, a person requiring a large sum of money
invites a group of friends or trusted persons to play. Each player
agrees to pay an equal sum of money to the "pot". This capital is
paid regularly, e.g. weekly for ten weeks. Each time the player who
offers the highest interest at a particular time receives the total
amount of the pot. He or she then pays capital plus interest for
all subsequent rounds. The game ends when each player receives the
sum of money, i.e. the capital plus interest. The player who gets
the final amount will therefore receive capital plus each member's
interest. The second to the last receives capital plus interest
of all members minus one, and so on.
The initiator of the game has the right to take the sum of
money when the central pool is called in the first round. He/she
does not need to offer or to pay interest in the remaining rounds.
However, he/she is responsible for ensuring that all players in the
game contribute regularly to the pot. There are many variations to
the game from a daily to a monthly basis. The size of the capital
and the number of players could also vary.
About one-fifth of respondents used the share game method
either exclusively or in combination with other financing methods.
The game is played in the project site as well as at work.
Additionally, there are persons who establish share games on a
regular basis as a form of earning. Many dwellers played more than
one game at a time, or took more than one share in a particular
game in order to get more money to meet their needs. Money from
these games was used for land deposit, building materials and
labor. Occasionally, it was used to repay other loans. Repaying
the pot is difficult when interest rates are set high.
Assistance from Relatives and Friends
A 1978 U.N. survey of "non-conventional" or informal financing
mechanisms in developing countries highlighted the importance of
the extended family not only as a source of labor but also of funds
to supplement the meager savings of owner/builders. Of the fifty
low-income residents interviewed in Manila, most respondents said
that a relative had loaned or even given money to buy materials for
a particularly expensive and critical component of the dwelling,
such as the roof or the cement for weather-proofing the walls.
In some countries such as Somalia, remittances from relatives
working in the Middle East serve as a significant source of housing
finance. Money is used for all housing purposes as well as to meet
living expenses during construction when income is used to finance
construction costs. This is the only method of financing that is
without interest and overhead costs.
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Interest-free loans from friends is also common. As with other
types of finance, the money is used as deposit on land and
installation of utilities and for housing materials. Usually, the
schedule for repayment is mentioned but no conditions are set.
However, when borrowed money is required by the lender, every
effort is made to repay all or part of the loan. For instance,
a housewife in the Bangkok study who borrowed from her sister to
pay for land deposit and utility installation repaid her sister
(who required the money to build her own house) from a combination
of sources including participation in share games, loan at 5%
monthly interest, and sale of a gold necklace. In Nairobi, a
dweller was lent money by friends for the extension of the house
on condition that rent from one of the rooms would go towards
payment of the loan.
Small shopkeepers, workmates and teachers or missionaries may
also serve as sources of small, short-term loans or as holders of
accrued income. The sari-saris of the Philippines-- small-scale
stores that sell food and household items in very small amounts --
reportedly may extend or turn down requests for credit. While not
necessarily providing direct loans for housing, they permit the
borrower to pay cash for small quantities of building materials by
extending credit for other necessities. Teachers and missionaries
in poor communities are also often entrusted with savings and are
even asked for loans. In the case of the Sabarmati River slums of
Ahmedabad in India, of the 22% of the surveyed households who were
in debt, 39% were in debt to a relative, 12% to a neighbor, 9% to
a personal friend, and 7% to an employer. Less than 2% of those
interviewed had even applied to a bank for a loan (UN, 1978).
Low-income households usually seek personal loans in times of
personal crisis such as illness, or when a large amount of money
is needed for a major, non-recurring event such as a marriage.
Loans are less frequently sought for the purpose of improving one's
housing which is seen as a postponable event and therefore
difficult to justify as easily to relatives and friends in terms
of obtaining an urgent personal loan. For instance, in Kampong
Maxwell, a squatter settlement of Kuala Lumpur, 71% of all dwelling
purchases, construction and improvements have been financed through
the savings accumulated by the occupants. Of the remaining 29% of
financing for housing, 4.8% were loans from friends/relatives,
14.3% from government loans, 2.4% from cooperative financing and
7.1% from employer loans.
From the perspective of the borrowers, there are disadvantages
as well as advantages to relying upon these sources of financing.
In the case of the extended family, funds for building materials
are often accompanied by voluntary labor contributions. However,
the disadvantages may be considerable too. Inevitably, a loan from
a family member entails an obligation of some sort for the borrower
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even when the loan has been paid off. This is captured in the
Filipino word "utang na loob" which is essentially a debt that can
never be repaid materially. For instance, one problem from relying
upon personal contacts is that the common practice of having to
share one's dwelling with extended family members may be reinforced
when they have had a share in the building process.
Rotating Savings and Credit Associations
Christian (1972) observed the universal existence of informal
savings and credit groups in the developing world. These groups
are known under a variety of names: tontine in West Africa, esusu
in Nigeria, harambee or obilima in Kenya, ekub in Ethiopia, sanduk
in the Sudan, gamiya in Egypt, char in Thailand, kye in Korea, ooi
in Hongkong and sociedad mutuales in Latin America. These are
informal and voluntary associations where members contribute a
predetermined amount of money to a pool of funds on a weekly or
monthly basis. Each member has a right to use the funds under some
estabished procedure. Rotation among members is often established
by drawing lots. These societies are based on mutual trust among
members who belong to the same social group or a community where
they are well known. Some societies, such as the tontines of
Cameroon, emerged from the traditional practice of pooling labor
to work on each other's farm. With the coming of the money
economy, the system assumed a financial nature, and has become so
specialized that it directly competes with the banking system.
Rental Income
A 1986 USAID study of informal housing finance in two
low-income areas in Kenya, Githurai in Nairobi and Kisauni in
Mombasa, revealed that one reason for the very large and expanding
informal housing sector - in spite of the shortage of formal credit
- is the economic viability of investing in rental housing. The
letting of rooms plays a decisive role in generating income which,
in turn, increases the household's access to finance. At some
point, a household is able to generate enough rental income to meet
expenses associated with the construction of the rental unit. The
speed with which this break-even point is reached is affected by
the rate of rent increases as well as the costs associated with
financing the construction of the rental unit.
Cash flow problems in the early years of the investment
prevent an even faster rate of investment. In the face of the
early years' shortfall, owners turn primarily to friends and
relatives for small, short-term and often, interest-free loans.
Since friends and relatives themselves have limited resources,
owners often borrow loans from other sources. Jorgenson's study
(1976) of housing finance in Kenya showed that among residents of
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a squatter settlement (Mathare Valley) , a sites-and-service scheme
(Kariobangi), and a public terraced housing scheme, rental income
accounted for as high as 100% of regular income. However, the
ability of low-income households to re-invest rental income in
further development are limited by the availability of land and
financing.
Trade Credit
Another common form of financing in some parts of the Third
World is the extension of credit by small contractors and suppliers
of building materials. Christian (1984:72)states that, "In many
cases, this kind of credit is not considered a loan, since the
equivalent of an interest is incorporated into a tiered pricing
system. In short, the longer the client wishes to take to pay for
the work or for the materials, the higher is the price. Rough
calculations of the implicit interest embodied in these
arrangements is almost invariably higher than rates prevailing in
the formal sector". He also observed that small contractors and
building material suppliers are usually financed by formal sector
financial institutions.
Quasi-Formal Sources of Finance
A study of the informal financial system in Kenya (USAID,
1986) indicated that credit unions play a very active role in
lending to the informal sector. They provide short-term loans,
two to four times the savings balance. Loans often carry a 12%
annual interest rate over a 3-year period. As a rule, loan
repayment does not exceed two-thirds of a member's take home pay.
According to the officers interviewed, housing is rarely
stated as a reason for the loan. It is more common to see
"building materials", "land", "deposit", or "to pay fundis" as the
reason on the application. Thus, it is difficult to establish
exactly how much is lent for housing. In Dandora, however, credit
unions provided 6% of total resources that
went to housing, and this estimate may be comparable to the
situation in Githurai and Kisauni.
A monthly interest rate of five percent is paid on savings,
and share certificates are credited with a bonus once a year of
six to ten percent. The maximum 3-year repayment period is
strictly adhered to, except in cases of extreme hardship on the
part of the borrower. Because of the close bond among members,
the loan committee has a good knowledge of the credit-worthiness
of the applicant. Normally, they require guarantees from three
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other members, and in employment-based unions, a close link is
established with the employer to ensure repayment of the loan.
The union may exercise control to ensure that the loan is used
for the stated purpose,but rarely is this prerogative actually
exercised. It is not often that the union verifies how the money
was used or whether the investment was viable or not.
one finance company provided medium-term loans to low-income
groups in Mathare, Dandora, Kariobangi, Dagoretti and Githurai.
These loans had an interest rate of 19% a year, and a maximum
maturity of 7 years. In its 2-year operation in Githurai, the
company provided sixty to eighty, with no defaulters. Deposits
with the company yielded a maximum of 16% annual interest. Its
excellent cost recovery record demonstrates the potential of using
flexible and innovative methods of lending to the informal sector.
For instance, with regard to security, the plot owner's certificate
in Githurai was used as a security and a notice sent to the
land-owning company to this effect. In Dandora, the company
offered to redeem the borrower's outstanding balance with the
Nairobi City Council in return for having the leasehold title for
use as security. In cases where there are no such documents
available, the company draws up an agreement of sale of the
property with the borrower with the clear provision that the sale,
equal to the loan amount, will be effective only in the event of
a default.
Loans are not used exclusively for housing but include all
types of small investments such as tractors, matatus (small buses),
small businesses and land. The company was essentially a
grassroots organization, making it very accessible to the
borrowers. The loans application period was short compared to
other institutions, i.e. one week for a housing loan. But the
single most important difference it had from other finance agencies
was its stress on the viability of the investment as the criteria
for eligibility, rather than current income. To ensure a
commitment on the part of the borrower, he/she was required to put
up one-third of the resources him/herself. The study makes the case
that if owners can be offered a loan repayment schedule that fits
their income profile over time, they can easily prove to be credit
worthy clients. Thus viewed, financing is not an interest rate
problem but one of cash flow.
Unfortunately after two years of operation, the company was
forced to close down alongside other government-controlled finance
companies which had to call in their deposits abruptly following
a government decree. This requirement over committed funds,
forcing these affected companies into a liquidity crisis. However,
officials from this company believe that had they been given a few
more year to call in the loans, without issuing new ones, their
agency would have survived.
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Secondary Financing Mechanisms
In addition to the above primary sources of financing,
households also tap several supplementary sources of financing:
sale of assets such as rural land and cattle; gambling and lottery.
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APPENDIX B
Project Description
To obtain the case histories, families were interviewed
from three site-and-service projects in Zimbabwe: the Kuwadzana
site-and-service schemes in Harare sponsored by the United States
Agency for International Development (USAID), Nketa low-income
pilot project in Kwekwe sponsored by USAID and the United Nations
Centre for Human Settlements, and Sunningdale housing scheme in
Harare, one of four projects financed by the World Bank. The
basis for the selection of these projects as well as the
methodology for the case study approach are described in Appendix
C.
Kuwadzana Sites-and-Service Scheme
Jointly sponsored by the Government of Zimbabwe and USAID,
the Kuwadzana housing project in Harare was designed to supply
housing to over 7,000 families in two phases. Phase 1,
approximately 3,700 serviced stands ranging in size from 200
square meters to 400 square meters will be allocated to low-
income families. Standowners are expected to begin building
within six months of allocation and to complete a 4-room core
within 18 months.
In order to assist project participants in housing
construction, the government has offered loans of up to Z$3,230
paid in installments of Z$500. Repayments are made under current
interest rates of 9.75% over a 25-year maturity period. Loans are
available in the form of building materials from the municipal
store at the project site, or at the option of the borrower, in
the form of cash. In the latter event, the participants may use
the loan to pay for labor or materials. The City of Harare's
Department of Community Services is responsible for implementing
the project, with the Ministry of Public Construction and
National Housing assuming overall project oversight
responsibility.
Kwekwe Site-and-Service Scheme
Soon after independence in 1980, the Government of Zimbabwe
through the then Ministry of Local Government and Housing
requested the United Nations Development Program for technical
assistance from the United Nations Centre for Human Settlements
to undertake a comprehensive study of housing policy options to
guide the development of a national housing policy. The request
resulted in a project which produced a number of technical papers
and recommendations. As a follow up, the technical assistance
team prepared a report, " A Proposal for Two Experimental Low-
Income Housing Projects and Community Development Program". This
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report culminated with the Kwekwe and Gutu project. Funding for
the capital costs of the projects was provided by USAID through a
joint multilateral technical cooperation agreement with UNCHS and
the Government of Zimbabwe. A unique feature of the project is
the introduction of the graduated payment mortgage with funds
channeled through a building society at an interest rate of 12.5%
over a 25-year maturity period. Kwekwe, the site for the urban
component of the demonstration project, is a typical example of
an intermediate urban center with several mining-related
industries. Most of the low-income families are employed by
major industries or provide support services. The site layout
consists of 1,045 serviced plots of 300 square meters (12m x
25m). The land is under the Kwekwe Municipal Council which is
the local authority responsible for the project.
Sunningdale Site-and Service Scheme
The government is currently in the early stages of
implementing a large scale World Bank-financed program designed
to involve the private sector in the financing of low-income
shelter. Under this program, the World Bank loans $43 million to
the Government of Zimbabwe which will on-lend the bulk of the
funds to four local authorities (Harare, Bulawayo, Masvingo and
Mutare) for site development and costs associated with the
preparation of over 11,000 plots and related best community
facilities. Once the plot is fully serviced, a mortgage on the
property will be issued by the building society which will then
repay the local authority for the purchase of the serviced plot.
Financing for the construction of a basic minimal standard house
is also provided by the building societies. To date, two
building societies have decided to participate in the project.
Some 70% of the plots are allocated to low-income families with
incomes less than Z$200, and 30% to those with incomes between
Z$201-400.
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APPENDIX C
Research Design
The research design consisted of three parts: (a) selection
of survey areas, (b) evaluation of baseline data, and (c)
administration of comprehensive, in-depth interviews.
Selection of the Survey Areas
The areas for study were selected to obtain a representative
view of the different approaches to housing construction and
finance in Zimbabwe. The USAID and UNCHS projects, as well as the
World Bank scheme, represented different financial models, while
the St. Mary's Township illustrated the construction process in
the absence of formal finance and program requirements.
Baseline Data
The baseline data used in the selection of the case studies
were obtained from the evaluation surveys of the USAID project at
Kuwadzana and the UNCHS project at Kwekwe. The former consisted
of four parts: (a) an analysis of data on allottees obtained from
the project records, (b) a survey of project participants to
identify their attitude towards the program as well as their
ability to meet program requirements, (c) a survey of informal
builders, and (d) interview with project administrators.
Data on 376 randomly selected allottees from Phase I,
representing 10% of total Phase I residents, were extracted from
project filed between mid-February and mid-March of 1985. Of
these, 300 were selected for the evaluation survey. The selection
used a stratified random sampling technique based on household
income. Of the 300 selected to be interviewed, there were 235
completed interviews.
The evaluation of the UNCHS projects at Kwekwe and Gutu
consisted of a random sample of 300 allottees, 250 in Kwekwe and
50 in Gutu. This represented 25% of the total population of both
projects. Beneficiaries who had not started laying down the
foundation of their houses at the time of the interview were
excluded from the sample.
Case Study Method
Using the information obtained from the baseline studies, a
collection of case histories were compiled for each survey site.
These are in-depth, comprehensive studies of the history,
economic background and housing situation of
individual households. These case studies were intended to
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provide deeper insights into the housing process, considering in
full detail the socio-economic background of selected households,
and to provide information which is difficult to obtain by other
means, in particular, information regarding informal financing.
The principal criterion for selecting the households was not
proportional distribution but rather the inclusion of all of the
main variables identified in the thesis proposal. Using
information from the baseline studies, 'overview' tables were set
up representing various categories of households identified in
the following criteria for selection: (a) History of
accommodation (squatter, renter, owner, others); (b) Mode of
construction (self-help, informal builder, brigade, cooperative);
(c) Source of financing (borrower and non-borrower); (d) Pace of
construction; (e) Construction process (number of rooms started,
quality of construction); and (f) Presence of renters, vegetable
gardens, and/or home-based economic enterprise.
An interview guide was prepared as a basis for the case
studies. The studies consisted of three parts. The first part is
a summary of the basic personal information, present housing and
a brief family history; the second part describes the history of
accommodation of each household; finally, the last section is
subdivided to investigate (a) socio-economic conditions of the
family, (b) the construction process, (c) housing finance, (d)
preferences regarding housing solutions and credit terms, and (e)
household priorities and expectations.
In all 10 households were interviewed at St. Mary's
Township, 25 at Kuwadzana, and 14 in Kwekwe. These were later
supplemented by five case studies from the World Bank project at
Sunningdale which was, at the time of the original survey, only
in the early stage of stand allocation. In St. Mary's Township,
the selection process was less precise because of the lack of an
organized and updated baseline data. Selection, therefore, had to
be based on observable factors within the area, such as building
type and quality, size of rental unit, and presence of home-based
enterprises. Since the settlement was started before
independence, mode of construction is predominantly self-help,
and source of financing, informal.
The interviews were undertaken by a team consisting of two
trained third year sociology students recommended by the
Department of Sociology at the University of Zimbabwe, and five
staff members of the Research Unit of the Housing Department of
the City of Harare. The latter group is highly trained in the
household interviews. They carry out monitoring studies of all
low-income housing schemes in the city.
A meeting was conducted prior to the field interviews to
orient the interviewers with the objectives of the study and to
solicit their comments on the interview guide. The interview
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guide was tested in a pilot survey carried out in Kuwadzana and
St. Mary's Township. It was revised based on the results of these
surveys as well as comments from the Research Unit, professors at
the University of Zimbabwe, and officials of donor agencies. The
survey period for Kuwadzana was five days, and St. Mary's, three
days each, using six interviewers. The interview period for the
Kwekwe project was four days, using three interviewers. Lodgers
and owners of informal enterprises located on the project sites
were also interviewed.
In addition, interviews were also held with USAID, World
Bank and UNCHS officials in Washington, D.C., Naairobi, Harare
and Bulawayo, as well as representatives from the Ministry of
Public Construction and National Housing, the cities of Harare
and Bulawayo, and a building society.
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APPENDIX D
Standards: Urban & Rural Housing
Metropolitan and Other Urban Areas
Standard Core House
Cost (1984): Z$5,348
Stand size : 300 square meters
House area : 49.7 square meters
Construction characteristics: According to Housing Ministry
policy, houses in urban areas must be single-storey detached
units constructed of burnt brick, stabilized soil/cement block or
concrete block masonry. Floors are concrete. Roofing materials
may include metal, tile, or cement asbestos. Each house must
have at least a kitchen, bathroom, and three other rooms (e.g., a
living/dining room and two bedrooms). The bathroom must have a
flush toilet and shower with separate drains. The toilet and
shower can occupy the same space, but there must be room for a
future bathtub. In addition, the unit must be expandable to seven
rooms, and be designed so as to permit phased construction that
minimizes the destruction of finished work.
Infrastructure: Units feature individual water and sewer
connections; electrical connections are optional. Tower security
lighting is provided along with paved roads and stormwater
drainage.
Rural Areas
Standard Core House + Kitchen + Toilet and Washing Area
Cost (1984): Z$2,966
Stand Size : 0.25 hectares
Core House area: 31.5 square meters
Kitchen area: 5.75 square meters
Toilet and washing area: 5 square meters
Total unit area: 42.25 square meters
Construction Characteristics: Housing units in rural areas are
made up of three separate structures: a core house, a kitchen and
a toilet/washing facility. These structures are arranged so as to
form a right angle with the core house situated at the vertex.
The house is at least five meters away from the kitchen and ten
meters from the washing area. Walls are constructed of brunt
brick, and are coated with cement. Floors are made of cement with
a smooth finish. Roofs usually consist of corrugated asbestos
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sheets; thatch roofing is allowed in some instances. Kitchens may
be traditionally-styled (i.e. they may have circular walls), but
must be constructed of permanent materials. Toilet must utilize a
Blair ventilated pit latrine.
Infrastructure: Stands in the rural areas are not serviced under
Ministry policy. The latter anticipates the installation of
individual water and electrical connections in the future once
the rural infrastructure is more developed
Source: D. Manson and H. Katsura, "Meeting the Housing Needs of
Zimbabwe: An Assessment of the Alternatives," prepared for the
U.S. Agency for International Development, Office of Housing and
Urban Programs, 1985. Draft copy.
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